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PREFACE

I initially embarked upon this paper for personal
reasons.

The matrilineal branch of my family being the

Lundys, I sought to celebrate the role played by Catherine
Lundy in the events of 181L.

Family myth did not, unfor

tunately, stand the acid test of scholarly research.

Re

luctantly, my ancestor's part in the drama has been, by
necessity, relegated to the status of a footnote citation.
Nevertheless, I continued my task and soon discovered that
my efforts might have a utility far greater than ancestoral
glorification.
Once a contentious issue between American and AngloCanadian historians, the Battle of Lundy's Lane has sub
sequently been reduced to near-oblivion.

In the decades

before the First World War, historians endeavored to illu
strate the glory of their respective pasts.

Anglophobia

gave vent to highly colored and chauvinistic American
accounts of the War of 1812.

The Niagara Campaign of

181^, more than any other episode in the war save perhaps
the Battle of New Orleans, won for American arms a measure
of glory, conspicuously absent in the other campaigns.
Based upon the highly questionable official reports of the
senior American officers, American histories lack somewhat
in substance.

Although some excellent, but often super

ficial, accounts of the battles along the Niagara have
iv
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emerged, in large part many histories retain their mis
conceptions and errors.

Even an historian as venerated

as Henry Adams fell prey to his prejudices.
At the same time, Canadians were eager to claim their
place in the sun in conjunction with the glories of the
3ritish Empire.

Many military histories appeared in the

years before the First World War, the most thorough being
Brigadier General Ernest Cruikshank' s series.

These his

tories were just as guilty of excessive nationalism cloud
ing their account of these events as their American coun
terparts .
In my paper, I have attempted to reach a synthesis
of these contradictory interpretations.

I must confess

my own nationalist predispositions yet I endeavored not
to have them influenced my analytical dealing with the
subject.

Thanks to the archivists of the University of

Toronto, I had access to several vital primary sources
from which a clearer picture of events could be gleaned.
I am equally indebted to the Buffalo Historical Society
as well as the smaller, but no less helpful, societies
in St. Catherines, Ontario, Niagara Falls, Ontario,
and Niagara Falls, New York.
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I.

CANADA INVADED

The United States embarked upon the War of 1812 to
preserve the freedom of the seas against British depreda
tions and impressment.

The Orders in Council were viewed

as the source of American commercial distress.

Many of

the ambitious young politicians, eager to exhibit American
power, saw in British maritime actions a slap in the face.
In a speech of December 31. 1811, Representative Henry
Clay of Kentucky stated:

"What are we not to lose by

peace? - commerce, character, a nation’s best treasure,
honor!”'

Thus, the fundamental cause of the War of 1812

was the British maritime policies which hampered American
commerce and injured national pride.
Why was American military strategy aimed toward
Canada’s conquest?

Firstly, there was no doubt in Ameri

can minds that British agents provoked Indian frontier
depredations.

Secondly, and more importantly, an invasion

of Canada was the only means available to carry the war to
the British.

The British, victors at Trafalgar, could not

be seriously threatened upon the seas by an American fleet
which had only a handful of frigates.

The conquest of

Canada was the obvious, indeed, the only method of injur-

1
Irving Brant, James Madison, Commander-in-Chief
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), p. 17.
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ing Great Britain.
It was thought that little more was required than a
mere declaration of war followed by a friendly occupation
1

of Canada.-

Canadians, -Americans believed, would welcome

the lifting of the yoke of British tyranny and monarchism.
A three-pronged invasion was launched by the Americans in
the summer and autumn of 1812:

Brigadier-General William

Hull advanced from Detroit with his army of 2,500; Major
General Stephen Van Rensselaer of the New York Militia,
commanding 3,170 men (900 regulars), invaded the Niagara
frontier; and Major General Henry Dearborn moved against
2
Montreal with 5>000 men in the main American effort.
The British, mobilizing their scant garrisons of
regulars, were hopelessly outnumbered yet the population
of Upper Canada, the hardy sons of loyalists, eagerly took
up arms against those who expelled their fathers.

Also

the French-Canadians of Lower Canada, long aware of Ameri
can hostility toward Roman Catholicism, felt secure within
the British regime which, in the.Quebec Act of 177^ >
guaranteed religious toleration.

The British, first to

draw blood, seized Forts Dearborn and Mackinac.

These

successes in the west were crowned by Hull's ignominious
surrender of his army to General Sir Isaac Brock's tiny

Harry Coles, The War of 1812 (Chicago:
of Chicago Press, 1965)> p. 2^.
2 Robert Leckie, The War Nobody Won:
Putnam, 197^)> PP- 25-26.

University

1812 (New York:
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force, without resistance, on August 16, 1812.

Marching

the 250 miles from the Detroit frontier to the Niagara,
the British succeeded in replusing a second attempt at
invasion.

The victory at Queenstown, which cost the
1

Americans 950 men, was won at the price of Brock’s life.
These early achievements against heavy odds were due both
to the brilliant leadership of Brock and the incredible
incompetence of his adversaries.

The third invasion

ended as ingloriously as the preceeding two:

Dearborn's

militia, standing upon their constitutional rights, refused
to cross the border into Lower Canada.

Without so much as

firing a shot in anger, Dearborn's army retreated into
winter quarters.
The initiative now fell to the British who responded
by launching an invasion of Ohio.

Major General Thomas

Procter, with a force of regulars, Canadian militia, and
Tecumseh's Indians, routed a portion of Major General
William Harrison's army at Frenchtown, Michigan, on
January 22, 1813.

In the action the Americans lost 93^;

many of the American prisoners were massacred by the
2
Indians as Procter passively looked on.
The British
then began unsuccessful siege operations against Fort

^John Richardson, The War of 1812 (Toronto:
torical Publishing Company, 1902), p. 113.

His

“Brigadier General James Winchester to Secretary of
War Armstrong, 23 January 1813, as cited in Richardson,
The War of 1812, pp. 1^5-146.
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Meigs on the Maumee River and Fort Stephenson on the San
dusky.

British hopes of inflicting a decisive defeat upon

the Americans in the west were dashed when Commodore Oli
ver H. Perry destroyed the British flotilla at the Battle
of Lake Erie (September 10, 1813).

Perry's success

prompted Harrison to renew a drive against Detroit.

Com

manding 7,000 troops, Harrison compelled Procter first to
quit siege operations before Forts Meigs and Stephenson;
then to withdraw from Detroit into the Canadian interior.
Harrison pursued Procter to the vicinity of present-day
Chatham, Ontario.

Here, at the 3attle of the Thames, the

Americans overwhelmed Procter's force of 800 regulars and
1,000 Indians.

The victory, the first success achieved

by American arms, signaled the collapse of the Indian
Confederation (Tecumseh was one of the forty-seven AngloIndian battlefield deaths) and marked the end of British
power in the west.

Eventually, Harrison's successes would

take "Old Tippecanoe" to the White House but at the moment
his victory was diminished.

The War Department disbanded

the militia and ordered Harrison's regulars to join the
concentration along the Niagara frontier.

Disgusted,

Harrison resigned his commission and returned to civilian
life.
-1

Adjutant-General Edward 3aynes' General Order, 2h
November 1813, as cited in Richardson, The War of 1812,
p. 215.
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General John Armstrong, who replaced William Eustis
as Secretary of War early in 1813, shifted American atten
tion to the Niagara.

He envisioned an ambitious two-

pronged invasion of Upper Canada.

The first operation

was directed against the colonial capital, York (presentday Toronto).
the town.

On April 2k, an amphibious assault captured

The powder magazine mysteriously exploded and

General Zebulon Pike's 1,600 troops sustained 320 casualties, the famed explorer among the dead.

Angered, the

Americans burnt the public buildings of York.

The expedi

tion returned to Sacket’s Harbor having accomplished
nothing save to harden Canadian hatred.

The American's

second operation was as abortive as the first.

With

Dearborn ill, Colonel Winfield Scott, his adjutant, in
co-operation with Perry (then under Commodore Isaac
Chauncey's Lake Ontario command), succeeded in taking
Fort George by an amphibious operation, completed on May
8.

The British evacuated the Niagara peninsula and re

treated toward the head of the lake.
Dearborn contented himself with holding his position.
On June 6 , an American pursuit finally began which was met
by Major General John Vincent at Stoney Creek where ?00
British regulars inflicted a humiliating rout upon a
mixed force of regulars and militia three times their

■^Kate Caffrey,
The Twilight's Last Gleaming (New
York: Stein and Day, 1977)> P« 193-
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size.-

Generals William Winder and John Chandler, politi

cal appointees, were cashiered for their parts in the
disaster.
The Americans by no means had the corner on incompe
tency.

The British governor-general, Sir George Prevost,

decided to exploit the absence of Dearborn and Chauncey,
then assaulting Port George, by himself launching an
amphibious assault upon Sachet's Harbor.

The operation

would have been successful except for Prevost's bumbling.
The garrison, under Brigadier-General Jacob J. Brown,
counter-attacked and eventually repulsed the British
attack (May 28-29).
Stalemated along the Niagara, Armstrong decided upon
a renewal of operations against Montreal.

Brigadier-

General James Wilkinson, replacing Dearborn, intended to
move against Montreal via the St. Lawrence River with an
army of 8,000 men.

In conjunction with Wilkinson, Briga

dier-General Wade Hampton, with a force of ^,000, would

o

advance down the Champlain Valley.-

Hampton established

himself along the Chateaugay River (October 22).

A much

smaller British force assaulted Hampton, throwing the
Americans into confusion.

The British brigade, too small

1Coles, The War of 1812, p. 141.
2Caffrey, The Twilight's Last Gleaming, p. 209.
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to execute an envelopment, simulated one by surrounding
the American position and beating drums and blowing
1
bugles.
Bluffed, the Americans fled. Wilkinson, whom
Hampton detested, was left to fend for himself.
After many delays, Wilkinson advanced from Ogdensburg,
New York down the St. Lawrence where a reinforced detach
ment of 2,000 men engaged a diminutive British force at
Chrysler’s Farm (November 11).

The British, under Colonel

J. W. Morrison, repulsed repeated piecemeal American
frontal assaults, routing Wilkinson, who suffered ^39
casualties."

The invasion was a disaster from start to

finish; Wilkinson retreated to French Mills where no pre
parations were made for winter quarters.
The year 1813, like the previous one, had been marked
by the dismal showing of the American army.

The assaults

against Montreal ended once again in another set of
debacles.

Obstensibly, the defeat at Stoney Creek blunted

the Niagara offensive.

The actual cause of the stalemate

was the abject incompetency of the American senior officers.
In the west, Harrison's and Perry's victories were not
exploited since Armstrong's attention was fixed on the
Niagara frontier and Montreal.

Had the Secretary of War

permitted Harrison to advance against the shattered British

1Ibid., p. 211.
2Coles, The War of 1812, pp. 146-1^7.
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forces, the Americans, moving toward the head of Lake On
tario, would have compelled the British to abandon the Ni
agara line.

Instead, the British were allowed a respite aur

ing which their forces could he reorganized and redeployed
Armstrong, himself a general, had been an officer in
the Revolutionary War.

A former secretary of state and

attorney-general of Pennsylvania, he was a United States
senator between 1800 and 1809; then minister to France and
Spain.

Commissioned a brigadier-general and commander of

New York, he served as Secretary of War until forced to
resign in disgrace after the British capture of Washington
1
in September, 1814.
The defeats had their positive results.

The incapa

city of the greybeard generals clearly became manifest.
In 1812, the average age of the eight general officers
was sixty years of age.

Armstrong cashiered these old

men and commissioned eight new generals who averaged
thirty-six years:2
Ma.ior Generals

Brigadier Generals

Jacob Brown
Andrew Jackson
George Izard

Edmund Gaines
Alexander Macolm
Winfield Scott
T. A. Smith
E. W. Ripley

i
Francis Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary
of the United States Axmv (Washington: Government Print
ing Office, 1903), P. 170.
p
Robert leckie, The Wars of America (New York: Har
pers', 1968), p. 279.
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The Niagara peninsula, a fertile arm of Upper Canada,
is sandwiched between Lakes Ontario and Erie.

Drained by

many rivers and creeks, its topography is generally flat.
The dominating physical feature is the Niagara Escarpment,
the former glacial lakeshore which rises hundreds of feet
above the vineyards and orchards along the shore of Lake
Ontario.

The world famous falls of Niagara make naviga

tion between the lakes impossible, however, the river is
sufficiently calm below Queenstown and above Chippewa to
allow for shipping.

Between the falls and the escarpment

at Queenstown Heights, there exists wild rapids flanked
by precipitous bluffs.

The invasion routes were, by

necessity, either above or below this natural obstruction.
The peninsula had been settled by Empire Loyalists
after the American War of Independence, many of them
veterans of that conflict.

The only town of note was

Niagara (Newark) which served as the capital of Upper
Canada in the years immediately following the Revolution.
Exposed as it was to Fort Niagara, it was removed to York.
Chippewa and Queenstown, on either end of the portage,
were hamlets of considerable importance.

The bulk of the

population were engaged in agriculture upon their scattered
homesteads.

In the years immediately preceeding the war,

the district was settled by many Americans attracted by
the availability of cheap lands.
pated by the people of the region.

The war was not antici
They did not comprehend
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what prompted the conflict but the residual animosities
lingering from the American Revolution were sufficient to
insure active Canadian support and participation.
population of Upper Canada was not monolithic.
were elements of discontent.

The

There

Many recent Irish immigrants

allied themselves with the numerous American settlers,
forming units that fought against British regulars and
their former neighbors.

The most notable of these forma

tions was the Canadian Volunteers under the leadership of
Joseph Willcocks, Irish immigrant and former member of the
1
Legislature of Upper Canada.
The naval balance of power was a vital consideration
in the campaigns on the Niagara frontier.

The brilliant

victory won by Perry gave uncontestable control of Lake
Erie to the Americans.

However, the picture on Lake

Ontario was never so clear.

Here the battle for naval

supremacy was waged, not on the waves, but in the dock
yards of Kingston and Sacket’s Harbor.

Neither Chauncey

nor his British antagonist, Commodore Sir James Yeo, dared
engage in combat.

When one side won a temporary advantage,

the other fled to his bases.

In 1813 > Chauncey enjoyed

such an advantage and was able to participate in the cap
ture of both Fort C-eorge and York.

British efforts to

redress this imbalance resulted in the British gaining

1
_W. R. Riddell, "Joseph Willcocks," Ontario History

34 (1927):

486.
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supremacy by the beginning of 1815.

During the critical

year of 181^, the fortunes of either flotilla fluctuated
depending upon the relative balance of power.
The Niagara frontier, due to its geographic location,
was a natural avenue of invasion.

The lodgement at Fort

George provided an excellent springboard for an offensive
directed first against Eurlington Heights, then ultimately
York and Kingston.

Yet, the Madison administration's pro

secution of the war left a great deal to be desired, par
ticularly when it came to co-ordinating operations between
the army and the navy or the various invasion attempts.
Even so, if resolutely employed, the overwhelming super
iority of American arms could result only in success.

But

by 181^ the will to win had begun to erode in some American
circles.

The initial movements of the Federalists toward

what was to become the Hartford Convention had gotten
underway.

In New York, the most populous and strategically

located state in the theatre of war, the Republican gover
nor, Daniel Tompkins, was opposed by strong anti-war Fed
eralist factions.

This decline in morale soon manifested

itself as the American position on the Niagara front dis
integrated.
The month of December 1813 was marked by the retire
ment of the American troops from their lines at Fort George,
The American garrison there had become woefully weak.
Most of the American regulars, along with the better
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militia units, had heen drawn away to build up the armies
that failed so egregiously in their campaign against Mon
treal.

In early December the volunteers, whose term of

service had elapsed, left for home leaving the fort to
its fate.
Brigadier-General George McClure, in command of the
Fort George garrison, became uneasy about his exposed
position.

His appeals for reinforcements went unanswered

while the lines of a British investment began to tighten
around him.

Elements of the British 100th Regiment,

commanded by Colonel John Murray, were brought into the
line at Twelve Mile Creek from the Champlain Valley.
McClure, after holding a council of war on December 9.
resolved to quit Fort George and raze the town of Niagara.
This, he maintained, was in accordance with a directive
issued by Armstrong:
Understanding that the defense of the post committed
to your charge may render it proper to destroy the
town of Newark, you are hereby directed to apprise
its inhabitants of this end and to invite them to
remove themselves and their effects to some place of
greater safety.1
On the afternoon of December 10, the inhabitants of
the town received an order to evacuate all dwellings,
stores, and shops preparatory to their destruction by

^Ernest Cruikshank, Documents relating to the inva
sion of the Niagara Peninsula by the American Army, com
manded by General Jacob Brown, in July and August, 181^
(Welland, Ontario: Niagara Historical Society Publica
tions, 1920), p. 12.
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fire.

Some took the warning and attempted to remove their

goods and chattels hut for the most part the townspeople
ignored these orders.

Four hours later, as evening drew

on, in the midst of a raging blizzard, a platoon of
militia led by Willcocks began systematically to incinerate
the town.

Houses, hotels, halls, stores, and churches went

up in flames.
Queenstown was similarly dealt with when batteries
at Lewistown bombarded the town with red-hot shot.

Many

farmsteads were destroyed by marauding parties of soldiers
while the few remaining cattle in the region were driven
away or slaughtered.

On December 10 General McClure wrote

from Fort Niagara to Governor Tompkins:

"The village is

now in flames and the enemy shut out of hope and means of
wintering in Fort George,

This step has not been resolved

on without counsel," he added, "and is in conformity with
the views of the Secretary of War, made known to me in
previous communications."
by the latter.

This was strenuously denied

"My orders," asserted Secretary Armstrong,

"were to burn it if necessary to the defense of Fort
George, and not otherwise.

But he does not defend Fort

George, and then burns Niagara.

My orders were given on

the report of the General that the attack of Fort George

1Ibid., p. 14.
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might he covered hy Newark. ""
The flames of Niagara had become the signal for the
rapid advance of a small British corps of observation
-ander Murray.

Putting his men in sleighs, the British

commander hurried forward through a snowstorm and fell
upon the incendiaries before their work of destruction was
complete.

The village had been reduced to ashes but the

barracks and defenses of Fort George were left compara
tively uninjured.

In their haste to retreat, the Ameri-

cans left all of their tents standing in the works."
McClure was correct in that the burning of Niagara
robbed the 3ritish of adequate winter quarters.

Fort

George and Niagara now could not house a sufficiently
large enough garrison to defend the frontier.

The Ameri

can general, confident that the British would not stage a
winter offensive, sat behind the formidable walls of Fort
Niagara.
The 3ritish, angered by the American actions, immedi
ately grasped the initiative.

On the night of December 18,

Murray, with the 100th Regiment and detachments of the 4lst
the Royals, and a few men of the Royal Artillery, some
five hundred and fifty in all, crossed the Niagara River.

A

Ibid., p. 16.
2

Ernest Cruikshank, The Battle of Lundy's Lane
(Welland: Lundy's Lane Historical Society, 1891), p. 5.
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They landed above Youngstown where lay a detachment of
American militia from the garrison on outpost duty.

The

outposts were quickly seized and the sentries bayonetted
to the man (in order not to alarm the garrison, Murray
had taken the precaution of ordering all muskets to remain
unloaded.)

Arriving at the fortress, the assault party

waited in the darkness at the main gate for the changing
of the guard.

On the opening of the gate, the relief

guard was met with an attack of bayonets.

Through the

gate the British rushed, followed by the rest of the
attacking force.

The surprised Americans made what
1
resistance they could.
In half an hour the deed was accomplished.

The fort,

strongly built of stone with twenty-seven mounted guns
and a garrison of over three hundred, was captured at
the expense of six British killed and five wounded.

An

enormous quantity of arms, equipment, and stores, to the
value of nearly one million dollars, was secured.

The

fort, a post of immense strategic value, was held by the
British until the end of the war.
The same day, some miles up river, British MajorGeneral Phineas Riall landed a force of fourteen hundred

*1

Ernest Cruikshank, Drummond's Winter Campaign, 1813
(Welland: Lundy's Lane Historical Society, 1897)» PP- 1723.
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at Lewistown.

Advancing along the left bank of the Nia

gara, Riall carried Lewistown and Fort Schlosser.

The

American force at Black Rock, however, presented the Bri
tish with a formidable task.

Riall, commanding four com

panies of the 8th Regiment of Foot, the light companies
of the 89th Regiment of Foot, 250 men of the 4lst Regiment,
the grenadiers of the 100th Regiment, together with fifty
militia and a body of Indians, landed below Black Rock
at 2:00 A.M. on December 20.

1

The light companies of the

89th surprised and overwhelmed a militia picket, thereby
securing the bridge over Conquickity Creek.

The 4lst and

grenadiers stormed the approaches of the bridge, then
threw back a weak counter-attack.

Riall's intention was

to force a fight over control of this vital bridge thus
creating a diversion.

While the fire-fight raged around

the bridge, an amphibious assault by the Royal Scots,
under Lieutenant-Colonel John Gordon, landed up-river.
The American militia responded by pouring heavy cannon
and musket fire into the landing parties inflicting much
damage.

Meanwhile, Riall pushed through his opponents

taking the town of Black Rock.

The militia, reported by

Riall as "in great force and very strongly posted," main
tained its position with obstinance.

However the British

^Gilbert Auckinlech, . A History of the War between
Great Britain and the United States (Toronto: McLear,
1855), P. 258.
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veterans soon prevailed.

The Americans fell hack upon

Buffalo, their retreat guarded by a fieldpiece supported
by large numbers of infantry and cavalry.

Nonetheless,

the cohesion of the militia began to erode under constant
British pressure and more American positions soon fell to
the red coats.
Black Rock offered rich booty but Riall did not
possess means for transporting it.

Thus the war materials

were put to the torch as were the private dwellings of
the town.

With Black Rock securely in Riall's hands,

Gordon was dispatched to discover and destroy all defen
sive positions in the vicinity.

The advance continued

and Buffalo suffered the fate of Black Rock and Newark
before it.
This series of actions ended in the British command
ing the entire length of the Niagara River.

The Americans

fielded 2,500 militia against Riall's 739 and sustained a
loss of 477, mostly prisoners.

The British lost thirty-

one killed, seventy-two wounded, and two missing.

l

Sum

ming up the action for Armstrong, Major General Amos Hall
wrote:
They (the British) were met by the militia under my
command with spirit but were overpowered by the num
bers and discipline of the enemy, the militia gave
way and fled on every side; every attempt to rally

"Cruikshank, Drummond's Winter Campaign, p. 41.
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them proved ineffectual. . . . The flourishing village
of Buffalo was laid in ruins. The Niagara frontier
now lies open and naked to our enemies.1
Both hanks of the Niagara were now in blackened
desolation.

Ironically this destruction was needless.

McClure's burning of Niagara was not in response, to
Armstrong's directive nor the desires of'the Madison
administration.

Following as it did upon the burning of

York in April, the sacking of Niagara could not be ignored
by the British.

In regard to that act , Colonel John Harvey,

adjutant to the commanding general in Upper Canada, dis
patched a letter to the American government calling upon
them to justify the actions of McClure:
Having just received a report from the officer in
command of the British troops on the Niagara frontier
that the whole of the town of Niagara was destroyed
by fire previous to its being evacuated by the Ameri
can troops, I am directed to call upon you immediately
and distinctly to state whether this atrocious act
has been committed by the authority of the American
government or is the unauthorized act of any individ
ual. It is essential that not a moment should be
lost in returning a specific answer to this communi
cation. 2
The British capture of Fort Niagara, Lewistown,
Manchester (Niagara Falls, N.Y.), Fort Schlosser, and
Buffalo was in response both to military necessity and

^Auckinleck, A History of the War, p. 258.
2Harvey to McClure, 11 December 1813, Public Archives
of Canada, "C" Series, Multivolume.
(Ottawa: Government
Printing Bureau, 1888-1902), 681: 214. This source here
after will be cited as Archives, "C" Series.
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the desire for retribution.

In an attempt to gloss over

the British retaliation, Governor-General Prevost issued
a proclamation stating:
Lamenting as His Excellency does the necessity im
posed upon him of retaliating upon the subjects of
America the miseries inflicted upon the inhabitants
of Newark, it is not his intention to pursue further
a system of warfare so revolting to his own feelings
and so little congenial to the British character
unless the future measures of the enemy compel him
again to resort to it. 2
On January 28, 1811, Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon
Drummond, commanding general in Upper Canada, received
his reply from General Wilkinson by direction of President
Madison:
I am commanded by the Executive of the United States
to disavow the conduct of the Brigadier-C-eneral
McClure of the militia of the State of New York in
burning the town of Newark and, in irrefragable
testimony that this act was unlicensed, to transmit
to Your Excellancy a copy of the order, under color
of which that officer perpetrated a deed abhorrent
to every American feeling. . . . no system of retalia
tion which has for its object the devastation of
private property will ever be resorted to by the
American government but in the last extremity, and
this will depend on the conduct of your royal mas
ter's troops in this country.2
Despite these courtly assurances, similar acts were
commited.

On May 1^, a detachment of 800 American regu

lars, militia, and seamen under the command of Colonel J.
B. Campbell of the Eleventh United States Infantry, deli
berately destroyed the village of Port Dover on the shores

Auckinleck, ibid., p. 252.
p
Cruikshank, Documents, p. 19.
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of Lake Erie.

General Riall demanded an explanation from

Campbell but received no reply.

Colonel Duncan McArthur,

in command of a detachment of cavalry dispatched from
Detroit, swept through the western districts of Upper
Canada.

While passions ran high, there was little chance

that Washington could properly restrain its officers in
1
the field from engaging m these acts.
Its successes along the Niagara put the small British
army in possession of ample and sorely needed supplies of
provisions, ammunition, and military stores besides fur
nishing them with winter quarters.

Previously, British

troops lacked winter clothing of any description, being
without a field-train or any organized commissariat.

The

British army in Upper Canada were without wagons with the
unhappy result that much of the ammunition was rendered
2
useless by inclement weather.
While short of artificiers, engineers, and logistical
support, the British Army was blessed with an energetic
commander in the person of Drummond.

Born in Canada, at

Quebec, in 1771, his father, Colin Drummond, was paymastergeneral for the British forces in Lower Canada.

At age

seventeen, Drummond entered the British army and five
years later rose to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the 8th

Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 6.

o

""Cruikshank, ibid. , p. 5*
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Regiment (King's Regiment of Foot).

Seeing action in the

Netherlands, Egypt, and the West Indies during the wars
against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, Drummond was
posted to Canada in 1808.

He served on the staff at Quebec

until 1811 when, at the age of thirty-three, he was pro
moted to lieutenant-general.

After a short tour of duty

in Ireland, Drummond returned to Canada in 1813 as secondin-command to Prevost.

Following his successes along the

Niagara, Drummond projected a movement against Detroit
and the destruction of the American squadron on Lake Erie,
then laying at Put-in-Bay.

2

He pushed his vanguard elements

toward the fork of the Thames with scouts penetrating as
far as Lake St. Clair and beyond.

One such party ventured

into Michigan where they routed a surprised company of
militia, capturing their arms.-^

Due to the unusual mild

ness of the weather, the roads were impassible until
March.

By then, Detroit was heavily reinforced while

several thousand militia were collected in the vicinity
of present-day Sandusky, Ohio for the defense of Perry's
ships.^

^Grey, Lundy's Lane, pp. 28-29.
2Drummond to Prevost, 17 February 1814, Archives, C.
682, p. 28.
■^Drummond to Prevost, 7 March 1814, Archives, C . 682,
p. 104.
’’’’Drummond to Cantain Freer, 13 March 1814, Archives,
C. 788, p. 67.
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At the same time, Drummond was obliged to proceed to
York to open the legislature of Upper Canada.

Since Decem

ber, 1813, the British general combined the functions of
civil administrator with those of commander of the forces.
During his absence, American plans to recover Fort Niagara
began to evolve.
As early as February 28, the American Secretary of
War ordered the army at Sacket's Harbor to cross frozen
Lake Ontario and capture Kingston, base of the British
naval squadrons and key to the lines of communications
between Upper and lower Canada.

Considering this highly

impracticable, Major C-eneral 3rown marched his army to
the Niagara frontier.
Time was beginning to run short for the Americans.
Thinly populated and weakly defended, Canada was supposed
to have been easy prey.

Begun in 1812, the war aimed at

the removal of Britain from the continent.

After Leipzig

and Yittoria, Bonaparte's downfall was assured, allowing
Great Britain to devote more of her energies and resources
to guaranteeing the security of her North American pro
vinces.

During 1812 and 1813, four inept American inva

sions had been humiliatingly repulsed by a handful of
regular troops supported by Canadian militia.

Instead

of being welcomed as liberators, the Americans were met
by resolute resistance.

Sixteen thousand troops, mostly

veterans of Wellington's victorious Peninsula Army, were
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beginning to find their way to Canada.

In view of this,

the Americans had time to launch one more attempt at con1
quest.
Despite their December victories, the British troops
along the Niagara frontier were in a deplorable state.
The British garrison at Fort Niagara, composed of a bat
talion of Drummond's old command, the 8th Regiment, was
plagued with disease and desertion.

News of this had been

obtained by the Americans from deserters.

In addition,

Drummond weakened his command by sending a detachment of
the Newfoundland Regiment and artillery to relieve Macki
nac, Michigan.

The number of desertions from the Niagara

garrison had become so great, and discontent so pronounced,
that Drummond was forced to withdraw the battalion, re
placing it with elements of the 100th Regiment of Foot.
Scarcely had this been accomplished than they too began
to desert in such numbers that Riall recommended the aban2
donment of "that cursed fort."
The high rate of deser
tions largely resulted from the fact that the British army
was recruited from the pauper and agrarian classes both
in England and Ireland.

Besides being imperfectly clothed

and subjected to traditionally harsh discipline, they had

xRandal Grey, "Lundy's Lane," War Monthly (May, 1975):
27.
2Riali to Drummond, 15 March 181^, Archives, C. 388,
p. k-k-.
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received no pay for upwards of six months.

Duty at Fort

Niagara was monotonous, having a deleterious effect on
discipline and morale.

General Drummond resolutely re

fused to evacuate a post so important and, as fine weather
returned, desertions diminished.
Drummond was unremitting in the execution of his
duty.

Through the worst of weather and execrable roads,

he travelled the length of the colony making inquiries
into the conditions of the people and the resources of
the country.

Ascertaining that the wheat crop near the

frontier was likely to prove deficient, he promptly pro
hibited the distillation of grain and issued orders de
manding the construction of magazines.

Writing to Prevost,

he pointed out that "the crop in the Niagara District is
short, but I think there will be enough for the Right
Division if that at Long Point is collected in time."

2

The Niagara frontier between Chippewa and Fort Erie was
already a burnt-over district while Long Point had escaped
the ravages of the American invaders.

In addition to his

troops, Drummond also had the burdensome responsibility
of feeding several thousand non-combatants.

“Cruikshank, Lundy1s Lane, p. 14.
p
Drummond to Prevost, 25 January 1814, as cited by
Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. ?•
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With no organized and functioning commissariat,
Drummond was forced to make do from a country already
hordering on destitution.

Most of the western Indians

fled their homes upon news of Procter's defeat at the
hands of Harrison at the Sattle of the Thames.

These,

as well as the whole of the Six Nations from the C-rand
River, three thousand persons in all, sought refuge near
the British cantonment on Burlington Heights, at the head
i
_
'of Lake Ontario.
This concentration of Indians so
frightened the inhabitants of the area that they too
abandoned their farms and took shelter amidst the troops.
Added to this were the homeless fugitives along the Nia
gara frontier.

While Drummond’s armed forces numbered

less than 2,000 between 7>000 and 8,000 rations were issued
daily.

So serious were the food shortages, the British

command feared that the whole of the province west of
Kingston might be abandoned.
was scarcely any better:

The situation at Kingston

Each day 5>000 rations were

consumed and on April 5> there remained but sixteen
barrels of flour in store.

Drummond was so preoccupied

by these vital questions of food and supply that he could
say, as Wellington often did, that he did not know whether

Drummond to Prevost, 8 February 1814, Archives, C .
118, p. 45.
2Charles Stacey, "Upper Canada at War, 1814," Ontario
History 48 (1956): 39-
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he was much of a general out he felt certain he was a
first-rate commissariat officer.
Drummond's predecessor suffered a vote of censure by
the Legislature of Upper Canada for having proclaimed mar
tial law for the purpose of supplying his troops from the
country.

Faced with the prospects of starvation or with

drawal, Drummond had no recourse hut to seize what was
required.

Drummond's efforts to induce the western Indians

to remove themselves to Lower Canada failed as did his
endeavors to persuade the Six Nation Indians to return to
their deserted farms.

For want of officers and equipment,

Drummond directed the enlistment of 400 militiamen into a
militia corps elite.

The surplus levies were returned to

their farms in the hope of increasing productivity while
relieving the supply problem.

Captain William Robinson

of the 8th Regiment was given command of this newly armed
battalion of light infantry hereafter known as the Incor
porated Militia.

Several captured field-guns and wagons

were allocated to this unit.

1

British optimism was not improved by intelligence
reports detailing American movements.

.American newspapers

clamored for the speedy recovery of Fort Niagara.

Late

in January, 31ack Rock was reoccupied by the Americans

Drummond to Prevost, 29 March 1814, Archives, C. 682,
p. 269.
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who mads their presence felt by subjecting Fort Erie to
1
periodic artillery fire.
At the same time the British
learned that large barracks were under construction upon
Lewistown Heights.

The subsequent movement of large bodies

of troops from Sacket's Harbor in the direction of the
Niagara were almost immediately revealed by deserters in
Kingston, and General Riall was placed on his guard.

Se

vere cold weather accompanied by heavy snow falls during
the latter part of March delayed the progress of defensive
positions under construction by the British.

In early

April, Riall sallied forth from Fort Niagara and destroyed
all earthworks along the New York bank of the river lest
they fall into the hands of the advancing Americans.

A

deserter who came into the British lines reported that
7,000 troops were assembled at Buffalo.

2

News from the Ohio country was anything but encourag
ing.

A great council of the Indians of Ohio, Indiana,

and Michigan was held at Dayton under supervision of
American agents.

Those Indians assembled were informed

that they would be treated as enemies unless they took up
arms against the British.

Each warrior was promised a

f

“Drummond to Prevost, 1 February 181^, as cited by
Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 8 .
“William Merritt, Recollections of events principally
on the Detroit and Niagara frontiers during the War of 1812
(St. Catherines, Ontario: St. Catherines Historical Society,
1363), p. 5k.
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stipend of seventy-five cents per day and warned that
their wives and children would be retained as hostages
to insure Indians co-operation.

The Delawares, Senecas,

and Wyandots joined in the war dance and were directed to
mass at Detroit.

Similar attempts to mobilize the Indian

were undertaken in New York and Pennsylvania.
American marauding parties made frequent inroads into
the western districts.

These American incursions dimin

ished grain available to the British.

Meanwhile, it be

came known to the British command that a squadron of six
American ships, loaded with troops, had passed through
Lake Huron with the intention of attacking Mackinac, the
only post still retained by the British in the west.

On

Lake Ontario, a forty-two gun frigate, the USS Mohawk,
latest product of the frantic shipbuilding race, seemed
to give Chauncey's squadron a decisive edge over Yeo's,
who lifted an eighteen-day blockade of Sacket's Harbor on
June 6 .

The loss of Lake Ontario threatened to undermine

Drummond's entire position in Upper Canada.
Upon the prorogation of the Assembly of Upper Canada
on March 18, Drummond returned to Kingston and threw him
self with great vigor into the labor of defending the pro*|
'Glenn Tucker, Poltroons + Patriots, 2 vols.
apolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 195^)> 2: 603•

(Indian
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vince.

Every soldier that could he of the slightest use

was set to work in the Kingston shipyards.

Two frigates

of the largest class were launched and made sea-worthy
while the American fleet was some weeks from being ready
for action.

Having thus obtained the naval lead, he

sought permission to assault Sachet's Harbor while that
vital town's garrison was understrength.
Governor-General
i
Prevost refused.
Nevertheless, Drummond made a success
ful dash from Kingston upon Oswego, a naval and military
base second in importance to Sacket's Harbor.

Despite a

valiant defense, the American garrison was speedily ex
pelled leaving the British in command of the harbor and
its accumulated stores.
of Sacket's Harbor.

Yeo maintained a strict blockade

The net effect of these two actions

was to delay the equipment of the American fleet for
several weeks, thus retarding any offensive action along
2
the dangerously weakened Niagara frontier.
Early in May, the American army at Batavia, New York
began to take shape.

Secretary Armstrong promised that

the force should consist of not less than 5,000 regulars
and 3,000 militiamen drawn from New York and Pennsylvania.
The cavalry and artillery were reorganized and the enlist
ment of three new regiments of riflemen was authorized.

*i

Prevost to Drummond, 9 April 1814, A.rchives, C. 683,
p. 21.
^J. Mackay Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 19°5)» P* 139-
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To encourage recruitment, a “bounty of $12h was offered to
each person enlisting.

Most of the infantry regiments

selected had served in previous campaigns, consequently,
they had seen as much active service as their opposite
i
numbers.
A camp of instruction was established under the very
capable command of the youngest general, at age twentyseven, in the American Army, Winfield Scott.

Scott came

from a family with an excellent martial tradition.

His

grandfather fled Scotland after Culloden, settling in the
vicinity of Petersburg, Virginia where he acquired a large
plantation.

Winfield's father, a captain in the Continen

tal Army, educated his son at Richmond and William and
Mary College.

At age twenty, Scott was admitted to the

Virginia bar yet two years later gave up his legal career
for a captain's commission in the army.

Posted to New

Orleans, Scott had a personal dispute with his commanding
general, James Wilkinson.

His charges of incompetence

and treason, while probably valid, resulted in a duel with
one of Wilkinson's aides-de-camp and a year’s suspension.
With the commencement of the war, Scott was commissioned
a lieutenant-colonel of artillery and posted to the Nia
gara frontier.

At the Queenston fiasco Scott's military

talent clearly manifested itself.

Although a junior offi

cer, Scott assumed command of the American troops atop

■^louis Babcock, The War of 1812 on the Niagara Frontier
(Buffalo: Buffalo Historical Society, 1927), p. 217.
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the heights.

Overwhelmed, Scott conducted the surrender

of the American forces, himself becoming a prisoner-ofwar.

Paroled by the British, Scott returned to Washing

ton a hero, his conspicuous talent rewarded by his being
commissioned a brigadier-general.

Returning to the Nia

gara, he took a prominent part in Dearborn's invasion of
Upper Canada, temporarily being commandant of Fort George,
the very post where he was held prisoner but a year be1
lore.
Upon Scott's shoulders fell the responsibility of
molding the new American army.

The troops were drilled

seven to ten hours a day, six days a week.

Parades and

ceremonies were carried out with exactness and spirit.
Like Von Steuben, Scott organized and drilled officers
who in turn organized and instructed squads and companies.
No official drillbook then being in existence, Scott
translated his dog-eared Manuel General de Service des
Etats Ma.ior-Generaux, (Qrdinnance de 1791) •
For the first time an American army could execute
harmonious movements of many battalions without confusion.
Strict sanitation reduced sickness down to unprecedented

^Winfield Scott, Memoirs of Lieutenant General Scott,
2 vols. (New York: Sheldon, 18£>4) , 1: 7-3^*
2Ibid., p. 119-
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levels for this period - less than ten per-cent "unfit for
d u t y . M o r a l e soared and reasonably good weather and suf
ficient rations reduced desertions.

Scott did not shrink

from public and summary executions of deserters and malcon
tents.

Even officers were not exempt from Scott's rigid

regime.

At one point, out of twenty-five men confined to

the blockhouse, nine were officers.^

"Confidence, the dawn

of victory, inspired the whole line," later declared General
•5
Scott.
Summing up, Scott wrote m his memoirs of Camp
Buffalo:
A system of sanitary police laid down; rules of civi
lity, etiquette, and courtesy - the indispensable out
works of subordination - prescribed and enforced, and
the tactical instruction of each arm commenced.^
Scott intended to forge an army that "would possess the
firmness and cohesion of veterans."

By mid-May, he seemed

satisfied that his aims had been fulfilled.

In a letter

to re-instated General Winder, he wrote:
I have a handsome little army of 1,700. . . . the 9th
11th, 21st, and 25th Regiments and two companies, Sec
ond Artillery. The men are healthy, sober, cheerful,
and docile. The field officers highly respectable and
many are decent and emulous of improvement, if, of such
materials, I do not make the best army now in service by
the first of June, I will agree to be dismissed from the
service.5

“J.R. Jacobs, The War of 1812 (New York:
1969), p. 130.

Hawthorn,

2Ibid.
3Scott, Memoirs, 1:

121.

^Scott, Memoirs, 1:

119.

5Scott to Winder, 7 May l8lh, as cited by Jacobs,
The War of 1812, p. 131-
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The American war effort was plagued by political
factiousness, especially in the crucial northeastern
states.

The New England states, facing economic stagna

tion as a result of the loss of the British trade, were
firmly in the hands of the Federalists, many of whom were
openly talking of secession.

These populous states, the

industrial and commercial center of the American republic,
were of decisive importance if the United States was to
sustain the effort against Great Britain.

In New York,

the Republican governor, Tompkins, advocated prosecution
of the war yet he was handicapped by a vocal Federalist
minority in the legislature.

Ironically, it was British

actions that brought about the erosion of the Federalist
Party in New York when Drummond's December offensive along
the Niagara crystalized pro-war sentiments.

Not surpris

ingly, the spring elections of 1814 prostrated the Feder
alist Party giving Tompkins his long awaited free hand.
The state Senate readily passed a bill- authorizing the
enlistment of 4,000 state troops to serve for one year.
A general order providing for the equipment of the New
York contingent was issued by the New York Legislature in
March.

It provided for the equipment of two infantry

regiments of ten companies, each consisting of 108 offi
cers and men, and an independent battalion composed of
one company of rifles, two companies of light infantry,
and one company of mounted rifles.

This brigade, number-
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ing 2,562 of all ranks, was given to Major-General Peter
B. Porter, a United States congressman from the Niagara
District and one of the chief promoters of the war.

As

chairman of the committee on Foreign Relations, he pre
pared the report of December 1811 recommending war with
Great Britain.

1

Porter's militia was subjected to Scott's drills and
soon attained a high degree of efficiency.

The Pennsyl

vania contingent, numbering 600, participated in the raz
ing of Port Dover and did not arrive at Buffalo until
late in June.

General Porter proceeded to Onondaga, the

ancient council place of the Six Nations, soliciting the
assistance of those tribes in the projected invasion of
Canada.

The Iroquois readily promised to join the coali

tion and a council was organized at Buffalo to ratify the
treaty.

All the nations except the Mohawks were repre

sented as Le Fort, an Onondaga, was elected war chief.
Mainly through the actions of Red Jacket, celebrated chie
of the Senecas, upwards of 600 Indians were assembled to
. .

join the expedition.

2

While these extensive preparations for the invasion
were in progress, Drummond was fruitlessly urging Prevost

“Ibid., pp. 129-133p
Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 11.
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to reinforce his army.

Prevost had his attention centered

on a numerous American army forming on the shores of Lake
Champlain.

Penciled upon the margin of Drummond’s letter

of June 21, which expressed his firm belief that the main
attack would be made on the Niagara and that the movement
of troops toward Plattsburg was simply a feint to prevent
reinforcements from being dispatched from Lower Canada,
Prevost wrote:

"Much obliged to Lieutenant General Drum

mond for his opinion, but it is entirely without foundation."

Drummond was forced to rely upon the troops

already in the Niagara peninsula.

As soon as navigation

opened, he reinforced Riall with the 103rd Regiment and a
small company of marine artillery.

Even after the arrival

of these troops, the strength of the Right Division of
the army in Upper Canada, distributed from York to Long
Point upon Lake Erie, did not exceed 4,000 effectives of
p
all arms.
For fear of a sudden amphibious assault, a
battalion was maintained at both Burlington and York.
Both flanks of the British position in Niagara were ex
posed to American movements by an enemy in command of the
lakes.

The Port Dover episode illustrated the American

ability to launch .just such an attack.

Riall feared an

American landing on the shores of lake Erie whereby the

"Prevost to Drummond, 27 June 1814, Archives, C. 683,
p. 300.
2Drummond to Prevost, 22 June 1814, Archives. C. 683,
p. 304.
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enemy, already on his flank, could gain his rear hy the
western roads thus cutting off his retreat to Burlington.
With the Americans enjoying uncontestahle command of Lake
Erie, the British were indeed vulnerable to such a move.

menu.

1
The actual force available for the defense of the

Niagara was less than 2,800 regulars, 300 militia, and
150 Indians, distributed along a front of thirty-six
miles.

Slight fieldworks had been constructed at Chippewa

and Queenstown and a redoubt of considerable strength
built at the mouth of the Niagara, at first named Fort
2
Riall but subsequently called Fort Mississauga.
When
these works, in addition to Forts Erie and George, were
properly garrisoned, scarcely 700 men remained available
for field operations.

Many of the troops still nominally

effective were so enfeebled by disease, exposure, and
fatigue that they had become unfit for combat.

The sur

geon of the 8th Regiment recommended that the battalion,
then stationed at Chippewa and Niagara Falls, should be
immediately removed as nearly every man in it had been
down with dysentary or intermittent fever during the past
twelve months.-^

The Royal Scots had suffered as much in

^Hitsman, Incredible War, p. 932
Captain Martin to Prevost, 3 July 1814, as cited by
Cruikshank, Lundy1s Lane, p. 13.
■^Drummond to Prevost, 21 May 1814, ibid.
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the same manner.

Writing from Kingston to Prevost, Drum

mond summed up the situation:

"One of the test regiments

is shut up in Fort Niagara, another decidedly inefficient,
and a third expected to he so if compelled to take the
■1
field.
Late in June he determined to relieve the 8th
Regiment hy the 4lst Regiment and sent forward the Incor
porated Militia to the frontier hut was unahle to relieve
2
the Royal Scots as he had intended.
Deserters who came into the British lines maintained
that a movement on the part of the Americans was imminent.
They also reported that the ardor of the troops was much
improved hy the distribution of hand-bills announcing
that Napoleon had gained a great success at the gates of
Paris in which the emperors of Russia and Austria and the
Prussian king, along with 40,000 of their troops, had heen
captured.-^

A flotilla of nine armed vessels had heen

assembled at Buffalo while the Americans were collecting
boats with the intention of crossing the Niagara.

In

response to these reports, a detachment was dispatched hy
Riall to reconnoiter in the hope of penetrating the enemy’s
designs.

Although the 3ritish patrols ranged the country,

^Drummond to Prevost, 4 July 1814, Archives, C. 684,
PP. 36-37.
^John Mahon, The War of 1812 (Gainesville:
sity of Florida Press, 1972), p. 268.

Univer

^Babcock, Niagara Frontier, p. 157.
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their only success was the seizure and "burning of the
American "barracks upon lewis town Heights.

Owing to this

uncertainty, Riall was forced to retain the greater part
of his force at Chippewa and Queenstown, leaving his
right wing comparatively weak.

In Fort Erie there was a

garrison of 125 men. rendered all but hors de combat by
illness.

Colonel Thomas Pearson, with a detachment of

Lincoln Militia, the light companies of the Royals and
the 100th Regiment, watched the river from its head to
Chippewa, where five companies of the 100th were posted.
The 103rd Regiment was at Burlington, the Glengarry Light
Infantry at York, and the 8th Regiment had "begun its march
to Lower Canada in the hope of regaining its health.

Both

in the 4lst and the 103rd there were several companies of
mere "boys sc youthful as to reduce their utility to garri1
son duty.
Many of the disloyal inhabitants had fled from the
colony during the two preceeding years.

Others had "been

taken into custody and most of those who refused to take
an oath of allegiance to the Crown were exiled to the
United States.

"It is "but justice to say," Drummond re

marked, "that by far the greater part of the inhabitants
are well disposed, and many have on various occasions
manifested their loyalty to the service by their actions

“Ernest Cruikshank, ed., Campaigns of 1812 - 1814 Contemporary narratives (Welland: Niagara Historical
Society, 1902), p. 114.
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in the field.

Those chiefly who have shown an opposite

disposition are such as from time to time have crept into
the Province from the neighboring states and settled on
1
lands purchased from individuals."
A considerable number of the Lincoln Militia, paroled
by the Americans during their occupation of the Niagara
district in 1813, could not again serve in the war.
Drummond proposed to increase the Incorporated Militia to
900 men by drafting one-fourteenth of the male population
capable of bearing arms.

He was strongly opposed to en

listing the remainder except when forced to.

"I regret,"

he said, "that our present circumstances should render it
necessary to call upon the yeomanry of the country for
their services in the field while their farms must be neg
lected, especially when produce and provisions of every
kind have become very scarce and extravagantly dear, and
it is with difficulty the commissariat are able to procure
the necessary supplies.

These considerations would in

duce me most willingly to dispense with the military for
the domestic services of the militia if our regular forces
2
here were such as to enable me to do so."
Of all these circumstances, the Americans were well

*|

Cruikshank, Lundy *s Lane, p. 1^.
P

“Drummond to Lord Bathurst, 20 March 1814, as cited
by Cruikshank, ibid.
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informed.

A careful estimate in April placed the British

regular force on the Niagara frontier at 1,9^0 men.

Since

the opening of navigation, one American vessel had cruised
day and night along the north shore of Lake Erie, constantly landing and taking on spies.

American intelli

gence reported the deterioration of the British situation
along the frontier.

While the British waned, the Ameri

cans, hy the end of June, were fully prepared to launch
their final gambit.

Scott's finely tuned machine, the

best fielded by the United States during the war, was
confident in its ability to succeed where previous inva
sion attempts had failed so miserably.

“Babcock, Niagara Frontier, p. 169.
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II.

THE BATTLE OF CHIPPEWA

At daybreak on July 3> the American army was skill
fully landed under the cover of the guns of a brig-of-war
and two schooners.

Two beachheads were established, one

above and the other a short distance below Fort Erie.
These landings, out of range of the fort's three artillery
pieces, were not opposed.
landing was

This is not to say that the

not uneventful.

General Scott, eager to get

ashore, fell into the river while sounding for the bottom
with his sword.

Encumbered with sword, epaulets, cloak,
i
and jackboots, Scott was forced to swim for his life.
Scott’s pride perhaps the only casualty of the day, the

fort and its garrison was secured by early evening.
The regular force of the invading army consisted of
the 9th, 11th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 25th United
States Infantry, part of the 2nd Rifles, a squadron of
cavalry, and four companies of artillery.

Organized into

two brigades, under Generals Scott and Eleazer Ripley,
the army numbered between 4,000 and 5,000 of all ranks.
The militia and Indians, composing a third brigade, under
the command of General Porter, numbered in excess of 2,000.
The entire force was commanded by Major-General Jacob

"Scott, Memoirs, 1:

124.

42
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.srown.1
Born in 1775 into a Bucks County, Pennsylvania Qua
ker family, Jacob Jennings Brown initially was a surveyor
in the Northwest around modern Cincinnati.

Returning to

the east, Brown secured a position as a secretary to Alex
ander Hamilton.

Under Hamilton's patronage, Brown was

elected a county-court judge at Watertown, New York.

In

1808, he was elected colonel of militia, less because he
was thought able to command than because his large estate
made a good spot for the quarterly drinking bouts which
passed for militia drill.

Politically active, Brown held

several pocket boroughs in Upstate New York.

Despite hav

ing been Hamilton's protege, Brown became a Republican
who delivered his boroughs to Tompkins in the elections
of 1811.

As a reward, the frontier farmer was commissioned

a general and given command of the Northern District of
p
New York.
Brown owed his Niagara command to the cele
brity won by his success, or rather his good fortune, in
the defense of Sacket's Harbor the year before.

His mili

tary knowledge was so slight that General Wilkinson asser
ted that Brown was unable to post the guards of a camp
correctly.

Wilkinson even told a story of his planting a

‘Hitsman, Incredible War, p. 96.
2Fletcher Pratt, "Sword of the Border," Infantry
Journal 14 (1931): 387-389-
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battery in a hollow for the advantage of elevating the guns
1

to fire at the heights above.“
The Second Brigade of Brown's army was commanded by
Eleazer Wheelcck Ripley.

Bern at Hanover, New Hampshire,

Ripley's family claimed Myles Standish as an ancestor.
Ripley came from a long line of theologians - his father
was a professor of divinity at Dartmouth, a college founded
in 1770 by Ripley’s namesake and grandfather, Eleazer
Wheelock.

Himself a graduate of Dartmouth (1800), Ripley

practiced law at Portland, Maine (then part of Massachu
setts).

Elected to the Massachusetts House, he soon ele

vated himself to Speaker.

Upon the outbreak of the war,

he volunteered for the 21st Regiment and was commissioned
a lieutenant.

A year later, Ripley was regimental colo

nel; by 181^, at age thirty, Ripley was a brigadier gen
eral .2
The War Department instructed Brown to direct his
offensive toward Burlington, isolating the forts at the
mouth of the river and severing their communications with
York.

Having gained the head of Lake Ontario, he was to

await the arrival of Chauncey.

With the aid of the navy,

Brown would reduce the Niagara forts or move directly upon

“James Wilkinson, Memoirs (Baltimore:
P. 17^.
2Tucker, Paltroons and Patriots, 2:

McKay, 1818),
603-60h.
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Kingston, as circumstances dictated.-

The views ana ex

pectations of the Secretary of War are described in a
letter to the President on April 30 in which he stated:
Eight, or even six thousand men landed in the hay
between Point Abino and Fort Erie and operating
either on the line of the Niagara or more directly,
if a more direct route is found, against the British
post at the head of Burlington Bay, cannot be re
sisted with effect without compelling the enemy so
to weaken his more eastern posts as to bring them
within reach of our means at Sachet's Harbor and
Plattsburg.2
In a letter of June 10, which actually put Brown's
army into motion, Armstrong informed that officer that
the Secretary of the Navy was of the opinion that Chauncey's squadron would not be ready to co-operate before
the 15th of July, but he added:
Tn—
ifflitediaias— occimamion to your troons,
and to prevent their blood from stagnating, why not
take Fort Erie and its garrison, stated at three or
four hundred men? Land between Point Abino and Erie
in the night; assail the fort by land and water; push
forward a corps to seize the bridge at Chippewa; and
be governed by circumstances in either stopping there
or going further. Boats may follow and feed you. If
the enemy concentrates his whole force on the line,
as I think he will, it will not exceed two thousand
men. 3
True to Armstrong's prediction, the British did not
shrink from accepting the American challenge.

Major-

“Scott, Memoirs, pp. 134-136.
p
Armstrong to Madison, 30 April 1814, as cited by
Cruikshank, Documents, pp. 111-113.
^Armstrong to Brown, 10 June 1814, ibid., p. 127.
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General Riall, the British commander, was an officer of
twenty years standing yet had seen little actual warfare.
Contemporaries described Riall as a short, stout, near
sighted man, of an impetuous temperament, and rashly
brave.1
Riall ordered Colonel, the Marquis of Tweedale, com
mander of the British light troops, to reconnoitre the
.American positions.

The Americans were strongly posted

upon the heights opposite Black Rock.

The next day, July

4, the .American army advanced, brushing aside Tweedale's
opposition and rebuilding the many bridges along their
path.

At nightfall, the American advance guard camped

within sight of the British field-works at Chippewa.

Gen

eral Brown was well informed respecting the movement and
numbers of his opponent for he estimated that Riall could
not bring more than 1,000 men into the field.-

With the

confidence engendered by consciousness of an overwhelming
numerical superiority, Brown continued his advance with
the main body of his army.
Riall hurriedly concentrated all available British
troops at Chippewa.

Five companies of the Royals were

brought forward while a dispatch called for the instant

1
"Merritt, Recollections, p.
2
Cruikshank, lundy1s Lane, p. 17.
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^7
recall of the 8th Regiment.

The fire-eating British com

mander was compelled to await the approach of the invaders
at Chippewa instead of assaulting them on the march as he
originally intended.

Reconnoitring their position on the

morning of July 5> Riall estimated the American force in
sight at 2,000.

The 8th having come up at noon, Riall
1

determined to attack the Americans without delay."
Brown's intention was to outflank the British position
by the construction of a bridge over the 150 yard wide
Chippewa River.

The American army did not possess pontoons

so this project would occupy several days.

The three bri

gades of the army bivouacked in a field, which was two
miles long and a half a mile wide, along the banks of the
Niagara River.

A dense forested area composed their flank.

A bridge existed at Chippewa but it was protected by a
battery on the south bank.

Adjacent to the battery stood

Fort Chippewa consisting of a few barracks, storehouses,
and a navy yard.
General Brown, in order to secure his flank, dis
patched Porter's Brigade to take up positions in the for
est.

The bulk of the American army busied themselves con

structing pontoons and preparing for a belated' July ^th
feast.

No offensive actions being expected from the Bri-

^Riall to Drummond, o July 1814, Archives, C. 684,
p. 51.
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tish, Brown did not post a picketline.
The British were not idle.

i

Scott and his staff,

"breakfasting "by invitation with a local family, nearly
fell prisoner to an Indian patrol.

Fearing for his life,
2

Scott sprinted back toward the American lines."

The In

dians did not follow, apparently being interested in re
connaissance , not combat.

Similar scouting parties passed

around the American camp and their reports induced Riall
to believe that the main body of Brown's army had not yet
come up.

Riall by now had three skeleton battalions of

infantry, numbering 1,300 rank and file, a troop of the
19th Dragoons, six pieces of field artillery, 300 Indians
and a like number of Lincoln Militia.^

In the meantime,

the Americans in his front had been joined by Ripley's
entire brigade and the greater part of Porter's bringing
the American forces available to Brown to 5,000 with nine
guns.^

They had encamped behind Street's Creek, a shallow

stream less than twenty yards in width at its mouth,
which was easily fordable everywhere.

A tract of culti

vated land in their front, divided into fields by ordinary

1Jacobs, The War of 1812, pp. 135-138.
Charles Elliott, Winfield Scott, the soldier and
man, 2 vols. (New York: MacMillan, 1937), 1: 147.
•^Riall to Drummond, 6 July 1814, Archives, C. 684,
p. 52.
^E. W. Ripley, Facts relative to the Campaign on the
Niagara as cited by Cruikshank, Documents, p. 134.
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log or brushwood fences, extended from the river to the
dense woods on the American left.

Near Chippewa, a thin

belt of trees stretched down almost to the water’s edge,
partially concealing the movements of either army from
the other.
late in the afternoon Riall aroused the attention of
his adversary by pushing forward a detachment of the Lin
coln Militia and the entire body of Indians, led by Cap
tain John Norton.

These elements established themselves

in the woods on the American left flank.

Brown promptly

ordered a portion of Porter’s brigade to drive them back.
Finding that the British offered an obstinate resistance,
Brown continued to pour in militia and Indian reinforce
ments until 1,300 men were engaged.

The skirmish lasted

half an hour, in the usual Indian mode, with a great deal
of firing and very little bloodshed.

Perceiving them1
selves seriously outnumbered, the British retreated.
While the opposing militia and Indians were engaged
in their skirmishing, Riall sent forward his three light

infantry companies of regulars.

Well-versed in forest

warfare from the experience of previous campaigns, they
concealed themselves in the thickets and awaited the ap
proach of the Americans.

When Porter's men were within

a few yards, a single heavy volley, pealing through the

Cruikshank, Lundy’s Lane, p. 18.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50

woods, threw the .Americans into utter confusion.

They

were, at the same time assailed in the flank by the mili
tia and Norton’s Indians.

This rout continued beyond

Street's Creek until stopped by elements of the 25th Regi
ment and a squadron of cavalry.

Several prisoners were

taken including three officers of the Pennsylvania Militia
and a Cayuga chief.

Le Fort was wounded and Dochstadter,

chief of the Cneidas, was among the n f t e e n Indians killed.

1

The Americans were in the midst of their holiday meal
when Riall's unexpected assault fell upon Porter's brigade.
But fortune was shining down on the American army that day,
Scott, ready to display his finely drilled machine whenever
possible, was conducting a parade.

Riall’s sudden onslaught

might otherwise have forced Brown's retirement had Scott
not been on hand with his brigade already in formation.
Hearing the crash of musketry, Scott began to debouch
across the bridge over Street's Creek, his troops deploying
under heavy fire with remarkable steadiness and parade
ground precision.

Brown, who witnessed Porter's rout,

galloped to Scott, positioned near the bridge, and ex
claimed:

"You will have a battle!"2

Without halting

Brown pushed on to the rear to put Ripley into motion,
leaving the direction of the battle to Scott.

1Ibid.
2Scott, Memoirs, 1:

128.
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Riall moved his entire force forward bringing up his
three pieces to engage the American artillery which had
taken up a position to command the road in their front.
The British artillery was pushed gradually forward until
it stood within 400 yards of its antagonists.
exchange followed.

A spirited

So incessant was the firing during

this phase of the battle, that Captain Nathan Tcwson,
commander of the American battery, was enveloped in smoke
and could not properly sight his guns.

Scott came racing

up to the battery and cried out, "Captain, more to the
left; the enemy is there!"

while pointing out the direc-

tion with his sword.
Three guns of Towson’s battery followed Scott's ad
vice.

Nevertheless the American guns were being swept

from the field until one of the British cassions was struc
by a shell and exploded.

This explosion disabled several

men and horses besides causing great confusion and depri2
ving the British of much of their ammunition.
In consequence of this unfortunate event, General
Riall was obliged to bring forward his infantry prematurel
to relieve his guns which were being menaced by American
infantry on the right flank.

Forming six companies of

the Royal Scots and five companies of the 100th Regiment
into two columns, parallel with each other, Riall led

'Elliott, Winfield Scott, 1: 121.
p
_
Cruikshank, nundy's Lane, p. 18.
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them in person against the center of the American position.
The 8th Regiment, enfeebled by disease and wearied by
its long march, was held in reserve.

Each of these bat

talions, their light companies detached, numbered less
than kOQ rank and file.

Scott's Brigade alone markedly
1

outnumbered the force about to attack it."
The less than inspiring performance of American arms
in the war led the British officers to make some sarcastic
remarks regarding American valor.

The Marquis of Tweedale

explained away American bravery as being due to the date July k.

He was soon to regret his jibe.

When Riall saw

the grey uniforms of Scott's Brigade, he was elated.

"Why

these are nothing more than Buffalo militia! " He did not
know that clothing shortages had forced Scott to dress his
men in militia grey instead of regular army blue.

Only

when "they deployed with the greatest regularity and
opened a heavy fire," did Riall realize that "These are
regulars, by God!"

To this day, in commemoration of the

Battle of Chippewa, American West Point cadets wear the
grey uniforms of the First Brigade.
The genuine hero of the victory cf Chippewa was Gen
eral Winfield Scott.

Riding up and down the lines he ex

claimed, "Let us make a new anniversary for ourselves" in

1Ibid.
2Riall to Drummond, 6 July 181^, Archives. C . 388,
p. 107.
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reference to the "Glorious Fourth."

Addressing Major

Jacob Hindmann of the artillery, he stated, "Let us put
down the federal convention by beating the enemy in front.
1

There is nothing in the constitution against t h a t i S u r 
veying his lines and anxious to save time, Scott, ever
conspicuous in his brilliant uniform, dashed along the
front rather than take the less exposed circuitous route
to the rear.

A cheer rose from every man as they witnessed
2
the exploits of their daring commander.
By the time the British had made their formations,
the Americans had brought up the whole of their artillery
and speedily reduced the British guns to silence.

These

pieces then directed deadly canister fire upon the advan
cing columns.

Scott maneuvered the 9th and 11th Regiments

in a wheeling movement overlapping the wings of the Bri
tish line.

Holding their fire until the British were

within sixty paces, the Americans opened up a fierce and
incessant fusilade.

Losing heavily at every step, the

Royals (1st Regiment of Foot, the oldest regiment in the
British army) and the 100th Regiment moved steadily for
ward until within 100 yards of the American lines when
they received the command to charge.

With all the futile

This proposed convention did take place at Hartford,
in December of 181^.
2Scott, Memoirs, 1:

129-
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bravery of Sir Edward Pakenham's columns at New Orleans,
the British marched into the mouths of the American mus
kets.
The fields were intersected by deep furrows and cover
ed with tall grass, which greatly impeded the progress of
the British advance, rendered footing uncertain.

Colonels

Gordon and Tweedale fell desperately wounded at the head
of their battalions.
struck down.

Nearly every field officer was

The men fell in heaps under the scathing

fire of the American infantry and artillery.

In the words
1
of Scott, "they mouldered away like a rope of sand."
As

the British moved forward the American artillery fire
literally tore great gaps in their ranks, which for some
time were steadily closed up.

Finally, the survivors be

came inextricably confused and the assault faltered.
With the British lines perceptively wavering, Scott
decided to launch a counter-attack.

Halting before the

11th United States Infantry Regiment, Scott inspired his
troops by stating:

"The enemy say that Americans are

good at long shot; but cannot stand the cold iron.
call upon you to give the lie to the slander.

I

Charge!"

With this, the regiment bolted forward.
When Riall saw his troops breaking, he did not fol
low.

At first, the fiery Irishman seemed to have in mind

a suicidal charge.

He rode straight toward the Americans,

1Ibid., p. 131.
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his aides at his side, as if seeking death in preference
to the humiliation of defeat.

Even this effort failed to

inspire his shattered troops.

His personal honor assured,

with many of his escort down and his uniform pierced hy
several halls, Riall was the last British officer to leave
the field.

1

The American counter-attack halted after the British
infantry broke.

In the absence of a pursuit, the British

were allowed a respite in which they brought forward the
reserve formation, the 8th Regiment.
accomplished in tolerable order.

The retreat was

Most of the dead and

many of the wounded were left upon the field and the guns
removed only by the gallant exertions of some of the dra
goons.

The troopers, who attached their own mounts to the
2
carriages, rode off in the face of the enemy.
The easy triumph was mainly owing to the American
superiority of numbers and artillery.

Judging from its

loses, Ripley's Second Brigade was scarcely engaged.

Por

ter’s Brigade was routed in the preliminary fight in the
woods and played no part in the actual battle.

Neverthe

less, Scott’s Brigade alone numbered 2,129 with most of
the 32? artillerymen engaged in his support.

American

^The Spirit of Our Times (Montreal), 16 March 1861,
as cited by Benson Lossing, The Pictorial field-back of
the War of 1812 (New York: Harpers', 1869), p. 811.
2
Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 18.
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numerical superiority was obvious to Riall who wrote in
his report:
Royal Scots and 100th Regiment charged with the
greatest gallantry, under the most destructive
fire but I am sorry to say, however, in this attempt
they suffered so severely that I was obliged to
withdraw them finding that further effort against
the superior numbers of the enemy would be unavail
ing.1
In his history of the war, Henry Adams chauvinistically
wrote:
The Battle of Chippewa was the only occasion during
the war when equal bodies of regular troops met face
to face, in extended lines on an open plain in broad
daylight, without advantage of position; and never
again after that combat was an army of American regu
lars beaten by British troops.2
This conclusion, although widely accepted by American
historians, is in error.

In his letter to Winder (May 6),

Scott claimed his strength at 1,700.

This, however, did

not include 287 officers and men of the First Battalion /
22nd Regiment which later was detached to Scott's command.
General Scott's biographer, Charles W. Elliott, accepts
Ripley's estimate of the strength of the First Brigade
stated at 2,129.

Adams discounts Ripley stating that

the entire army, on July 1, mustered 3.503 for duty, about

^Riall to Drummond, 6 July 181^, Archives, C. 388,
p. 107.
2

Henry Adams, History of the United States during the
Administration of James Madison, 2 vols. (New York: Scrib
ner's, 1889), 2 : -91.
-^Elliott, Winfield Scott, 1:

153-
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1,000 "being absent, sick, or detacned.

1

This n g u r e would

appear an underestimate in view of the level of discipline
and sanitation exercised at Camp Buffalo.

In his memoirs,

however, Scott speaks of a "deficiency of numbers" during
the battle.

Adams mistakingly interprets this to denote

the general situation.

In fact, this was in reference to

Scott's overambitious deployment in which his line was
formed into an obtuse angle, the apex toward the rear.
Riall's precipitate advance exposed his columns to flank
attacks.

Scott immediately recognized this and executed

a bold maneuver:

holding his center in position, he pushed
2
his wings forward opening intervals between his units.
Thus, Scott's "deficiency in numbers" was not in reference
to his ability to meet Riall but merely his inability to
maintain a solid tactical disposition while he sought to
infilade his assailants.
American loses have been variously stated but it is
unlikely they exceeded 400.

On the other hand, General

Riall lost upwards of 500, of whom two-fifths were killed
or missing.

Of nineteen officers of the 100th Regiment

who went into action, fourteen were killed or disabled,
with 190 non-commissioned officers and men.

Only 146 un

wounded men of this battalion returned from the field.

1
Adams, James Madison, 2:
^Scott, Memoirs, 1:

35-

131.
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Lieutenant George Lyons' company, posted off the extreme
left of the British line directly in front of the Ameri
can "battery, went into action with thirty-five officers
1
and men of whom only six escaped uninjured.
The seven
companies of the Royals suffered still more severely.
Eleven officers and 20? rank and file were reported as
killed, wounded, and missing.

Altogether these two bat

talions of the 100th and Royal Regiments lost ^22 officers
and men out of a total of 950-

On the whole, Riall’s

force was reduced by more than a third.

The loss sus

tained by the Lincoln Militia indicates that they fought
with equal stubbornness, six officers and forty men being
2
killed or wounded of the 110 committed.
The glory of the victory of Chippewa belongs to Win
field Scott and his excellent battalions.

At no time did

Brown play a role in the conduct of the battle.

This fact

was recognized by Brown who wrote:
Brigadier General Scott is entitled to the highest
praise our country can bestow - to him more than any
other man I am indebted for the victory of the 5th
of July.3
Brown's role in the battle was hardly praiseworthy.
Along with Ripley's brigade and a few units of Porter's

1Riall to Drummond, 6 July 181^, Archives. C. 388.
p. 108.
2Ibid.
■^Elliott, Winfield Scott, 1:

15^.
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militia, Brown made a wide circuit to the left attempting
to get between Riall and the river.

The action was over

before Brown's columns were concentrated.

Scott was left

to engage Riall without any troops held in reserve, an ob
vious tactical error.

Had the First Brigade been commanded

by a lesser general than Scott, the victors might well have
been clad in scarlet, not grey.
Wilkinson’s jibe at Brown's military knowledge appears
valid.

Convinced that the outnumbered British would not

dare attack, Brown did not even take the precaution to
establish a line of pickets.

With no proper outposts,

Riall's advance swept upon the startled .Americans.

If not

for the holiday parade, the British onslaught might well
have resulted in a romp rather than a bloody repulse.
The American nation, accustomed to recurring disas
ters and shameful defeats, was electrified by the news of
the victory.

The military debacles suffered in Canada,

in addition to the British blockade, had prompted many
New England Federalists to call for a convention.

Scott's

brigade, save for a single battalion of Pennsylvanians,
was composed of New Englanders.

They, in their repulse

of Riall, did much to defuse this movement.1

Throughout

America the news of Chippewa was greeted with bonfires,
church bells, and guns fired in salute.

History is filled

■^Caffrey, Twilight's Last Gleaming, p. 21^.
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with greater military feats but few succeeded in bringing
a greater shift in national feeling than Chippewa.
Brown continued in his attempt to flank the British
position at Chippewa by means of a bridge.

On July 7

Riall destroyed his field-works and abandoned Chippewa.
The redoubt at Queenstown was likewise evacuated and Riall
retired, unpursued, upon Fort C-eorge.

The British had

already been abandoned by the Indians and by many of the
militia who were alarmed for the safety of their families.
The militiamen were directed to collect their families and
cattle and reassemble at Burlington, which most of them
1

succeeded in doing.
Provisions had begun to fail and the garrisons were
placed on half rations.

Parties were sent out to scout

the country and drive cattle into Fort George.

The in

vading forces advanced to the summit of Queenstown Heights
where they menaced the British position.
mained inactive for several days.

Here they re

On the night of July

12, a company of the British 8th Regiment were reconnoit
ring the American outposts in hope of securing a few pri
soners.

This body of thirty-four men was intercepted by

General Joseph Swift of the New York-Militia with 120 vol
unteers.

A sharp skirmish insued in which the British

1
Cruikshank, Lundy's lane, p. 21.
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lost six killed while the American leader was killed.

1

Next morning the movements of his opponents led Riall
to helieve that an attempt would be made upon the depot
at Burlington.

Having increased the garrisons of the

three forts at the mouth of the Niagara, Riall resumed
his retreat toward the head of the lake with only 836 offi
2
cers and men.
Meanwhile, minute-guns could be heard from
the heights above as the Americans paid tribute to their
fallen general.

Riall encamped at Twenty Mile Creek

there to be reinforced by Colonel Hercules Scott and 600
men of the 103nd Regiment of Foot.
The prospect of a successful defense of
forts, if they were resolutely attacked, was
Fort George was garrisoned with 733 men.

the three
not promising

Beyond a simple

stockade, the fort possessed no means of resisting a de
termined assault.

Missassauga was manned by bOk men and

could not survive a bombardment while the reduction of
Forts George and Mississauga almost certainly sealed the
fate of Fort Niagara with its garrison of647.^
For more than a week, Brown lingered on

the brow of

Queenstown gazing anxiously out upon the blue waters of

'Ibid,
2Riall to Drummond, 12 July 1814, Archives, C. 388,
p. 1^6 .
-^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the lake "below in the vain hope that Chauncey would ap
pear.

Naval guns, in conjunction with Brown's army, would

easily reduce the British forts.

Moreover, the Battle of

Chippewa had put the finishing touches on the army that
Winfield Scott had hammered into an effective fighting
machine.

The Americans came out of the "battle with a new

sense of invincibility.

However, Brown delayed his move

ment toward Burlington until the British forts on his
flank were eliminated and without Chauncey's fleet, the
American general was wary of assaulting Fort George.

From

the American headquarters at Chippewa General Brown wrote
triumphantly to Armstrong:
I will advance, not doubting but the gallant and
accomplished soldiers I have the honor to command
will break all opposition to the shores of Ontario
north of Fort George, where if Commodore Chauncey
can meet us, it is well.l
Brown was doomed to disappointment.

The Secretary

of War was not empowered to command the movements of the
commodore.

On July 13, Brown wrote a frenzied letter to

Chauncey in these terms:
Meet me on the lake shore north of Fort George with
your fleet and we will be able, I have no doubt, to
settle a plan of operations that will break the power
of the enemy in Upper Canada, and that in the course
of a short time. At all events, let me hear from
you. I have looked for your fleet with the greatest
anxiety since the 10th. I do not doubt my ability
to meet the enemy in the field and march to any di
rection - your fleet carrying the necessary supplies.
We can threaten Fort George and Niagara, carry 3ur-

4
_
Brown to Armstrong, 6 July 1814, as cited by Cruikshank, Documents, p. 139-
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lington Heights and York, and proceed direct to King
ston and carry that place. For God's sake, let me
see you. . . . There is not a douht resting in my mind
that we have between us the command of sufficient
means to conquer Upper Canada within two months if
there is prompt and zealous co-operation.Chauncey, ill with fever, would do nothing until com
pletely ready to do so.

On July 19, Secretary Armstrong

wrote Brown:
If Chauncey gives you his aid in taking Fort George
and Niagara and intercepting supplies and reinforce
ments to Burlington and York, you will by the first
day of September present a line of posts from the
mouth of Niagara to C-louster Bay covering and quiet
ing all westward of that line and menacing Kingston
to the east.2
But, on July 22, the Secretary of War was forced to write:
The delay and silence of the Commodore are unaccount
able. My letter to you fixing the first day on which
he would certainly leave Sacket's Harbor and by which
your movements were to be governed, was written at
the instance of the President, who was anxious to
prevent any want of co-operation between the two arms
from ignorance of each other’s movements.3
Not even the combined authority of the President of the
United States and the Secretary of War could bring about
a co-operation between the fleet and the army.

It was

August 10 before General Brown received a reply to his
letter of July 13.

In that answer, Chauncey wrote:

4
Brown to Chauncey, 13 July 181^, ibid., p. 1^4.
^Armstrong to Brown, 19 July 181^, ibid., pp. 1^9-150•
•^Armstrong to Brown, 22 July 181^-, ibid. , p. 156.
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That you might find the fleet somewhat of a conven
ience in the transportation of provisions and stores
for the use of the army and an agreeable appendage
to attend its marches and countermarches, I am ready
to believe, but, sir, the Secretary of the Navy has
honored me with a higher destiny - we are intended
to seek and fight the enemy's fleet. This is the
great purpose of the C-overnment in creating this
fleet and I shall not be diverted in my efforts to
effectuate it by any sinister attempt to render us
subordinate to, or an appendage of, the Army .In this letter, the commodore displayed himself as
a master of the sarcastic utterance, the explanation being
that he resented the action of the War Department in plac
ing him second in authority to an army officer and bitterly
resented the suggestion that the function of the navy was
to be a mere appendage of the army.

This attitude and

spirit of Commodore Chauncey is an illuminating commentary
upon the efficiency and authority of the government at
Washington.

Small wonder that its war operations so fre

quently ended in shameful disaster.
From time to time, Brown's columns wound down into
the plain and crept within cannon-shot of the batteries
of Fort C-eorge.

During these weeks, the Americans did

not succeed in accomplishing an effective blockade of the
British works.

Upon one occasion, two British field-guns

galloped out of Fort George and shelled the American rear
guard.

The same day, five American cavalry videttes were■

surprised and carried away by Canadian militia lurking in

“Chauncey to Brown, 10 August 1814, ibid., p. 162.
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the woods along their line of march.

The women and chil

dren in the farm houses and fields by the wayside conspired
to mislead and baffle the detachments sent in pursuit.
Meanwhile, a levee en masse of the militia from Long
Point to the Bay of Quinte had been proclaimed.

In a few

days, Riall was joined by upwards of a thousand men of
different battalions, "many of them fine serviceable fellows," but badly armed and undisciplined.

A goodly num

ber of these marched in from the London district.

Those

who had temporarily deserted rapidly recovered from their
panic and a considerable number of stragglers came into
the British lines.
The course of the American militia and Indians was
marked by pillage.

"The whole population is against us,"

wrote Major Daniel McFarland of the 23rd United States In
fantry.

"Not a foraging party goes out but is fired on,

and frequently returns with diminished numbers.

This

state was to have been anticipated.

The militia and In2
dians have plundered and burnt everything.”
Much to the

Americans' surprise, they found that the Canadian peoples
were still "fervent beyond parallel in the cause of their
king and country."^

Willcocks' Canadian volunteers eagerly

“Riall to Drummond, 12 July 181^, Archives, C. 68^-,
p. 177.
“Cruikshank, Lundy's L a n e , p. 22.
•^I’
oid.
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seized the opportunity of wreaking summary vengeance upon
their loyalist enemies.

Old men and hoys were sent as

prisoners into the United States and women were often
maltreated.
Before the invasion, General Brown had intimated that
he expected to be in a position to invest Forts George and
Mississauga by July 10.

This engagement would have been

joined had Chauncey's ships been in sight.

Contrary to

the advice of his engineer officers, Brown deemed it nec
essary to await siege-guns and wrote an urgent dispatch to
hasten their arrival.
While Brown sat at Queenstown and Chauncey remained
in the safety of Sacket’s Harbor, the partisan warfare
daily grew more intense.

On July 15, an American wagon-

train was attacked at Queenstown and the greater part of
it destroyed.

On the following night, an outpost at Fort

Erie was overwhelmed.

Next day, the Canadian militia sur

prised and took a cavalry picket at St. David's, Wilicocks
himself narrowly escaping with his life.

A similar fate

befell an American troop at Beaver Dams.

On the 18th,

while the main body of the American army was engaging in
a reconnaissance-in-force toward Fort George, the British
again dashed into St. David's and Queenstown securing many
prisoners.

These incidents so exasperated the invaders

that upon July 19 they burnt the entire village of St.
David's, alleging (probably with truth) that the inhabi-
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tants had participated in the attack on their wagons and
had killed an officer of dragoons.

This was followed up

by the destruction of every dwelling between Queenstown
and Niagara Falls save for the home of Thomas Lundy, who,
ironically like General Brown, was a Quaker from Bucks
County Pennsylvania.

These proceedings were attended by

such revolting conduct on the part of the New York militia
under Colonel Isaac Stone, that Major McFarland, who was
sent to cover their retreat, declared that he would resign
his commission if the commanding general had not been dis
missed from the service.

A subsequent court-martial was

convened with Stone being removed from his command.
Having been joined by several companies of the Glen
garry Light Infantry from York, Riall advanced to Ten Mile
Creek.

The British left wing, composed of militia and

Indians, threatened the rear of the American position
from DeCew's Falls.

The entire male population immediately

flew to arms actuated by a spirit of intense hostility to
ward the American invaders.

Riall's scouts found their

way into St. David’s, Queestown, and even Chippewa, har
assing the enemy's pickets and capturing stragglers.

Mean

while, British apprehensions were aroused by mysterious
negotiations on the part of their Indian allies with their
kinsmen in the American service.

In addition, an American

‘Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 23.
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raid from Detroit upon the defenseless settlement of Port
Talbot compelled Riall to detach the Oxford battalion of
the militia and some Indians in the direction of south1

western Upper Canada.*
On July 20, having left about 300 men in possession
of Queenstown Heights, Brown advanced with the remainder
of his army, within two miles of Fort George.

Here he

encamped collecting materials for siege batteries.

Brown

appears to have entertained the hope of inducing Riall to
hazard another engagement against unequal numbers.

Riall

concentrated a force of 1,700 regulars, 700 Lincoln Mili
tia, and 700 Indians at Twelve Mile Creek with the inten
tion of pouncing on Brown's flank should the American
general attempt an investment of the forts.

Fort George

was then garrisoned by 4-00 men of the Royal Scots and 260
of the 100th Regiment; Fort Mississauga by 290 of the 8th
Regiment, a company of Negro volunteers, and a few artil
lerymen and artificers; while Fort Niagara was held by
550 men of the 4lst Regiment and fifty artillerymen.

Near

one-fourth of these garrisons were upon the sick lists
2
and others too young to be of much service.
Deserters from the American army came into the Bri
tish lines with increased regularity.

From them, Riall

^Riall to Drummond, 12 July 1814, Archives, C. 684,
P. 173.
2Riall to Drummond, 20 July 1814, ibid., p. 182.
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was able to discover that Brown had been joined by considerable reinforcements since his success at Chippewa.

1

He had also assembled a number of boats at Lewistown so
as to better facilitate the provisioning of his forces
without the necessity of preserving the long line of com
munications with Fort Erie.
Also on July 20, a company of the C-lengarrys, com
manded by Captain James FitzGibbon, reconnoitred toward
Queenstown.

From Queenstown Heights, FitzGibbon obtained

an excellent view of the entire American army spread out
in the plain below.

As he watched, the Americans began

to strike their tents and retreat toward Queenstown.
Staying too long in his crow's nest, FitzGibbon's party
was detected by American
resulted in

light infantry.

A fire-fight

the eviction of the 3ritish who werepursued

almost to the British outposts, then centered at Ten Mile
Creek.

That night the American army slept at Queenstown

while the British pushed their advance-guard to Four Mile
2
Creek where communications were restored with the forts.
The sudden retirement would seem to be a result of
Brown's fear lest his lines of retreat be threatened by
the militia then rising in response to the levee en masse.

^Riall

to Drummond, 16 July 181^, ibid., p.1?6.

2Riall

to Drummond, 23

July 181^, ibid., p.186.

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Discouraged by the lack of co-operation from the navy and
worried about his flank and rear, Brown ordered a retreat
beyond the Chippewa River.

Relinquishing all hope of

Chauncey's intervention, Brown hoped to lull the British,
by his retrograde movement, into a false sense of security
Then Brown invisioned a rapid march upon Burlington, there
by trapping the British in the bottleneck of the Niagara
peninsula.

He harbored no doubts that the American army

was superior to anything the British could field against
him but had based his hopes of reducing the forts entirely
on the arrival of Chauncey’s squadron with heavy artillery
Nevertheless, Brown's bold plan was not without its merits
Unfortunately for the American scheme, across the
lake at York, General Drummond arrived from Kingston with
400 men of the Second Battalion / 89th Regiment of Foot.
These solid soldiers, under the command of Colonel Joseph
Warton Morrison, had played an important role in the hardwon victory at Chrysler's Farm the autumn before.

Two

companies of the 104th Regiment had already been sent for
ward to strengthen Raill.

The commanding officer of this

body of troops was Lieutenant-Colonel William Drummond of
Keltie, a nephew of the British commanding general.

Fur

ther reinforcements were making their way westward leaving
the vital fortress of Kingston almost without a garrison.

^Drummond to Prevost, 23 July 1814, ibid., p. 188.
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One of General Drummond’s first acts was to order the
discharge of all the very young and old militiamen with
the object of relieving the troublesome logistical situation.

Learning that the .Americans had established Lewis-

town as their logistics base, he immediately embarked the
89th Regiment in two vessels, Star and Charwell, with in
structions to proceed directly to the mouth of the Niagara.~

Upon their arrival, Lieutenant-Colonel John Tucker

was instructed to draft two-thirds of the garrisons from
the forts making, with the 89th and the flank companies
of the 104th Regiment, a body of about 1,500 men.

At day

break on July 25 this force was to move against the Ameri
can batteries begun near Youngstown.

In conjunction with

this, Riall was instructed to advance toward St. David's
in the hope of riveting American attention upon the Cana
dian, and not the American, shore.

Drummond informed Riall

in a letter on July 12 that a bold and successful stroke
at the American supply depot would seriously jeopardize
the position of the invaders.

However he explicitly

stated that no major engagement was to be accepted until
the remainder of the British reinforcements were brought
up.

Then, the British general confidently expected to

■^Drummond to Prevost, Zh July 181^, ibid., p. 197.
2Ibid.
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campaign at a single Plow.

1

Riall had learned his lesson well at Chippewa and he
too cautioned against any precipitous movement against the
enemy's concentrated strength.

Riall believed that the

reinforcements, already on the march, consisting of three
strong regular battalions, would "create such a force as
to render the enemy's discomfiture and annihilation comp
plete.
Little did the general realize that the fateful
clash of arms was but a few short hours away.

^Drummond to Prevost, 27 July 181L, ibid., p. 211.
^Riall to Drummond, 2k July 181L, ibid., p. 202.
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III.

LUNDY’S LANE

In the early evening of July 24, Drummond himself
went on "board the schooner K.M.S. Netley and set sail for
Niagara to take command of the troops in the field.

Due

to his "zeal, intelligence, and local knowledge," the Duke
of York selected Drummond for the Canadian command.

The

same officer saw Riall as "an active and intelligent young
man."1

These officers were nobly supported by many gal

lant and resourceful young officers.

Colonel Hercules

Scott had been with Abercromby in Egypt and under Welling
ton in India.

Harvey, Morrison, and Pearson had repeatedly

distinguished themselves in the preceeding campaigns against
the Americans.

As the historian Brigadier Ernest Cruikshank

pointed out in 1891, "few in that fighting age could lead
2
a charge better than Drummond of Keltie."
When General Drummond landed at Fort Niagara at day
break, it 'was learned that the situation had been markedly
altered.

General Brown had retired to Chippewa and Riall

had taken the opportunity to push beyond the line St.
David’s-Queenstown to a strategic rise near Niagara
Falls.

Commanding the pivotal nodal point at the junction

of Lundy's Lane and Portage Road, Riall was In a position

1Grey, Lundy1s Lane, p. 30* -ke Duke of York was
Commander-in-chief of all British forces.
“Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 35.
74
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to resist any American advance while capable of readily
being reinforced from the rear.

At nightfall on July 24,

the dispositions of the British forces were as follows:
a)

b)

c)

d)

The First Brigade, Colonel Scott in command, com
posed of a detachment of the 19th Light Dragoons,
half a battalion of the 8th, and seven companies
of the 103rd, with two 6-pound field-guns, lay
at Twelve Mile Greek;
The Second Brigade, Tucker commanding, held the
forts at the mouth of the Niagara. This force
consisted of half a battalion of the Royal Scots,
the 2nd Battalion of the 4lst, and a wing of the
100th, as well as two 24-pounders and two 6-pound
guns. Tucker's units had that very day been rein
forced by Morrison and his detachments from the
89th Regiment of Foot;
The Third Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pear
son, was designated the Light Brigade. It was
made up of a troop of the 19th, the light com
panies of the 8th and 103rd. the Glengarry Light
Infantry, and the Incorporated Militia. This
force encamped at Four Mile Creek;
The Fourth Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Perry’s
command, consisted of three battalions of militia
and a body of Indians who formed the right wing
of the British line extending along Twelve Mile
Creek as far as DeCew Falls. Four battalion com
panies of the Royal Scots and four battalions of
militia, with three 6-pounders and a howitzer,
were held in reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel
John Gordon.1

On paper, this looks to be a formidable force yet the
battalions of the Royal Scots, 8th, and 100th were skele
ton formations.

The latter could only muster one captain,

three subalterns, and 250 effectives while the others were
scarcely any stronger.

The militia units were small in

numbers and miserably armed and equipped.

There were, in

^lbid., pp. 25-26.
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total, about 4,000 men scattered over thirty miles.
Riall's position did allow for a speedy concentration,
at a few hours' notice, in a strongly defensible posi
tion atop what is now Drummond Kill.”
On the evening of the 23rd, Brown's army encamped
upon their victorious field between Street’s Creek and
Chippewa with a battalion of riflemen and a regiment of
militia still posted at Lewistown Heights.

The advance

picketlines of the Lewistown garrison extended as far as
Youngstown with the principle supply base removed to Fort
Schlosser.
At midnight, Colonel Pearson was ordered by Drummond
to advance his Third Brigade, numbering about 800, along
Portage Road.

By 7 a.m. of July 25, Pearson was in pos2
session of the high ground at Lundy's Lane.
All this

was done without encountering any armed resistance.

In

the course of the march, this detachment was animated by
the spectacle of two stout country-women bringing in an
American soldier whom they had disarmed and made their
prisoner.

3

"Hitsman, Incredible War, p. 198.
p
Drummond to Prevost, 27 July 1814, Archives, C .
684, p. 235-^Cruikshank, ed. , Contemporary Narratives, p. 77.
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Instructions were fqrwarded by Riall to Scott to move
upon the same spot (from Twelve Mile Creek) at 3 a.m. but
these orders were subsequently countermanded resulting in
First Brigade remaining in quarters until the afternoon.
Only Riall, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond
and a small escort, joined Pearson in the morning of that
fateful day.

These movements forced General Drummond to

alter his plan of operations.

Morrison, with the 89th, a

detachment of the Royals, and another of the 8th, two 2k~
pounders, and a party of rocketeers, was directed to march
to Riall*s aid at Lundy's Lane.

On the opposite shore,

Tucker's force of 500 advanced from Fort Niagara supported
upon the river by a number of boats manned by seamen under
the command of Captain Alexander Dobbs, R.N. Tucker's
column arrived at Lewistown by noon and expelled the small
garrison after a trifling skirmish, capturing a hundred
tents and a quantity of other stores.

Their action com

plete, the light company of the 4lst and the detachment
of the Royals were brought over to reinforce Morrison's
column bringing that force to some 800 effectives.
After a brief halt, Pearson's column resumed the
march.

At 6 p.m. a dragoon rode up in great haste to meet

General Drummond who was in the rear of. the column.

The

trooper informed Drummond that the Americans were moving

Drummond to Prevost, 27 July 181^, Archives, C-68^-,
p. 235-
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on Riall's position in great strength.

Upon hearing this

startling news, the British general raced forv/ard and on
reaching Lundy's Lane, to his intense displeasure, he
found Riall in the process of quitting the hill.”

Only

units of the Light Brigade were covering the retreat while
the Americans were within a few hundred yards of the crest
of the hill.

The narrow road leading to Queenstown was

choked by Morrison's column which by now was within the
commanding general's view from atop the prominence that
now bears his name.

To continue a retreat under such cir

cumstances would almost certainly hazard disaster.

Anxious

to make use of the best defensive position south of Queens
town, the fifty foot flat-topped hill at Lundy's Lane, and
unwilling "to baulk the ardour of the troops," Drummond
2
decided to stand and fight.
He at once countermanded
the movement, ordering Lieutenant Tompkins, with his guns,
to hold the advancing Americans in check until the British
3

could come up and consolidate.
In the course of the afternoon, General Brown learned
that the British were advancing in considerable strength
along the right bank of the river.

Later, news came of

■^Cruikshank, Lundy’s Lane, p. 27.
2Grey, Lundy *s Lane, pp. 27-28.
^Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 28.
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the coup at Lewistown.

Brown concluded that his tase at

Schlosser would he the next post to he assailed.

In pre

paration for his rapid advance upon Burlington, the Ameri
can general had reserved only one tent to every ten men
and only enough provisions for the march to the head of
Lake Ontario.1
Schlosser.

The rest of his haggage was maintained at

The British move against Lewistown appeared

to give Brown the decisive advantage.

The American army

had enjoyed two days rest after their short march from
Queenstown and Port George.

With the British forces di

vided, Brown believed that the favorable moment for the
executing of his offensive had arrived.

The force at

Lundy's Lane was reported to he nothing more than a body
of militia sent forward as a corps of observation.
^ p.m. Brown ordered his entire force under arms.

At
Winfield

Scott’s First Brigade, accompanied by Towson's company of
artillery with three guns and the entire body of cavalry
and mounted riflemen, marched toward Queenstown with in
structions that if opposed, it was to engage the enemy
until the remainder of the American army could be committed.
The American generals were unaware of Drummond's
arrival on the frontier with reinforcements.

Emerging

1Ibid.
2Mahon, The War of 1812, p. 273-
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from *the woods nearly opposite the falls, Scott came into
view of an extended line of battle astride the hill.
Scott dispatched Major Roger Jones to gallop the
three miles to the American camp at Chippewa. Scott proi
mised to hold his ground until reinforced.
The American
advance had already been met by British skirmishers fight
ing a delaying action behind which Drummond was hurriedly
reconstituting his lines.
The leading elements of Pearson's column already be
gan to arrive upon the field.

The American infantry, pur

suing the British light infantry, were suddenly hit by
artillery fire.

Scott had two options:

He could break

off the action and await Brown or he could assault the
British before they could receive reinforcements and sol
idify their positions.
Once engaged, Scott felt himself obliged to attack.
A. retreat, exposed to artillery fire and a British pursuit,
might soon dissolve into a rout.

The rapidly forming Bri

tish lines directed a heavy fire upon Scott's formations.
To an officer of Scott's stamp, any retrograde movement
never really was an option.

The brilliant y o u n g Virginian

might well have adopted Frederick the Great’s motto:
"1'audace, l'audace, toujours 1'audace."

Military his

torian Mathew Steele wrote of Scott:

^Elliott, Winfield Scott, 1:

172.
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The fault of attacking superior numbers and attacking
vigorously as General Scott always did, is one seldom
to be censured in a leader. Scott, like all courag
eous, dashing leaders, had the quality of inspiring
his men with something of his own spirit.Since Chippewa, the army regarded the First Brigade as in
vincible and Scott, considering the effect of his retreat
upon the rest of the division, chose to hold the front and
2
attack.
The Battle of Lundy's Lane was an accident of fate.
Neither Brown nor Drummond had any illusions as to what
was at stake.

A victory would secure for the Americans

the control of Upper Canada as far as Kingston.

A victory

by Drummond would mean that Upper Canada, for months,
would be free from any dangerous attacks from the enemy.
As far as the rival generals were concerned, the fight
must be to the finish.

With the subordinate officers and

with the rank and file, the battle would be a test of the
fighting qualities

ofthe

opposing armies. In this con

flict, honor and famewere in the balance.

In addition,

the deepest passions of both armies were aroused.

The

Americans were burning with the desire to wipe out the
shame and humiliation of the many defeats suffered during
the past two years

atthe hands of inferior numbers.

British were fired

bythe desire to reverse the defeat

“Mathew Steele, American Campaigns (Washington:
Adams, 1909), P- 79
2Scott, Memoirs, 1:

139-
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The

sustained at Chippewa.
The exact strength of Brown's army upon the eve of
battle is difficult to establish.
siderable reinforcements.

He had received con

As soon as it was known that

he had passed the frontier, troops were put into motion
from Detroit, Ohio, and Sachet's Harbor.

A letter in the

Baltimore Dispatch, dated July 12, told of Brown's being
reinforced by one thousand men.

These reinforcements of

regulars included detachments of the 11th, 22nd, and 23rd
Infantry Regiments which brought those units to full
-j

strength.

On July 16, deserters reported that 700 men

crossed the river from Lewistown to reinforce the army,
then lying at St. David's.

Furthermore, the Niles' Regis

ter of Baltimore reported that "C-eneral Brown has received
some handsome reinforcements from Buffalo, and there is
no reason to believe he cannot maintain his ground for
2
some time."
The most authoritative evidence on the subject is to
be found in a pamphlet published by General Ripley in 1815
It contained an official statement showing the effective
strength of the two brigades of regulars to have been 136
officers and 2,620 non-commissioned officers and men.

On

the 24th, 100 men of the 22nd Infantry and 220 of the 1st,

"Baltimore Dispatch, no date given, as cited by Cruik
shank, Lundy's Lane, p. 29.
2Niles Register (Baltimore), June 1814, ibid.
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who were not included in Ripley's memorandum, arrived from
Fort Erie.

Ripley subsequently produced a second report

stating the effective strength of Porter's Brigade on
July 30, five days after the battle, to have been sixtyone officers and 538 rank and file.

The loss to this

corps in the action of July 25. according to the official
published return, was 112.

However, this does not include

loss from desertion and straggling which are endemic in a
militia force, especially after a hard-fought fight.
Thus, the total given by Ripley for the entire American
-J

army was 4,059 officers and men.

The general staff, dra

goons, mounted riflemen, and a detachment of engineers
still must be accounted for but no official return has
ever been published.

Making these allowances and consid

ering the probable understatement of militia loses, it is
my opinion that Brown fielded an army of at least 4,500
of which 3,500 were regulars.

Taking into consideration

men detailed to camp duties and illness, Brown still must
have been able to bring 4,000 men into action.

American

historian Henry Poulson, writing at the turn of the cen
tury, cites a letter written in Buffalo the day after the
2
battle which quotes that exact figure.
Brown possessed

•1

Frank Severance, ed., Parers relating to the War of
1812 in the Niagara Frontier. Buffalo: Buffalo Historical
Society, 1962), pp. 69-78.
2
Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 30.
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nine artillery pieces, three of which were 18-pounders and
one a 5 1/2 inch howitzer.

In artillery, the Americans

enjoyed a decided preponderance from the onset of the en
gagement yet the excellence of the British position coun1
terbalanced Brown’s advantage.
Leaving the Queenstown Road (Portage) at nearly a
right angle, Lundy’s Lane followed a course almost due
west for about half a mile when it begins to trend north
ward.

The road, an old Indian tract, was named after the

Lundys, a loyalist family whose homestead was a mile and
a half west of the battlefield.

Almost a hundred yards

west of the junction of the roads, on the south side of
Lundy's Lane, stood a Presbyterian church.

A low frame

building with a distinct red coat of paint, it occupied
the highest point of the rise.

The hill slopes gently

southward and westward but dips more abruptly to the east
and north.

On the right of the church lay a small enclo

sure in which a few weatherbeaten wooden slabs and rude
headstones marked the graves of the fathers of the settle
ment.

Southward, a thriving young orchard covered the

slope below the graveyard extending quite to the edge of
Portage Road and encircling a small farm and out buildings.
Meadows and cultivated fields lay beyond bounded by thick
woods which extended to the river and along its banks."

"Mahon, The War of 1812, p. 27^.
^Grey, Lundy's Lane, pp. 28-29.
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Fearing an anibush, Winfield Scott carefully reconnoi
tred these woods with his cavalry patrols.

While the

Americans were thus occupied, the British light infantry
regained the commanding position they had just abandoned.
The lane was then bordered by many apple, cherry, and
peach tress.

In these orchards, the C-lengarry Light In

fantry took up their ground forming the right flank of the
British position.

Tompkins' two field-pieees, with a

small Royal Marine Artillery Congreve Rocket detachment,
was sighted at the summit of the knoll among the graves
so as to sweep the approaches.

The units of the Incorpor

ated Militia were posted on the extreme left of the British
line behind the fences and in the fields.

An interval of

more than two hundred yards was left unoccupied, which was
thickly overgrown with scrub-pine and brushwood.

The ex

tremities of both wings were inclined slightly forward.
The remainder of Morrison's column formed to the rear of
the guns in the shelter of the ridge, as they came up.
The troopers of the 19th Dragoons were posted on the high
1

road some distance further away.No better ground for receiving an attack could be
found for many a mile.

Small parties of the 1st and 2nd

Lincoln Militia continued to arrive from their various
outpost duties.

These units reinforced the Glengarrys on

-j

“Drummond to Prevost, 27 July 181^, Archives, C. 681,
p. 236. ■
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the British right flank.

The entire number of all ranks

in the field when this formation was complete was 1 ,637,
of whom half were provincial troops.

Soon after the

"battle commenced, the light company of the Royal Scots
arrived from Twenty Mile Creek.

A courier was sent off

to countermand the march of the remainder of Colonel
Scott's column which, it was learned, had taken the road
i
from the Beechwoods to Queenstown.
A romantic myth has evolved that Drummond’s force
was composed of Wellington’s veterans.

With the exception

of Scott and perhaps a small number of other officers ex
changed from other regiments, not a man in the entire
force had ever served under that illustrious commander.
For that matter, very few had seen any active duty outside
o
Canada.“
As the Americans emerged from the woods, the 9th,
11th, and 22nd regiments deployed in the fields on the
left of Portage Road.

The 25th, under Major Thomas S.

Jesup, debouched to the right of the road.

The American

artillery was brought up and unlimbered upon the road.
Scott's First Brigade numbered 1,506 with artillery units,
two troops of Dragoons and the New York commands of Brough

^Drummond to Prevost, 25 July 181^, Archives, C. 68^,
p. 239.
2
Charles Stewart, The service of British regiments
in Canada and North America (Ottawa: Department of Nation
al Defence, 1962), pp. 112-12?.
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1

ton and Stone adding anotner 300 men.'
Palling "back under pressure, the British skirmishers
frequently formed as if to offer resistance.

The Americans

deployed and made the necessary preparations to sweep away
the British.

No sooner did the Americans threaten; than

the British melted away.

Much valuable time was gained

by these maneuvers, which continued until the American ad
vance guard was within musket range of the British firing
line.
The sun was about an hour and a half high (between 6
and 7 p.m.) when Scott began the engagement by a general
attack of light troops along the entire front of the Bri
tish position.

On the right, the C-lengarrys easily main

tained their ground.

In the confusion, a section of the

Royal Scots was brought forward.

Startled by the sudden

apparition among the trees of men in green uniforms, not
unlike those they encountered earlier (American riflemen)
at Lewistown, the Royals fired a volley into the Glengarrys.
This resulted in several casualties and increased confusion
on the British flank.
Having observed the British forces opposed to him,
Scott satisfied himself that he was facing only a portion
of Drummond's army.

He quickly decided to launch a frontal

assault while simultaneously turning each of the flanks.

■^Babcock, Niagara Frontier, pp. 1^3_1^8-
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Scott formed the 11th and 22nd United States Infantry regi
ments for the direct assault while detailing the 9th and
25th to turn the flanks.

The center attack was not pushed

with vigor being flung back by artillery fire alone.

Cap

tain Towscn's two 18-pounders were unable to silence the
British battery.

The withering fire of the well-served

British guns cut down the Americans before they reached
the foot of the hill.
The Americans soon gained a decided edge on the left
flank.

Observing the belt of unoccupied ground next to

the river, Scott ordered Jesup to take the 25th Infantry
on a wide curcuit through the undergrowth.

His object

was to turn Drummond's flank and gain control of the Queens
town Road from the rear.

Favored by the approach of night

and concealed by the thick woods, Jesup's men made their
way unperceived into the interval.

The Incorporated Mili

tia, in the midst of shifting toward the left, was caught
entirely by surprise.

Jesup's charge swept away the mili

tia battalion taking prisoner four officers and one hun
dred men.

Following up his success, Jesup advanced as

far as the road.

Finding it occupied by the 19th Dragoons,

Jesup immediately dealt with the troopers as he had done
with the militia.

The routed cavalry rallied some miles

north of the field.
This was not the full measure of the American success.
The 8th Regiment, its flank exposed by the rout of the

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90

The Battle of Lundy’s Lane
July 25, 1B1U.
First Phase: the repulse of Scott's
Brigade. 8 p.m.
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Map adapted from original
battlefield sketch enclosed
in dispatch of 5 August l8lli:
Prevost to Lord Bathurst
as cited by Cruikshank, Lundy's
Lane, pp. i-ii.
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militia, had to follow suit. Major Jesup's light company,
under aptly named Captain Daniel Ketchum, scored two fur
ther successes.

Captain Loring, aide-de-camp to General

Drummond, was captured while attempting to locate the cav
alry.

General Riall, that thirty-eight year old, hot

tempered Irishman, having heen, as usual, in the thick of
the fighting, fell wounded (which subsequently required
his arm to he amputated.)

The unlucky general was being

carried to the rear in the gathering darkness.

His stretcher-

bearers' witless cry of "Make room there, men, for General
RiallI" took the party directly into Ketchum's troops.
These valuable prisoners were speedily hurried from the
field and when their identity became known to the remainder
of the brigade it became a signal for a loud and prolonged
cheer.

Cheering became general along the entire American

line, having been taken up by Ripley and Porter's advancing
columns.~
The American cheer for Riall's capture was countered
by a British shout when a lucky shot with an unpredictable
Congreve rocket struck one of Towson’s caissons which in
stantly exploded with a great bang.

The successful Bri

tish battery redoubled its fire overpowering but not si-

Ketchum!s report appeared in the Niles' Register, as
cited by Cruikshank, Lundy's lane, p. 33Major Jesup's memorandum as cited by Cruikshank, Con
temporary narratives, pp. 235-2^2 .
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lencing the American guns.

The remnant of the Incorpora

ted Militia reformed in the rear of the 89th.

This fine,

mainly Irish, unit had defeated four times its number at
Crysler's Farm the November before.

1

Fronting Portage

Road and covering the flank and rear of the troops atop
the hill, the 89th's musketry soon compelled Jesup to re
linquish the position he had just gained.

In the action,

Colonel Robinson fell seriously wounded, his command de
volving on Major James Kerby.
Scott immediately discerned that the key to American
success lay in the capture of the British guns.

Regroup

ing the 9th, 11th, and 22nd regiments after their initial
half-hearted assault, Scott once again committed his regu
lars to a direct attack.
unable to lend support.

Once again, Towson's guns were
This general advance was carried

with greater conviction by the Americans, who threatened
to overrun the British guns.

Drummond immediately seized

upon the situation and counterattacked with elements of
the 89th, 8th and Royal Scots.

This action culminated in

a fierce, no-holds-barred struggle in which both sides
suffered grievious loses.
Scott’s battalions were clearly losing this renewed
musketry exchange with the British regulars.

1

vols.

The assai-

John Fortescue, A History of the British Army, 13
(London: MacMillan, 1899-1930)> 9 - 236.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93

lants finally retired leaving the slope strewed with their
dead and wounded.

During the repulse, Scott's brigade

suffered 600 casualties among the 1,300 committed to the
attach.

Major Henry Leavenworth, commander of the 9th

United States Infantry, ashed of Scott, "Sir, your rule
for a retreat now holds good?"

The rule being that when

a third of a battalion were decapacitated, the officer in
command was entitled to order a retirement.

Scott waived

his rule and urged the wrechage of the 9th to hold firm.x
Colonel Hugh Brady's 22nd Infantry, which displayed
great consistency under fire at Chippewa, brohe into a
rout and ran across the front of the 11th.

That regiment,

in the midst of a wheeling maneuver, had several of its
platoons carried away by the tide.

The American officers

failed to halt the fugitives and only a part of them could
be induced to return to the action with the majority left
2
"skulking from the fire" in the woods.
After an hour and a half of combat, Drummond considered
using what little light remained by launching a counter
attack.

The Glengarry Light Infantry and the Lincoln Mili

tia on Drummond's right flank saw action only in the repulse
of the 9th Infantry at 6:30 p.m.

The arrival of the re-

-Robert Tomes, Battles of America, 5 vols. (New York:
Virtue, 1878), 3- 163-164'.
2Major McNiei’s letter as cited by Cruikshank, Lundy's
Lane, p. 33-
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mainder of the American army quickly dissuaded him.
In the course of Scott's assault, the Americans were
reinforced hy a 100-man vanguard of Ripley's Brigade.

Soon

Brown, in command of the reserve, appeared and assumed the
direction of the battle.

Biddle and Ritchie’s companies

of artillery, with six guns, advanced to Towson’s assis
tance.

The aweful stillness that engulfed the battlefield

after Scott's second repulse, broken only by the ceaseless
roar of the falls, gave way to a renewed artillery duel.
Notwithstanding the disparity in numbers, the British
guns still maintained a decided advantage.

Captains

Thomas Biddle and John Ritchie were both wounded, the
latter mortally.

Towson reported the loss of twenty-seven

of thirty-six serving his three guns.
Brown’s chief of staff, Colonel William McRae, came
to the same conclusion Scott arrived at an hour before:
ultimate success or failure depended upon the Americans
taking the hill and silencing the guns.

By this time

(8:28), the entire American force had arrived on the
2
field.
Scott's command was exhausted and much diminished
in numbers.

The task of succeeding where Scott failed

fell to Ripley and his Second Brigade.

The 1st, 21st,

and 23rd regiments were formed for the main assault with

Ibid. Ritchie died beside the piece he vowed never
to. leave.
2
Grey, Lundy *s Lane, p. 29.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95

elements of the 2nd Rifles, 17th and 19th Infantry in
supporting roles.

Porter's 3rigade, composed of Dobbin’s

and Swift's New York Volunteers, Fenton’s Pennsylvania
battalion, and Willcock's Canadian Volunteers, attacked
the British right while Jesup still secured the opposite
flank.

Brown had 1,^00 deployed for the direct assault:

four battalions formed into lines with another behind in
close column of companies.

With a force far more powerful

than Scott's, Brown, if intelligent and resolute, possessed
sufficient strength to crush his inferior foe before relief
could arrive.
For a few moments, firing almost ceased.

In this

respite, the American artillerymen brought forward ample
supplies of ammunition and perfected their arrangements
for the advance.

Owing to the growing darkness, artillery

fire had ceased to be effective.

While the moon had risen,

its light was rendered faint by drifting clouds of smoke.
Only these irregular flashes of gun fire indicated the
line of battle.
The battle had now continued for nearly three hours.
The British units were reduced to less than 1,200 officers
and men.

The situation, in British estimatations, appeared

critical.

Ammunition, always a precious commodity for the

British, was nearly exhausted.

The remaining stocks of

1
"Merritt, Recollections, p. 79•
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ammunition were taken from the militia troops and quickly
1
distributed among the regulars." There no longer could
he any doubt in the minds of these tough British and Cana
dian troops that they soon would be confronted in a no
quarter fight with the whole of the American army.

De

fiantly, they determined to fight and die at their posi2

xions.

Like something out of an old motion picture, just
when all locked hopeless, the reserves arrived amidst
cheers and squealing bagpipes.

After their original

marching orders were cancelled, the British forces at
Twelve Mile Creek remained in their camp until afternoon.
Then orders were received from Riall instructing a portion
of the force to join him at Lundy's Lane via DeCew's
Falls.

This required a fourteen mile march under a

scorching summer’s sun.

Colonel Scott immediately broke

up camp and taking with him seven companies of his own
regiment (103rd), seven companies of the Royal Scots,
five of the 8th, the flank companies of the 104th, and a
few selected men of the militia, began the trek.

Due to

the depleted numbers, Scott's entire column did not muster
more than 1,200.

This force was accompanied by three

Grey, Lundy's Lane, p. 29.
“"Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 35-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97

6-pounders and a 5 1/2 inch howitzer."
Colonel Scott’s advance-guard was within three miles
of the battlefield fifteen minutes before the battle when
it met with a second dispatch from Riall ordering the
column to fall back to Queenstown.

Scott's aboutface

took him four miles further from Lundy's Lane before yet
another rider brouglut orders to retrace his steps -and
march to the sound of the guns.

Thus, after a twenty-one

mile march, Scott's Brigade arrived on the field at 9 p.m.
These weary and foot-sore infantrymen took up a position
in support of the Glengarrys and Lincoln Militia just in
time to meet Major General Porter's newly arrived-rifle
men.
The action began with a brisk attack on the British
left by Jesup from the woods along Portage Road.

The

American artillery opened fire with renewed vigor to aid
the advance of the infantry.

The American attempt to

turn the British right was foiled when Drummond directed
his headquarter wing of the Royals and the flank companies
of the 104th (New Brunswick) Regiment to prolong his flank.
The remainder of Scott's brigade formed into a second line
2
in the rear of Lundy's Lane.

-1
Captain MacKonchie's letter of August 9 as cited by
Mahon, The War of 1812, p. 274.
2Drummond to Prevost, 27 July 1814, Archives, C. 684,
p. 240.
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These dispositions were not completed when a large
hody of enemy troops was observed advancing upon the Bri
tish battery.

The troops destined to carry out the assault

were composed of the 1st United States Infantry (Colonel
R. Nicholas) and elements of the 17th, 19th, and 2nd
Rifles as well as the whole of Colonel James Miller's
21st Infantry.

This formation formed out of view of the

British in a hallow.

With their initial movements concealed

by the darkness, the Americans advanced silently in line,
two deep, followed by the 23rd (Major D. McFarland) in
support.

General Brown turned to Colonel Miller, "Sir,

can you take the battery?"
"I’ll try, sir. 1,1
At the outset, this assault appeared that it would
go the route of all previous frontal attacks.

The force

of 1,400 bayonets, under the command of Ripley, marched
into the mouths of the British guns.

The 1st Regiment,

forming the center of the American line, bore the brunt
of the fire.

The regiment, fresh from uneventful garrison

duties in the distant frontier posts along the Mississippi,
disintegreted almost immediately, suffering only thirtythree casualties out of the 250 committed.

Its place in

the line was assumed by McFarland's excellent infantry.
1
"Grey, Lundy's Lane, p. 32. "I'll try, sir" is the
motto of today's 5th United States Infantry Division whose
crest bears the British cannon taken by the men of the
21st Regiment.
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Despite their admirable advance, the 23rd began to waver
as its commander fell dead.

On the verge of collapse,

the regiment was rallied by Ripley who personally led the
23rd forward.^"
Miller’s approach on the opposite flank was screened
from the view of the gunners by the church and the orchard.
The Americans could clearly see the British battery illum
inated by the slow matches of the enemy gunners.

Follow

ing a shallow ravine fringed by thickets of shrubbery and
trees, the men of the 21st (330 strong) formed up in two
lines behind a vine-covered log fence - only 20 yards from
the British battery.“
The attention of the gunners was riveted upon the
enemy batteries below.

Resting their muskets on the fence,

the Americans fired a single volley then rushed forward
with fixed bayonets.

Though totally surprised, the men

of the Royal Artillery (^th Battalion) resisted ferociously
with rammers and handspikes.

Many artillerymen, the Ameri

can volley unheard amidst the din of the artillery duel,
were bayoneted while still trying to reload their fieldpieces.
The Americans sustained heavy loss.

Among the dead

was Captain Abraham Hull, the son of the general who had

^Cruikshank, Lundy’s Lane, p. 36.
2

-

-

-

iD ia .
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so ignominiously surrendered Detroit.

This youth so acute

ly felt his father’s disgrace that he had already fought
a duel in a vain attempt to silence censure.

On going

into action at Lundy's Lane he told a fellow officer that
he sought death as the only relief from the sense of dishonor that agonized him.

Lieutenant Joseph Cilley, who

led the charge, cut down an artilleryman with his saber
and the next moment fell desperately wounded by his side.
A single gun sought to shift its aim but the gunners were
cut down attempting to reload.
The British battery, which had been so deadly effec
tive against the Americans, was now lost.

Both of the 2A--

pounders and one of MacKonochie’s 6-pounders were taken.
Lieutenant Tompkins and a few of his men were taken pri
soner and confined in the church.

Inadequately guarded,

all forty men succeeded in escaping during the confused
fighting that followed.

One of the captured British offi

cers called the charge "the most desperate thing we ever
2

saw or heard."

The success of the 21st prompted the other American
battalions to redouble their efforts.
with the 23rd and reformed 1st.

Ripley came forward

Ripley's entire brigade

now was concentrated on a very narrow front between the

A

Tomes, Battles of America, 3:

166.

o

“C-rey, nundy's nane, p. 29.
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church and Portage Road.

Winfield Scott busily rallied

his depleted troops and moved to Ripley’s support.

The

positions of the adversaries were reversed - the Americanline, reformed, now crossed the original British position
at right angles, their backs to Portage Road.

The British

left, overwhelmed by the general advance, was thrown from
the hill.

On the British right, Porter’s volunteers were

involved with the flank companies of the 104th and the
Royals in a noisy fire-fight.
Miller's coup was delivered with such rapidity and
drive that the adjacent British infantry had no time to
advance in support of the guns.

Drummond sought to organ

ize an immediate counter-attack but found his infantry in
considerable confusion.

Mustering what troops he could,

the British general led the redcoats into the teeth of
the Americans atop the hill.

Scott wrote, "British orders

of 'Halt, dress, forward' were audible in the awful still
ness of the night.

At length,.a dark line could be seen

approaching at a distance of sixty paces."

A confused

hand-to-hand struggle ensued in which the British were
repulsed with severe loses.

At short range, the American

musketry was particularly effective owing to their prac
tice of adding three large buck-shots to the ordinary mus
ket ball.

The Royals detachment engaged was decimated,

Scott, Memoirs, 1:

143.
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losing its commander.

The Royals, hurriedly retreating

down the hill, rallied around the colors of the 89th.
Colonel Scott's 103rd Regiment was ordered forward.

Un

familiar with the new American positions, they blundered
into the center of the American line receiving a murderous
volley for their folly.

The British regulars, like the

1st United States, were thrown into disorder.

1

While the battle raged, the American artillery lim
bered up their pieces and advanced toward the summit.
While bravely galloping forward, the American artillery
met with unforeseen disaster.

One howitzer team zealously

rode within easy musket range of the British infantry
whose volley tore into the Americans killing or wounding
the team.
lines.

The riderless horses plunged into the British

This action had a double edged result:

while se

curing the howitzer, the British infantry were thrown into
disarray.

The other American guns enjoyed little success,

several caissons exploded, ignited by Congreve rockets.
Some of the surviving pieces fell silent for want of ammu
nition.

Most of the horses were killed forcing the Ameri

cans to man-handle their pieces when maneuver was called
for.

Despite the adversity, the American artillery dis

played determined bravery and tenacity.

“Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, pp. 36-37•
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Not to Toe outdone, the British artillery inched for
ward until less than fifty yards separated their muzzles
from the opposing guns.

Half an hour later the redcoats

came on again with the same measured steadiness.

Within

musket range, the British line halted and fired a fierce
volley.

Musketry, traded at twenty yards or less, illum

inated the night.
distinguishable.

Even the rival regimental badges were
Occasionally the clouds broke allowing

the moon to glimmer through but there was no wind to shift
the powder smoke or relieve the exhausted and thirsty com
batants in the sultry midsummer's night.

In the words of
1

General Scott, "the scene has never been surpassed.
The battle degenerated into a confused, ferocious,
and sanguinary slugging match waged at bayonet point.
Fire discipline vanished giving
bayonets, and swords.

way to clubbed muskets,

The British resolutely strove to

regain the summit they had lost only to be pushed down
the slope again.

Refusing to be driven from the field,

these tough British veterans regrouped in the hollow at
the foot of the slope and came on again.

Regiments, com

panies, and sections were broken up and intermingled yet
the few remaining officers preserved some semblance of
cohesion.

Those few troops lucky enough to have ammuni

tion continued loading as coolly "as if it had been a sham

‘Scott, Memoirs, 1:

l^h.
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battle."

1

Either side could clearly hear the officers

shouting their orders.

General Drummond, in the middle

of the conflagration, encouraged his troops to "stick to
2
them, my fine fellows!"
An American officer responded
by urging his men to "level low and fire at their flashes."-^
It is impossible to give an accurate account of these
melees.

For over an hour, at distances never more than

seventy feet, these two splendid formations engaged in a
terrible fight for death or glory.
sudden rushes surged forward.
did not break.

From time to time,

The enemy lines swayed but

The disputed summit was now strewn with

the bodies of the dead and dying.

Prisoners were taken

simply because men, disoriented by the shifting tides of
battle, stumbled into the enemy's hands.

In the darkness,

it was every man for himself with the Devil taking the
hindmost.
By examining personal reminiscences, historians assert
that the British made three unsuccessful attempts to wrestle
the rise away from the Americans.

One such attempt was

conducted by the 103rd, the British boy-regiment, so called
because of the youth of its members.

This, their baptism

of fire, was a severe test indeed - it was a test they

2

Shadrack Byfield, A narrative of a light company
soldier's service in the 4lst Regiment of Foot during the
late American War (Bradford, England: Bubb, 1840), p. 143.
2Ibid., p. 146.
3Ibid.
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proved inadequate to meet.

Melting away "before the Ameri

can volleys, the 103rd could only "be rallied "by the extra
ordinary exertions of Major William Smelt.

In another

desperate assault, the British succeeded in forcing their
way into the battery.

Fearing the capture of the guns,

Major Jacob Hindman spiked two cannon.
In the short interval between these assaults, Brown
and Scott consulted in consequence of which, Scott's Bri
gade, already mustered in a narrow lane south of the hill,
moved into columns of attack in echelon.

After the repulse

of the second British attack, Scott moved forward hoping
to exploit the British disorder.

Marching in perfect order

with considerable elan, the Americans were led over the
hill and down the other side by General Scott.

Drummond,

his horse shot from beneath him, hid the battleworthy rem
nants of the 89th Regiment of Foot in a field of grain.
The kneeling infantrymen, exercising superb fire-control,
withheld their volley until the American battalions were
within twenty paces.

Upon Drummond's order, the 89th

opened up a merciless volley that tore the Americans to
bits.

An eyewitness stated that "the effect of that sin-

gle volley on the enemy's ranks was awful in the extreme."

1

E.L. Allen's letter which appeared in the Pittsfield
Sun (Mass.), as cited by Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 30.
2
“Grey, Lundy's Lane, p. 30*
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With a hooray, the British carried home the success with
the "bayonet throwing Scott’s command into utter confusion.
The 11th and 22nd, out of ammunition, turned tail and
ran.

Lieutenant F.A. Sawyer of the 11th had one man in

his platoon.

Major Leavenworth rallied and reformed what
i
was left of the 9th Regiment: fewer than 200 men.
Having rallied to the left of their original position,
the men of the American First Brigade advanced yet again
under the indefatigable Scott.
the British right.
spire.

His intent was to smash

Scott’s example could not fail to in

Having already had two mounts shot from beneath

him and his buttock badly bruised by a ricochet shell frag
ment, the six foot five inch Virginian refused to admit
defeat.

However, fate was not kind to Winfield Scott this

day as he saw his skeleton regiments again repulsed with
heavy loss, himself falling from a fractured shoulder, a
result of a one ounce British ball.

Carried to the rear,

Scott would not leave the battlefield.

The courageous

American general was laid out beneath a tree, feet first,
2
facing the enemy.
Illustrative of their devotion to duty and bravery,
Scott's regimental commanders, Colonels Brady, Jesup, and
McNiel and the Brigade-Major, Gerald Smith, had also been

•1
"Ibid.
2Scott, Memoirs, 1:

1^5-147.
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disabled.

The 11th and 22nd Infantry regiments could not

be rallied while only Leavenworth's exertions, all the
while himself wounded, kept the 9th together as a fighting
unit.

The entire First Brigade lost more than half its

officers while its manpower had shrunk to battalion size.
In the absence of officers, the bewildered American sur
vivors aimlessly stumbled about the battlefield.

On one

occasion, a body of men actually threw down their arms
and attempted to surrender en masse but finding the Bri
tish reluctant to cease firing, they took up their weapons
2
again in despair.
This regrettable incident aside, the
lists of killed and wounded bore testimony to the gallantry
and steadfastness of Scott’s men.
About this stage of the battle General Brown himself
received a severe grazing in the thigh from a stick of a
Congreve.

An aide encouraged his general:

"Never mind,

dear general, you are winning the greatest battle ever
gained for your c o u n t r y . W i t h both Brown and Scott in
capacitated, the command of the American army fell to
Ripley.

The Second Brigade had suffered less than Scott's

yet its regiments were badly shaken by the long hours of
cruel combat.

Porter's Brigade, while wholly unsuccessful

^Lossing, Pictorial Fieldbook, p. 6h8.
2
Cruikshank, Contemporary narratives, p. 157-^Grey, Lundy’s Lane, p. 30-
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upon the left, was also in a distressed state.
At this crucial juncture, Brown issued a peculiar or
der which went far toward depriving his army of the fruit
of victory won hy desperate fighting.

The wounded general

ordered his successor, Ripley, to quit the field and return
to Chippewa.

There he was to reform his scattered division

and renew the "battle in daylight.

Scott, whose wounds were

considered fatal, could give no counsel.

Undoubtedly, the

indomitable Scott would have considered no retreat but
Brown was disheartened by the numerous American stragglers
he encountered.

He wrote:

While retiring from the field, I saw and felt that
the victory was complete on our part; if proper
measures were promptly adopted to secure it.*
An American retirement now needlessly surrendered the posi
tion so dearly bought with blood.
Ripley was able to haul away all but one of his own
artillery pieces, leaving the British pieces to be retaken
by Drummond.

More important than regaining their lost

cannons, the British recovered the all-important initia
tive.

Experience would have taught Brown the imprudence

of abandoning a hard-won position in order to reorganize
regiments, although severely shaken, still flushed with
success.

"Brown to Armstrong, no date, as cited by William
Wood, Selected British Documents of the Canadian War of
1812, 3 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1920), 3- iol.
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The British suffered as severely as their opposites,
yet General Drummond determined to seize the summit none
theless.

Unaware of Ripley’s intentions, the British com

mander busily reformed his shattered legion for a final,
supreme effort.
Drummond was Scott’s equal for reckless bravery and
determination.

Earlier in the fight, he received a wound

in the throat which was very nearly fatal.

Bleeding pro-

fusely, Drummond declined to dismount to have it dressed.

l

Twenty minutes later, he had his horse shot out from under
him.

Many officers, Colonels Pearson and Robinson among

them, were down.

His regiments already listed casualties

in excess of thirty percent.

Not to be discouraged, Drum

mond rallied his regulars and deployed into line for ano
ther assault.
At midnight, the thinned red lines reformed and close
The officers threatened, cajoled, and urged the wearied in
fantrymen up the slope.

The honor of spearheading the

assault fell to Captain John C-lew and his light company
of the 4lst.

Private Byfield of the iflst described the

action:
Our bugle then sounded for
volley was then fired upon
and wounded a sargeant and
company then arose, fired,

the company to drop. A
us killing two corporals
several of the men. The
and c h a r g e d . 2

1

'Cruikshank, lundy*s lane, p. 39.
p

Byfield, Narrative, p. 15o.
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Faced with surprisingly little resistance, the British
surged forward.

The Americans, in the midst of organizing

the retreat, were easily smashed.

One American cannon

resisted the British until all hut two of the gunners
were down, this 6-pounder falling to the advancing British.
The two 2h-pounders were recovered but the lost 6-pounder
had already been removed.

Several artillerymen were cap

tured but their officers made good their escapes on horse-i

back.

Many caissons and horses were similarly secured.'1

The light companies of the various British units pursued
the enemy with sporadic firing continuing in many quarters
of the field.

Since the British were too exhausted to pur

sue in strength, Ripley was allowed to make good his re
treat with the few units he still possessed.

Thus, the

greatest battle ever fought on Canadian soil ended with
the redcoats once more in command of the rise.
Almost all American commentators, armed with General
Brown's official report, convey the impression that the
Americans were not compelled to quit the hill they had
won.

Brown did not even admit the loss of any guns.

One

must keep in mind that Brown was a political animal, not
unlike those political generals that plagued the war ef
forts of the conflicting armies in the American Civil War.Not until August 7» when it was in Brown's interest to do

1
“C-rey, Lundy's Lane, p. 30-
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some favorable arithmetic, did his official returns reach
Washington.

Brown’s figures were at odds with those of

several of his subordinates, including one of his majorgenerals, to say nothing of Drummond's meticulous report.
Major Hindman, Brown's commandant of artillery, testified
that "General Brown said to him: - 'Collect your artillery
as well as you can and retire immediately.

We will march

to camp t o g e t h e r . H i n d m a n continued saying that most
of his men and officers were killed or wounded and that
he himself was wounded and thought it best to retreat.
"I found the enemy in possession of the guns and wagons.
Some of the men and horses were captured.
the field.

I then left

Lieutenant Fontaine informed me that the enemy

charged his party at the guns and made them all prisoners
but that he dashed through their ranks and escaped."
Equally conclusive evidence, the demoralized state
of the American Army, substantiate British claims of vic
tory.

Brown gave a figure of 854 casualties (171 killed,

573 wounded and 110 prisoners and missing), which is in
deed suspect in view of the fact that the Americans did
2
most of the charging.
The British admitted the loss of
878: 84 killed, 559 wounded, 193 missing with 42 seen

Major Hindman's evidence appeared in Ripley's Facts
as cited by Babcock, Niagara Frontier, p. 167.
“Brown to Armstrong, no date, as cited by Wood,
Selected Documents, 3 :
163.
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taken prisoner (the Americans claimed 169).“

Brown's re

port failed to include two units which had detachments
engaged.

The remnant of Scott's Brigade, collected by

Leavenworth, mustered only 500 men upon its return to
Chippewa.

British fatigue parties collected 210 American

corpses and several newly-made graves were found at Chip
pewa which would put American dead markedly in excess of
2
Brown's claims.
Drummond stated in his official letter
that several hundred prisoners had fallen into his hands
yet the American commander admitted only 110.

This figure

would seem extremely low if one considers the state of
confusion that the American regulars were thrown into.
This is to say nothing of Porter's Brigade of militia
which can certainly be suspected of wholesale dispersion
and desertion following their reverses.

The British mili

tia, who maintained themselves resolutely upon the British
flanks often without ammunition, claimed double that num
ber of losses.

All things considered, one would be hard

pressed to accept Brown's report.
Lieutenant J.B. Varnum, son of Senator Joseph Varnum
of Massachusetts, wrote on July 27 from Buffalo stating
his brigade (Scott's First Brigade) was almost annihilated

1Drummond to Prevost, 27 July 181^, Archives, C. 684,
p. 247.
2- . .
iDid.
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yet the official report only admitted the loss of five
1

hundred or about a third of its effective strength.-

Col

onel Miller, commander of the tough Massachusetts-recruited
21st stated his losses as 126, not 104.

Major Foster testi

fied that only fifteen or twenty of the 11th United States
Infantry (First Brigade) escaped uninjured - his statement
confirmed by a letter written in the Northern Sentinel,
dated August 19, 1814, by an officer of the 11th in which
he reports the loss in his company of 7 ^f° with only one
3
man present at roll call from his own platoon.
A similar
fate befell the 23rd Regiment (Ripley's Brigade) where
Major Hindman related that Tappan's Company, numbering
forty-five rank and file on the morning of July 25th, mus
tered only 9 the next day.
enormous casualties.

The American artillery suffered

Towson's artillery was severely hand

led while in Ritchie's Battery, one gun lost all its men
while another lost all but two.

Despite this, Brown claim

ed his total artillery casualties as forty-six.
Brown never did furnish complete figures of militia
losses.

He failed to include the 2nd Rifles and the 17/

19th Infantry in his reports yet British returns show three
officers wounded and captured from these corps.

Fourteen

Varnum's letter cited by Cruikshank, Lundy’s nans,
p. 42.
2Miller's letter to his wife, 28 July 1814, ibid.
■^Ibid.
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officers of Porter's Brigade, led by Major James Herkimer
(Stone's Mounted Riflemen), published an open letter in
several newspapers accusing General Brown of falsifying
the records and of understating the contributions of the
volunteers.

In view of this evidence, little credence

can be placed upon Brown's official report.
The British estimated American losses at 1,500.
This would appear overly optimistic.

Historian J. L.

Hildreth stated that the American army was reduced to
sixteen hundred men.

This would require the loss of some
2
two thousand battlefield casualties and desertions.
Yet
another source, quoted by Cruikshank, stated the loss in
killed and wounded at twelve hundred.

The British his

torian, Randal Grey, writing in 1975. applied some analy
tical mathematics to determine the American casualties at
Lundy's Lane.

Placing the British casaulties at 900, Grey

computed American losses as 1,100.

His formula was sim

ple yet an accurate one - he compared the casualties
among junior officers and N.C.O.'s.
American casualties-.

85 British.

The ratio being 97

id.

-1
The company entered the action 162 strong and when
mustered out, numbered only 48 men. The others had either
been killed in battle, died of wounds, or been taken pri
soner. J. Doty, History of Livingston County, New York,
as cited by Mahan, The War of 1812, p. 279^Richard Hildreth, History of the United States of
America, 9 yols. (New York: Harper's , 1850), 4: 169.
•^Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, p. 42.
4
Grey, Lundy’s Lane, n. 32.
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As already quoted, British casualties amounted to
878.

The 2,200-man infantry contingent bore the brunt,

sustaining 614 casualties with the Royal Scots and the
89th Regiment of Foot being the hardest hit.

The 89th

lost 63 percent of its strength (254) including seventeen
officers, 14 sergeants, and six drummers.

The Royal Scots

suffered 172 casualties, over a quarter of the number
that famed unit, later to serve on the victorious field
at Waterloo, lost during the entire war.

I

The 800 man militia force contributed to the British
successes in no small measure.

The Incorporated Militia

suffered most, losing 142 officers and men of whom 92
were listed as missing, a result of their rout at the
hands of Jesup.

The Glengarry Light Infantry, instrumen

tal in the repulse of both the 9th U.S. Infantry and Por
ter's militia, listed its losses at 57-

The other volun

teer units' casualties are as follows:
104th Regiment (flank companies) ...........
Lincoln Militia ............................
2nd. York M i l i t i a ..........................
Provincial Dragoons ........................

6
13
9?
3

In his official letter, Drummond lauded his militia forma
tions :
The zeal, loyalty, and bravery with which the militia
of this part of the Province have come forward to co
operate with His Majesty's troops in the expulsion

1Drummond to Prevost, 27 July 1814, Archives, C. 684,
p. 248.
~Ibid.
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of the enemy, and their conspicuous gallantry in
this and the action of the irth, claim my warmest
thanks.^
The total casualties represented about 27 percent of
Drummond's 3,300 combantants.

Many of the wounded, being

injured by buckshot, were soon capable of returning to
duty.

However fully a third of those wounded were ren

dered hors de combat.

The 110 officers and N.C.O.'s on

the casualty lists paid the price for the excellent fire
discipline and cohesion they maintained during a confus
ing and hotly contested night battle.
The armies had fought one another to a stand-off.
The British fell asleep amidst the dead and wounded upon
their victorious field.

Only a few hours of sleep was

possible upon the chilly ground before sunrise.

The plight

of the thirst-crazed wounded, ironic with the famous water
falls so near at hand, was terrible.

The Americans suf

fered far worse than did the British for want of that
precious commodity.

Hercules Scott's brigade, while on

the march from DeCew’s Palls, had been provided with water
and milk at the Lundy homestead.

The Lundy house, which

had previously served as officers' quarters for both
armies at various times, was converted into a makeshift
hospital and canteen.

Nineteen-year old Catherine Shannon-

Lundy, mistress of the Lundy homestead, labored throughout

1Ibid.
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the night and subsequent days to provide assistance to
Drummond's troops.1

The lack of water on the American

side prompted historian Rossiter Johnson to write that
"the principal reason why the Americans abandoned the
2
field was the want of water."
There were more compelling
reasons why the Americans quit the field yet it is undeni
ably true that the steaming heat of that July day, in com
bination with the lack of water, had a telling effect on
both sides.
What a terrible sight must have greeted the men upon
awaking from their slumber amidst the corpses.

The dead

were found piled in windrows, three deep, in and about
the position of the batteries.

The summit was strewn

with the mangled remains of sixty to seventy horses.

The

gruesome labor of clearing up the battlefield began.

The

remains of 200 American soldiers were burnt in a giant
funeral pyre above which now stands a column in tribute
of the battle.
The plight of the seriously wounded British was la
mentable in the extreme.

Fort Niagara became the main-

terminal for these casualties.

The wounded were carted

by wagons to Queenstown, then transported by water to the

■'"Some time after the battle, General Drummond presen
ted Mrs. Lundy with his dagger. This weapon is still in
the possession of the family.
2
Janet Cureton, "Catherine Lundy at the Battle of
Lundy’s Lane," McLean's, October I960, p. 57-
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river's mouth and the waiting fort.

These men were scarce

ly "better off once they completed their journey.

There

was a single doctor present, the twenty-two year old sur
geon of the 89th Regiment, Dr. William Dunlop.

His hos

pital was nothing more than a tumbled down, fly-infested
wooden barracks in which he was to treat 220 men.

He

worked non-stop for some ninty-six hours with the aid of
one lone orderly before taking five hours’ sleep.

These

incredibly tough veterans fought death with the same de
termination they resisted the Americans.

One lieutenant

of the C-lengarry Regiment, with five wounds considered
fatal, survived the ordeal of Fort Niagara and carried
one ball with him for the rest of his days.

1

The next morning, General Ripley again crossed the
Chippewa River with a force of 1,800 with the avowed in
tention of collecting the dead and wounded.

Actually, he

was following Brown's orders to occupy the hill and retake
the guns.

All of the Americans officers regarded this as

an act of folly.

Advancing toward the hill, Ripley found

Drummond's force drawn up for battle a mile and a half in
advance of Lundy's Lane.

Not wishing to renew the blood

bath, Ripley declined to offer battle and retreated with
all haste back to the American camp.

Hurrying across the

ADr. William Dunlop, Recollections of the American
War, 1812 - 181*f (Toronto: Historical Publishing, 1905)»
pp. LI-A3.
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river, Ripley ordered the destruction of the bridge as
well as the burning of Bridgewater Mill and Clark's ware
house.

Preparations were made for the retreat, with tents

and rations being destroyed or thrown into the river.

The '

retreat, began at noon, was conducted with such celerity
that the entire force arrived at the heights opposite
Black Rock at midnight in such a state of exhaustion that
the American army lay down to sleep without so much as
bothering to pitch their tents or light wa.tchfires.

All

of this extraordinary behavior for an army whose commander
i
claimed to be victorious!
But the battle had so weakened the British, they
could not conduct a pursuit in force.

This allowed the

Americans to encamp under the guns of Fort Erie.

Certain

ly, had Drummond pursued Ripley closely, the American
commander would have been forced to cross the Niagara
River.

The British did send forth a weak advance-guard

in pursuit of Ripley.

This body of dragoons, light in

fantry, and militia succeeded in capturing a few stragglers
and picking up corpses which had fallen from the American
wagons during Ripley's precipitate retreat.

Drummond,

considering himself too weak to attempt an investment of
the American fortified camp at Fort Erie, remained, with
the bulk of his force, near Lundy's Lane until the arrival

“Cruikshank, Lundy's Lane, pp. ^2-^3 .
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of reinforcements enabled him to advance again.
A considerable controversy still rages between the
differing Canadian and American interpretations of this
battle, which the London Times deemed "equally glorious
1
and important."- British and Canadian historians maintain
Lundy's Lane, or Niagara as it is sometimes referred to in
British histories, to be an undisputable British victory.
Conversely, Americans view Lundy’s Lane (also called Nia
gara Falls or Bridgewater) as an American tactical success.
American historians cite Brown's letter in which the Amer
ican general maintained that the victory was secured when
he ordered the retirement.

Certainly, by 11:30, the battle

was within his grasp - his exhausted infantry held posses
sion of the heights and the captured 3ritish guns.

Despite

these successes, Drummond's little army was hardly a de
feated rabble.

Repulsed three times with severe losses,

the stout British veterans rallied around their colors
determined to strike again.

Brown's two brigades had been

mauled with both the commanding general and his most reso
lute subordinate, Winfield Scott, carried from the field
seriously wounded.

Given the lack of water, the exhausted

state of the remnants of the American army, and the serious
shortage of artillery ammunition, it is highly improbable
the Americans could have defended the hill in face of this

A

Grey, Luna?/1s Lane, p. 3 6 .
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final onslaught by Drummond's red-coats.
Both Brown and Scott steadfastly refused to admit
they were defeated, claiming that only Ripley's withdrawal
marred an otherwise perfect American triumph.

General

Ripley's reports defended his conduct stating that his
actions were in accordance with Brown's final directive.
This is substantiated by the reports of other officers
who testified that Ripley's retirement was clearly a judi
cious measure designed to preserve the unity of the army.^
It is incongruous that General Scott could claim vic
tory for American arms.

His initial assault at 6:30 dis-

integreted with heavy loss without his troops firing a
volley.

The final onslaught of Scott's brigade came to

grief in the wheatfields before the muskets of the 89th
Regiment of Foot.

Art the conclusion of the night's fight

ing, Scott’s Brigade numbered 200 effectives under the
command of a major.

As for Brown, the mere fact he la

boriously falsified the casualty figures would indicate
he himself considered the battle something less than the
victory he claimed.
Brown, whom the twentieth-century American historical
writer Fletcher Pratt called "the best battle captain in
the history of the nation,'' played a passive role in the
direction of the battle,

1

allowing his subordinates to

Hitsman, Incredible War, p. 199.
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conduct operations.

1

Upon arriving on the field, Scott

immediately appraised the situation correctly and sought
to engage Riall's force, pinning it down until the main
American army could come up to deliver the coup de main.
Scott, just 600 yards from the hill, took an inordinate
amount of time deploying his units.

While the American

brigadier meticulously arranged his immaculate lines, the
British, behind some delaying tactics, were able to reoccupy
the hill.

When Scott's fine battalions moved to the attack,

they were faced by an imposing semi-circular array with
the British artillery in a commanding position.
The impetuous Scott, instead of awaiting Brown and
Ripley, led his brigade in the assault only to see it eva
porate before the British guns.

The American batteries,

although superior in number, failed to give their infan
try comrades any fire support; Scott’s second frontal push
suffered the same humbling fate.

When Brown finally assumed

command, he found Scott's First Brigade exhausted and all
but shattered.

Deploying Ripley's Brigade, the American

force confronted a reinforced British army, Hercules
Scott having come up in the meantime.

Had Scott restrained

himself once he was assured that the British would offer
battle, the combined might of the two brigades of regulars
and Porter's militia would certainly have overwhelmed their

“Pratt, Sword of the Border, p. 387.
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opponants.

Brown, like Scott before him, committed his

troops to piecemeal frontal attacks, successful, not on
account of brilliant generalship but merely due to Miller
escaping detection and staging his coup that resulted in
the capture of the British guns.
Brown, all his units either broken or engaged, had
no reserves to consolidate his gains.

The men of Ripley’

Brigade were the match of the British redcoats meeting
blow with forceful blow yet the strain of the struggle
began to be evident.

With so many of the officers down

and the command situation uncertain, Ripley was wise to
break off the action.
Drummond, every inch a soldier, displayed contempt
for death and a cool, calculated cunning.

Brown and Rip

ley, unquestionably brave and zealous, simply lacked mili
tary experience.

Drummond’s aim was to fulfill his duty

in the defense of the British possessions of Upper Canada
He harbored no political ambitions.

Unlike Scott, he

waged a wise defensive battle offering attack only to re
gain his lost position.

The British general's orchestra

tion of the battle had its faults:

witness the Royal

Scots firing upon the Glengarry Light Infantry and the
103rd Regiment marching blindly into the American center
receiving crushing volleys before retiring in disarray.
In Drummond’s defense, the British units maintained re
markable cohesion, especially after their expulsion from
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the hill.

The British regulars, while hardly the superior

of the Americans in the assault, illustrated excellent
discipline in their ability to rapidly rally after a
bloody reversal.

This faculty was conspicuously absent

among American units who proved exceedingly difficult to
rally once repulsed.
Both generals agreed that this, the Battle of Lundy's
Lane, had no equal in the history of the war in America.
Drummond's July 27 dispatch recorded that "the steadiness
and intrepidity displayed by the troops. . . . were never
surpassed."

Brown's report stated that "the battle.

will find but few parallels.
2
rarely been known."

. . .

More desperate fighting has

In terms of the percentage of casualties suffered in
a single day’s action among battles waged in North America,
Lundy's Lane is only surpassed by the Civil War struggle
of Antietam.

Curiously enough, these two bloody fights

have many obvious similarities.

Like Brown, General Robert

E. Lee invaded the North and was forced to engage McClellan
on ground not of his choosing.

The battle was most stub

bornly contested and sanguinary in the extreme yet McClel
lan’s failure to exploit his numerical superiority resulted
in a tactical setback.

However, in the strategic sense,

"^Drummond to Prevost, 27 July
p. 250.
2
Brown to Armstrong, 7 August
ments , p. 172.

1814,

Archives, C. 684,

1814,

Cruikshank, Docu
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Antietam was a Federal victory compelling Lee to quit
Maryland and with it his first invasion of the North.
While Brown might claim a questionable tactical victory
at Lundy’s Lane, he lost his chance to cripple the British
army.

The strategic victory was Drummond's.
Lundy's Lane defused the American invasion threat."

Brown’s army, badly mauled, retreated in less than per
fect order on Fort Erie.

The British occupied the field

of battle; their final charge was opposed only by an
American army reduced to a mere skeleton of its former,
formidable self.

Drummond's beleaguered men slept upon

their reconquered knoll with the American tiger emasculate
Upon this solid evidence, one must conclude that Lundy's
Lane was a British victory - a close-run thing, to borrow
Wellington's phrase, but a British victory nonetheless.

^Hitsmsn, Incredible War, p. 200.
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View of Fort George:

glatis3 bastion* and north bastion (above)

The business end of a naval 2ii-pounder - Fort George.
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Fort Niagara as seen iron the north-east bastion of Fort George*

Fort Niagara as vienred
from Mississauga Point,
site of Fort liLssissauga*
iiw i

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

129

The trail taken by Col. Murray's troops descending to the Niagara
River.
The point on the American shore, above Jamestown, where Murray’s
troops landed.
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The nain-gate and guardhouse of Fort Niagara. The gate uas con
structed by the French; the parapet and palisades, identical to
Fort George’s, built by the British prior to the American Tar
of Independence.

The interior of Fort Niagara vnLth the French-built chateau.
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Battlefield of Chippewa: this photograph, taken exact!" 16b ye a rs
after the battle, illustrates just how little the scene has changed.
r»ote the cultivated fields and the belt of trees obscuring the view of
Chippewa as noted in Riall’s report.

The Queenston earthworks, known as Forts ?d.all and Drummond, new house
wading pools and flower gardens.
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The lower Niagara, looking toward Lake Ontario, from atop Queenston
Heights* The scene is much the same as Brown's who forlornly peered
toward the lake in search of Chauncey’s fleet.

The ruins of TSississauga. The citadel, constructed from the remains
of Newark, post-dated the Tar of 1S12. Tote Fort Niagara above the
redoubt on the left.

iZ**

r.
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The monument erected at
Lundy's Lane in "honour
of the victory gained
by British and Canadian
forces."

*- y j Jv:■*■-«3"■' to.*;
r^.=?. . 2 , , ^ r v ^?v'if?-£i.- ;X * *

Another view of the monument amidst the gravestones. The British
battery, the key to the battle, was positioned where the monument
now stands.
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The Lundy Homestead* among the first stone dwellings built in
Niagara Falls, -was constructed in 1793- The house was the site
of a hospital and canteen after the Battle of Lundy’s Lane.
Turing the afternoon of July 25* 1311;* it served as an oasis
for H. Scott’s exhausted infantry. A similar view of the house
can be found in Lossing’s Pictorial fieldbook. p. 828.

Sometime after the Battle of Lundy's Lane, General Drummond
presented Catherine Lundy with this ivory-handled dagger.
The weapon is still in the possession of the Lundy family.
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Fort Erie: the draw-bridge guarded by a student-soldier dressed
in the uniform of the 89th P.eginent of Foot, In the background,
a view of the stone barracks and wall.
Fort Erie: the east barbette, barracks, and ditch.
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crt Erie: view from the ditch beneath the r.crth-west basvaon
Fort Erie:

the Anerican-bnilt bastion and sally-pert.
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IV.

THE SIEGE OF FORT ERIE

The sequel to the battle, the siege of Fort Erie, was
demoralizing for the victors of Lundy’s Lane.

Steeled by

the absence of a British pursuit, Ripley elected to occupy
Fort Erie.
since 1765*

A British fort stood on the site of Fort Erie
The first fort, little more than a stockade,

was destroyed in March, 1779 when a furious storm drove
huge masses of ice ashore flooding most of the fort and
making irreparable breaches in the walls and palisades.
The decision was made to build another, more substantial
fort.

The second Fort Erie was located farther south and

was constructed by detachments of the 8th and 47th Regi
ments.

This fort withstood the assaults of wind and wea

ther for almost a quarter of a century until on February
5, 1803, another notable storm breached its walls and
filled its interior with masses of ice and water.

In July

of that year, Colonel Gother Mann, commander of the Royal
Engineers in Canada, inspected the post and recommended
that a new fort of a permanent nature should be constructed
upon rising ground immediately in rear of the old position.
The new fort proposed by Colonel Mann was to consist
of four bastions connected with curtains in the form of a
simple square, with all works and buildings constructed
of solid masonry.

The installation was to be sufficiently

large enough to house two or three hundred men.

The gate-
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way to the fort was to he placed facing Lake Erie and the
American shore with defensible stone barracks two stories
high on either side forming a curtain between the north
east and southeast bastions.
fended the entrance.

A triangular earthwork de

Colonel Mann's recommendations were

forwarded to the Master-General of the Ordinance and on
January 9. 1804, Colonel Hunter was authorized to direct
that "the proposed works be commenced and carried on
gradually as circumstances might render expedient."
The erection of this, the third Fort Erie, was car
ried on at a leisurely pace for almost three years, after
which the project was discontinued altogether.

On August

24, 1811, Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Bruyeres of the Royal
Engineers reported to Sir George Prevost:
Fort Erie is situated at the entrance to Lake Erie,
eighteen miles above Fort Chippewa. The old fort on
the border of the lake is in ruins and totally aban
doned. The construction of a new fort. . . . on the
rising ground above the site of the old fort was be
gan in the spring of 1805 continuing until the latter
end of the year 1807. • . . At the time, the two pile
of barracks together with the masonry foundations of
the two bastions were finished. The remainder is un
finished and has received some injury from remaining
so long neglected. Fort Erie cannot be considered a
strong military position, but as it is necessary to
have some troops stationed at this to carry on trans
port and communication. The necessary security and
accommodation might be probably obtained by complet
ing this post.2

1
Ronald Way, Ontario's Niagara Parks - A. History
(Fort Erie, Ontario! Niagara Park Commission, i960), pp.
143-147.
23ruyeres to Prevost, 24 August 1811, ibid., p. 147.
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Fort Erls was still in this unfinished state when war
broke out in 1312.

It had been garrisoned by British

regulars until news arrived of the capture of Fort George
(May 27, 1813).

The fort was then dismantled, its maga

zines exploded, and the small garrison marched off to
join General Vincent at Burlington Heights.

American

regulars immediately occupied the position but abandoned
it on July 9 putting the barracks and storehouses to the
torch.
The British reoccupied Fort Erie only to lose it
again less than a month after the Americans abandoned it.
Ironically, on the very day Brown's troops compelled Major
Buck and his tiny garrison to surrender, Captain Benjamin
Martin, R.E., reported to Governor-General Prevost:
Fort Erie - In a tolerable state of defense, strongly
enclosed in rear with palisades. A small
blockhouse commenced, to flank the picket
ing. Three guns mounted-two twelves and
one nine pounder.The American commandant left in charge of Fort Erie
had made efforts to strengthen his position since its
surrender on July 3. He had replaced the timber palisades,
which proved to be anything but "strong" with a V-shaped
earthwork housing a strong battery.

Two unfinished bas

tions, those to the northwest and southwest, were converted

"^Captain Martin to Prevost, 3 July 1814-, as cited by
Cruikshank, Lundy1s Lane, p. 44.
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into "detached redoubts" with strong timber stockades and
ditches guarding their rear.

The American garrison had

also constructed a strong work on the bank of the river
which was dubbed "Douglas Battery" in honor of Lieutenant
David B. Douglas under whose supervision it had been built
From the left of this battery to the right of the fort,
continuous earthworks had been erected.

All this was

completed while Brown’s army menaced Fort George and it
was to this formidable fortress that Ripley retreated.

I

Drummond's forces, too weak to pursue Ripley, did not
arrive before Fort Erie until August 2.

The interim be

tween Lundy's Lane and Drummond's advance was not wasted
by the Americans who busied themselves preparing the fort
for the defense.

Under the direction of the engineers,

the American troops, employed day and night, constructed
entrenchments, batteries, traverses and abattis until the
original fort was but a small part of an extensively for
tified camp.

From the left of the fort and in a line

running south parallel with the lake, a strong breastwork
seven feet high was thrown up with a firing step behind
and a ditch in front six to ten feet wide and four feet
deep.

The picketing (sharpened stakes), which was placed

so close together that a man could not pass between, pro
jected from the exterior of the parapet at an obtuse angle

■^Mahon, The War of 1812, p. 277-
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On the outward side of the ditch, a dense line of abattis,
consisting of large trees placed in proximity to one ano
ther with their branches trimmed to a razor's edge, offered
a nearly impenetrable obstacle to assault.

On a sandy

mound (known as Snake Hill) at the southwest extremity of
the line of works was Towson's Battery, twenty feet in
height and mounting five guns.

The American enclosure was

completed by a line of abattis running from the battery to
the lake shore.

These extensive preparations made the

invader's position secure from any assault unpreceded by
regular siege operations.1
Several days elapsed before Drummond felt himself
prepared to resume offensive operations.

The S?th Regi

ment, which was reduced to less than 200 effectives, was
sent to Fort George to rest and refit.

Weak detachments,

garrisoning Fort George, were ordered forward and the
Regiment de Watteville, 900 strong, was brought over from
York.2
An advance guard, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Pearson, crossed the Niagara River, surprised and seized

Adams, James Madison, 2: 147, stated that "The num
ber of graduates before the year 1812 was very small; but
at the outbreak of the war, the corps of engineers was al
ready efficient. None of the works constructed by a grad
uate of West Point was captured by the enemy. During the
critical campaign of 1814, the West Point engineers doubled
the capacity of the little American Army for resistance."
2Drummond to Prevost, 31 July 1814, Archives, 0. 684,
p. 249.
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Black Rock, destroying the works there, before rejoining
Drummond's main force.

The British army, advancing along

the repaired river road, camped at Palmer's Tavern, six
miles short of Fort Erie.

The next day, August 2, saw

the British columns occupy the heights opposite 31ack
Rock, two miles from the American works.
ection of ground was excellent.

Drummond's sel

He placed his forces

behind a screen of trees which enabled them to approach
the north and western faces of the fort and at the same
time detach a column to attack the American fieldworks
along the lakeshore without being observed by the enemy.
Drummond, personally reconnoitering the American position,
decided that the much enlarged works of Fort Erie would
require the use of heavier guns than his 24 pounders oefore they could be attacked successfully.

l

Drummond wasted no time taking the offensive.

Detach

ing a force of 600 men (4lst Regiment, the light companies
of the 89th and 100th, and the flank companies of the
104th) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J.C-.P.
Tucker, the British sought to destroy the American logistics base at Buffalo.

2

Crossing the Niagara and advancing

along the American side on Military Road, the column was

Drummond to Prevost, 4 August 1814, Archives, C. 685
pp. 38-43.
2
Tucker to General Conran, 4 August 1814, Archives,
C. 685, p. 34.
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surprised "by vigorous musketry upon flank and front.

The

British regulars, "bewildered "by the resistance, were ral
lied by Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond.

Finding the vital

bridge along the Williamsberg-Buffalo road destroyed, an
ineffectual attempt was made by the British to rebuild
it.
The American force, later identified as the First
Battalion/First U.S. Infantry, blasted the British with
a steady stream of musketry.

Making no headway, Tucker

ordered his officers to locate a ford.

This effort, also

a failure, forced Tucker to retreat, leaving twelve dead,
seventeen wounded, and five missing in his wake.

Major

Lodowick Morgan's battalion (First/First Infantry) suffer
ed a loss of 10 men.
Drummond, suffering the first of many disappointments
during the siege, attributed the failure solely to the
unmilitary and disgraceful conduct of the troops.

At

the same time, however, he decided to give the repulsed
units an opportunity to retrieve their reputation.

The

next afternoon, the British staged a reconnaissance-inforce against the American picketlines.

This attack was

repulsed primarily by the well-served fire of the American
artillery and the guns of the three armed schooners, Ohio,
Somers, and Porcupine. Having free reign of the river,
these ships could enfilade the approaches both above and below
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the Britisn positions.

1

The British command structure was rendered uncertain
Toy a series of mischances.

Major C-eneral Henry Conran,

sent from York to replace Riall, was disabled by a fall
from his horse.

Colonel James Stuart (Royal Scots) came

down with a fever a day after his arrival from York.

Lieu-

tenant-Colonel Scott refused command, feeling slighted by
Drummond’s overlooking him for promotion.

As Drummond

was still suffering from the effects of his wounds received
at Lundy’s Lane, the command situation confused the British
siege operations.2
On August 6, Brigadier-C-eneral Edmund Gaines staged
a sortie of his own with a mixed force from several regi
ments.

Gaines assaulted the British positions expelling

the British Indians from the forests.

A counter-attack

by the Glengarry Light Infantry regained the lost posi3
tions.^
The Americans embarked upon a campaign to enlist
large bodies of militiamen from New York.

In a letter to

G o vernor Tompkins of A u g u s t 9> General Porter stated:

Is it possible that the State of New York will sit
with her arms folded and see this army, deserving a
better fate, sacrificed? With 3»000 men we should
not only be relieved but we might, with certainty,

1Ernest Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie (Welland,
Ontario: Lundy’s Lane Historical Society, 1 9 0 5 ) » PP- 13-17•
2Ibid., p. 16
3Ibid., p. 17.
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capture the whole British army in thirty days.

i

One thousand militia arrived in Buffalo but refused
to cross the Niagara.

These men were employed in the con

struction of formidable works on the .American shore at
Black Rock.

These batteries, in conjunction with the

schooners' guns, could enfilade the British lines on the
opposite side.
Discovering his position woefully exposed, Drummond
relocated his batteries.

A system of trenches, 800 yards

long with riflepits dug in advance for the pickets, was
constructed.
work.

The Americans sought to interfere with this

They launched two sorties against the working par

ties but both were repulsed with heavy losses.

The second

of these actions, on August 12, cost the Americans Major
Morgan, the victor of Black Rock.

The American actions

had a secondary function - to ascertain the strength of
the besieging force.

The repulses left Gaines to estimate

that he was facing 5,000 when in fact Drummond had barely

3,o o o .2
On the other hand, the American schooners so controlled
the British flanks that Drummond decided that no assault
upon the fort could succeed until these ships were taken
or driven away.

Therefore, Drummond eagerly accepted a

1Porter to Tompkins, 9 August 1814, as cited by Cruikshank, Documents, p. 207.
2Louis Babcock, "The Siege of Fort Erie," New York
State Historical Association Proceedings 8 (June 1909):
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p r o p o s al made b y C a p t a i n Dodos,
troudlesome v e s s e l s .

Dodds,

R o y a l Navy,

to seize these

seeing no service to de had on

the lake while Ch a u n c e y was i n control,

h a d drought 200 s e a 

m e n and m a r i n e s up from Port Niagara.

M u c h experienced in

l e a d i n g such r a i d i n g parties d u r i n g his service in the M e d i 
terranean,

Dodds o v e r s a w the portage

g i g to Point Adino.

of five dateaux and a

On the night of the 12th,

ed w i t h seventy seamen and marines,
lake t oward the Am e r i c a n anchorage.

Dodds embark-

r o w i n g quietly down the
C h a n g i n g course,

they

r o w e d toward the A m e r i c a n shore w i t h the intention of ap 
p r o a c h ing the schooners u p o n the route customary taken dy
s u p p l y doats f r o m Buffalo.

At m i d n i g h t Dodds'

m o v e d toward the Somers until challenged.

little fleet

His reply,

"Pro

v i s i o n boats fr o m Buffalo" s a t i s f i e d the sentry until the doats
a c t u a l l y r a n a b o a r d the s c h o o n e r .

The B r itish clambered up

the side and a short struggle ensued in w h i c h two A m e rican
s e a m e n were w o u n d e d and the r e m a i n d e r of the crew forced below.
The conflict al a r m e d the Ohio a n d w h e n a British boat
was

sighted,

it w a s m e t w i t h a v o l l e y of musketry.

Never

the l e s s the B r i t i s h ga i n e d the deck and overpowered the
crew.

The cables were cut but an a t tempt to board the

P o r cupine f a i l e d w h e n the Somers a n d Ohio were carried by
the current into the rapids.

N e i t h e r the Porcupine nor

the ba tteries of Fort Erie f i r e d a shot at the captured
v e s s e l s as they s i l ently d r ifted d o w n the river.

x Cruikshank,

The Siege of F o r t E r i e , pp.

19-22.
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The prizes mounted three heavy guns, manned by thirtyfive men.

The commander of the Porcuoine, alarmed by the

loss of his two companion ships, made all haste for PutIn-Bay.

F.C. Cooper, in his work, The History of the

American Navy, wrote:
. . . . the manner in which they (the British) brought
up the men 'ana boats from Lake Ontario for this pur
pose, and the neatness with which the enterprise was
executed, reflected great credit on all concerned.Drummond, exceedingly pleased by the results of this
coup, wasted no time in renewing his offensive, commencing
a spirited bombardment the next morning.

It became evident

that the batteries were ineffectual against the earthworks
so the fire was directed against the stone barracks.

The

bombardment continued intermitently until, shortly before
sunset on the l^th, a magazine exploded beneath the north
east bastion.

The gunners and adjacent covering forces

rose in a cheer thinking the fort greatly damaged.

Ob

serving earlier in the day that the stone buildings within
the fort seemed injured and that the outline of the para
pet and embrasures markedly altered by the fire of his
guns:

Drummond determined to take advantage of the favor

able temperment of his troops by staging a general assault
against the fort that night.
The available forces numbered not more than 3.000 be
longing to ten different regiments.

Of these units, only

^As cited by Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 20.
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the 103ra and the Regiment de Watteville were up to strength,
the others having been reduced to fragments by the recent
operations.

The 103rd, formerly known as the New South

Wales Fencibles (nicknamed the ’Rum Corps' by the Austra
lians), had been absorbed into the regular British army in
1810.

Many of its numbers being convicts, this formation

was famed for its insubordination and numerous desertions.

1

Besides this unreliable unit, the other key force in the
assault was the Regiment de Watteville.

This corps, ori

ginally part of the Dutch army, served with credit at
2
Maida.
Seeing service at Malta, in Egypt, Sicily, and
Spain, its ranks, once fine Swiss mercenaries, were now
filled by deserters and prisoners from the French Imperial
Army.

This polyglot unit, which also included Poles, Bel

gians, and Spaniards among others, had fought well at Os
wego but in the meantime became greatly disaffected and
plagued by desertions.

It was upon their numerical

strength, not their battleworthiness, that Drummond placed
3

his reliance.
Drummond's plan of operations called for a simultan
eous attack by three columns upon every accessible part
of the fortifications.

The first and strongest of these

1Ibid.

p

The Battle of Maida was a victory by a British army,
in support of Calabrian guerrillas, in 1806, over the French.
•^J.D. Martin, "The Regiment de Watteville," Ontario
History 52 (1950): 43.
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c olumns, c o m m a n d e d b y L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l
the n e w l y a r r i v e d R e g i m e n t
the r emnant
the

from the

de W a t t e v i l l e ,

consisted

1st Battalion/8th Regiment

light companies

teers
and

of the

Victor Fischer

of

Regiment

a dozen gunners

of

the

89t h a n d 1 0 0 t h ,

de W a t t e v i l l e

of

of

of Foot,

as m a n y v o l u n 

as c o u l d b e

enlisted,

the Ro y a l A r tillery.

Fischer's column of assault was instructed to leave
the British lines at four o'clock and march along the
Garrison Road for some four miles before turning toward
the lake shore.

Their movements, until the lake was

reached, would be covered by thick forest.

Upon gaining

the lake, the force was ordered to halt until eleven o'clock.
No fires were to be lighted and no loud talking permitted.
Every precaution was taken to prevent desertions:

the

rolls were counted each hour and no officer was allowed
to leave his unit.

To further ensure silence, the flints

were removed from all muskets save those of specially se
lected veterans.

Drummond hoped to repeat the coup of

Fort Niagara by seizing the key to the American position,
the Snake Hill Battery, by a surprise assault.
It was reported by the pickets that a small space was
left in the American defenses between the battery and the
lake.

Drummond's plan called for a small body of troops

to penetrate into the American rear thereby creating a
diversion allowing the main assaulting force to carry the
battery by storm.

It was hoped that the removal of their
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flints would "effectually conceal the situation and num
ber of our troops and those of the enemy being exposed by
his white trousers, which are very conspicuous marks to
our view, it will enable them to use the bayonet with the
effect which that valuable weapon has ever been found to
possess in the hands of British soldiers."

If the storm

ing party failed to penetrate the American camp at this
point, it was provided with hay-bags and short ladders to
scale the works elsewhere.
The attack was scheduled to commence at 2:00 A.M.
Since nearly the whole of the de Watteville Regiment vol
unteered, Fischer’s column exceeded a thousand troops.
Drummond had purposely avoided any demonstrations on this
flank in the belief that the Americans might neglect the
Snake Hill Battery for the more threatened right.

The

success of Fischer's attack would determine the outcome
2
of the day.
The center column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
William Drummond consisted of a small detachment of Royal
Artillery under Lieutenant John Charleton, the flank com
panies of the 41st and 104th Regiments, fifty marines, and
ninety seamen, about 360 officers and men in all its orders
were to enter the fort itself by escalade when the attacks

Drummond to Prevost, 15 August 1814, Archives, C .
685, p. 94.
^Harvey to Fischer, 14 August 1814, Archives, C. 68 5,
p. 90.
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elsewhere was well developed.

It was guided hy Captain

Richard Barnes of the 89th Regiment, and Lieutenant-Colo
nel Drummond personally selected Sergeant Richard Smith
of his own regiment for the desperate service of leading
the assault, an officer’s commission serving as an induce
ment.

The left column, composed entirely of the remaining

effectives of the 103rd Regiment, about 700 strong, was
i
commanded by the regimental colonel, Hercules Scott.
Scott was an outstanding officer, exceedingly brave
yet irascible.

He openly quarrelled with General Drummond

and made no secret of his lack of confidence in him.

Be

fore leaving his quarters the night before the assault,
Scott criticized Drummond’s plan of attack.
brother, he wrote:
tomorrow.
ver."~

Writing his

"I expect we shall be ordered to storm

I have little hope of success from this maneu-

Despite his contempt for the commanding general

and his plan, Scott could be depended upon in battle to
display his customary coolness and bravery.

At the last

moment he seemed in high spirits, taking his surgeon's
hands in his own and saying:
in the fort in the morning."^

"We shall breakfast together
Captain Leonard Eliot,

Deputy Quartermaster General, was assigned to guide

■1

Drummond to Prevost, 15 August 181^, ibid., p. 932Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 22.
3Ibid.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Scott's column, which was directed to assail the right of
the American position between the fort and the river.
Scott’s force would endeavour to penetrate through the
opening next to the salient angle of the bastion using
their ladders to scale the intrenchments.
The remnants of the 1st Battalion/Royal Scots, the
Glengarry Light Infantry, Incorporated Militia, and the
remainder of the Regiment de Watteville constituted the
reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel Tucker posted along the
high ground.

The squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons

positioned itself behind the battery nearest the fort in
readiness to escort prisoners to the rear.

General Drum

mond also took his position at the battery to watch the
assault.
In the operational order Drummond stated that "crouch
ing, ducking, and laying down when advancing under fire
are bad habits and must be corrected.

. . . Lieutenant

General Drummond most strongly recommends a free use of
the Bayonet."1

His secret order added that, "the enemy

force does not exceed 1,500 fit for duty and those are
?
represented as much dispirited."
If the assaulting col
umns met within the works they were to recognize each
other by the watchword "Prince Regent" answered by the

"''Coles, The War of 1812, p. 160.
^Harvey to Fischer, 15 A.ugust 181^, Archives. C. 68 5,
p. 9k.
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count e rsign " T w e n t y . "

"As proposals of surrender m a y

po ssibly "be made to you," continued the instructions,
"you are to attend to none w h i c h are n o t unconditional,
not su ffering y o u r s e l f for a m oment to he diverted from
the p r osec u t i o n of your attach.

Clemency to prisoners

it is u nnecessary to recommend to you,

hut in r e m oving

them y ou m u s t he careful not to detach too m a n y men."~
As Fischer's column was as strong as the other two
combined,

it is ohvious that Drummond hased his hope of

success u p o n its a b i l i t y to carry the Snake Hill Battery.
Once this,

the hey to the A m e r i c a n position,

fell, Fischer

could roll up the A m erican flanhs and destroy the American
forces w i t h i n the entrenchments.

However Drummond's plan

was not adequately researched and was predicated on the
belief that a secret and sudden assault could carry the
A m e r i c an battery.

It was b a s e d on shetchy reconnaissance

and the b elief in British ma r t i a l superiority.

By d i v i d 

ing his forces into two nearly equal bodies w i t h an i m 
passable forest b e t w e e n them,

Drummond unwisely exposed

either w i n g to the danger of b e i n g overwhelmed by a sudden
Ame r i c an counterattach.

2

B r itish activities did n o t go unnoticed by the A m e r i 
ca n commander,

Brigadier-C-eneral E dmund Pendleton Gaines.

1Ibid.
^Hitsman,

Incredible W a r , p. 201.
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Gaines entered the army of the U n i t e d States in 1797 as
a n ensign and ten years later gained nat i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n
w h e n he a rrested A a r o n B urr n ear Fort Stoddard,

Alabama

a nd later t e s t i f i e d against him at his trial in Richmond,
Virginia.

A N o r t h C a r o l i n a farm-boy,

Gaines rose to the

rank of ma.jcr-general and h eld i m p ortant posts during the
Creek,

Seminole,

and Black Hawk Wars,

c o mmand of the W e s t e r n Department.

finally gai n i n g

O nly his dismissal

a r ising out of charges that he exceeded his au t h o r i t y in
en l i s t ing r e cruits pr e v e n t e d him from pla y i n g a k e y role
i n the M e x i c a n War.
While Fischer's detachments were m a k i n g their unlit
camp u p o n his flank,

Gaines made a r o u n d of the works,

u r g i n g the officers on duty to be p a r t i c u l a r l y vigilant.
The chief engineer,
of West Point,

M a jor Wil l i a m McRae,

f o l l o w e d him,

were u n loaded and recharged,

ninth graduate

givi n g advice.

All the guns

piles of rou n d and case shot

were piled beside t hem for immediate use.

Dark lanterns

and port fires were constantly kept b u r n i n g in all the
batteries.

It is not clear if Gaines knew of the i m 

pe n d i n g Bri t i s h assault.

The i n c reased British t r oop

mo v e m e n t s pr o b a b l y pro m p t e d Gaines to suspect some sort
of B r itish a c t i o n w a s afoot.
The cloudy sky made the n i ght u n u s u a l l y dark.

A h e avy

r a i n b e g a n to fall drenching F i s c h e r ’s column in its bivouac.

Tucker,

Poltroons and P a t r i o t s , 2:

616-617.
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The remainder of the British forces fared scarcely better
as they were afforded scant shelter.

The left and center

columns splashed toward their jumping-off points along a
ravine, within 300 yards of the fort.
Fischer's column advanced to the assault led by a
company of the 8th Regiment's light infantry commanded by
Lieutenant James Young and guided by Sergeant Thomas Powell
of the 19th Light Dragoons.

This body was followed in

succession by the light companies of the de Watteville's
and the 100th, a second subdivision of the 8th light com
pany, the grenadiers of de Watteville's , the 89th light
company, volunteers from the battalion companies of de
Watteville's , and the remainder of the 8th Regiment.1
About 300 yards in front of Snake Hill, a strong
outpost of pickets, commanded by Lieutenant William Bel2
knap, was posted in an oak grove.
The British blundered
into the surprised Americans who were routed from their
positions after delivering a volley.

A spirited chase

ensued in which Belknap was bayonetted and captured.
advance was abruptly stoped by abattis.

The

Sergeant Powell

quickly decided to flank the abattis and waded into the
lake.

These trailblazers were soon followed by about half

1Fischer to Harvey, 15 August 181^, Archives, C . 68 5 ,
p. 86.
2
Belknap, after service in the Mexican War, gained
a general's commission.
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of the de Wattev i l l e light company.

The remainder of the

c o m p a n y w a n d e r e d into deeper w a t e r where m a n y were drowned
and the rest,

w i t h difficulty,

re g a i n e d the shore.

The

grenadiers of the R e g iment de Watteville stormed the
abattis, m a n y of t h e m succee d i n g in p e n e t r a t i n g that o b 
stacle.

W h e n it l o o k e d as if the B r i t i s h mi g h t succeed,

a terrific v o l l e y of g r a p e shot and m u s k e t r y struck the
grenad i ers in front and flank.

Those who survived this

m a e l s t r o m ra n to the rear i n frantic haste.
companies of the

The light

89t h were swept along by the tide.

The

fire from the r e d o u b t fell u p o n the c o nfused mass of B r i 
tish troops like r a i n as the A m e r i c a n p o s i t i o n seemed
w r a p p e d i n a c o n s t a n t sheet of flame.

The 8th Regiment

v a i n l y attempted to halt the r o u t of the Regiment de Watte
ville.

The u n a i m e d A m e r i c a n fire p o u r e d into the British

m a s s e s w i t h deadly effect and,

no doubt, more m e n fell as

casualties than if t h e y h a d b o l d l y a d vanced to the attack.
M a n y d i saffected m e n of the Regiment de Watteville seized
the o p p o r t u n i t y and m e l t e d a w a y into the forests until
th e y could m e e k l y s u r render to the Americans come next
morning.

This unit lost t h i r t y - f o u r dead,

twenty-seven
1

wounded,

and no less than eighty-three m i s s i n g . “

While the R e g i m e n t de Wattev i l l e was shamefully put
to flight,

Young,

“Martin,

w i t h a force n o t exceeding fifty men,

The Regiment de W a t t e v i l l e , p.

28.
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was attacked by three companies of the 21st United States
Infantry.

The little British force held their own in a

bloody hand-to-hand fight before being overwhelmed by the
intervention of the American reserve.

Those not killed

or wounded made their escape by the route they had come.
The valiant Young, although wounded, made his escape ac
companied by most of the officers.

Upon gaining the Bri

tish position, Young found only scattered elements of
various units.

This tiny body returned the American fire

and tenaciously assaulted the abattis and raised ladders
against the scarp of the redoubt, only to find them ten
feet too short to reach the crest of the parapet.

With

no hope of success, Young’s little force covered the Bri
tish retreat.

The bulk of Young's men were from the light

company of the 8th Regiment which lost two-thirds of
1
members in this action.

its

General Ripley directed the Americans at the Snake
Hill Battery with considerable skill.

Once the British

assault was broken, Ripley realized that this assault was
just a part of a general attack.

While Young heroically

tried to storm the redoubt, Ripley detached four companies
to the support of the right wing.

The American loss was

trifling, not exceeding a dozen men.

Including wounded

and deserters, Ripley reported the capture of 1^7 prison-

Drummond to Prevost, 16 August 181^, Archives, C .
68 5, pp. 101-103.
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ers.1
The other two assaulting columns lay quietly in the
ravine until the silence of the night was "broken "by the
"boom of cannon and crash of musketry from Snake Hill.
The British columns immediately moved to the attack.

Their

approach was soon detected by an outlying picket posted
near the river.

They discharged their muskets and ran

for the protection of the fort.

Scott's units moved along

the beach while Colonel Drummond ascended the bank direct
ing his march straight toward the north-east bastion.
Both moved in close column of half companies.

The steady

din of battle and roar of cannon on the other flank, the
blaze of the guns reflected by the heavy bank of clouds,
indicated that a stubborn action was raging there.

The

American garrison in the fort was on full alert yet with
held their fire.

The approach of the British, in their

steady, measured tread, could be heard along with the
suppressed voices of the officers exclaiming, "Close up!
Steady, men, steady!" Then the storm burst forth at
ranges of tens of yards.

The guns of the batteries,

literally crammed to the muzzle with case-shot and grape,
and the muskets of the long line of infantry loaded with
"ball and buck," opened upon the British at short range
with fatal effect.

The 103rd Regiment, compressed

■^Babcock, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 47.
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in the narrow defile between the hank and the river, suf
fered heavily.

Their ranks could not long stand this

punishment and they fell into much confusion.

Only the

strenuous efforts of Scott, Major William Smelt, and other
officers rallied the broken units.

With these officers

in the lead, the 103rd persevered and gained the point
where the high bank recedes from the water.

The column

swerved to the right towards the point where a supposed
opening existed between the epaulement and the bastion.
The entire path was subjected to the oblique fire of the
American infantry.
by the 9th Infantry.

This portion of the fort was manned
Soon, the 22nd, 25th, and the greater

part of the 11th, with several units of Porter's militia,
formed a body of infantry 1,000 strong on a frontage of
only 100 yards.

Heroic Colonel Scott, shot through the

head on the glacis, was carried back to the trenches to
die within the hour.

Major Smelt, later a Lieutenant-Gen

eral, was wounded about the same time.

For fifteen minutes

their efforts to struggle through the obstructions were
continued with amazing bravery.

Finding it impossible to

effect an entry here, the stalwart men of the 103rd made
their ways down the ditch and joined Drummond's column.
Three captains, eleven subalterns, and 350 non-commissioned
officers and men were numbered among the killed, wounded,
and missing.
a man injured.

The garrison along this line did not have
It is doubtful whether the 103rd fired a
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single shot in making this desperate assault.'
Although hy far the weakest, Drummond's column came
the closest to succeeding.

Brashly dashing across the

level plain, Drummond's units gained the ditch with little
loss.

The guns of the battery were spitting forth their

fire upon Scott's unfortunate column, the heavy smoke lay
ing thick above the heads of the British assault party.
Raising their ladders against the bastion, the stormers
made their ways through the emrasures inspired by Drummond'
2
shouts of "C-ive the damned Yankees no quarter!"
The sur
prised gunners abandoned their pieces but were momentarily
rallied by their officers and engaged the British infantry
in hand-to-hand combat.

Captain Alexander Williams, United

States Artillery, and Lieutenant Patrick McDonough, died
at their guns.

McDonough died at the hands of Colonel

Drummond after battling the British with only a gun rammer.
Their officers down, the American artillerymen fled from
the bastion, some taking refuge in or behind the stone
barracks from which they maintained a constant musket fire
upon the British at a distance of only a few paces.
A small party of Royal Artillery turned a piece upon
its former owners.

Soon, however, the bastion was receiv

ing a hot fire from the battery on the lakeshore.

The

Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, pp. 23-26.
p

Tucker, Poltroons and Patriots, 2:

617.

-^Babcock, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 43.
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British assumed that the battery was taken and the artil
lery fire directed against them was fired by Scott’s men:
"Cease firing1

You are firing on your own men!"

one British officer from the captured bastion.

shouted
Bor a

moment, the fire ceased until a countermand was heard and
the gunners opened up with renewed vigor.
The end of the north-east barrack was built directly
across the gorge of the bastion, leaving a passage of only
seven feet which was partly obstructed by masses of stone
from its shattered walls.

Through this opening, the attack

ers made their way into the barrack square, routing all
they found there.

A burst of musketry from the other

barracks illustrated that these strong stone buildings
were manned by sizable elements of the American garrison.
The British did succeed in compelling the Americans to
abandon the parallel bastion.

At this stage, Captain

Glew, who headed the last successful charge at Lundy's
Lane, fell wounded.

The command of the flank companies

of the 4lst Regiment devolved upon Captain Richard Bullock
who led them again to the attack upon the barracks.

One

of the doors was forced open but the British were expelled
2
after a stubborn struggle in which Bullock fell.
Fischer's attack *was clearly blunted and reinforce-

^Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 26.
2_. . .
±oid.
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merits streamed to the threatened fort from Ripley’s posi
tion on the lakeshore.

The first unit to arrive, elements

of the United States Artillery under Hindman which, united
with a body of the 19th Infantry, sought to regain the
interior of the fort.

This attempt was easily repulsed

and driven hack into the ravelin.
fered the fate of the first.

A second attempt suf

Detachments from the 11th,

19th, and 22nd Infantry came up and were formed in rear
of Fanning’s battery with orders to regain the bastion by
a flanking movement.

While the British had their attention

glued upon the Americans in the barracks and ravelin, the
Americans burst upon their flank and expelled the British
from their position in the barrack square.

However the

Americans could not budge the British from their position
in the bastion.

1

Three companies of the 23ra Infantry and one of the
19th, detached by Ripley from the left wing, entered the
ravelin and under Major George Brooke, once again assaulted
the British-held bastion.

At this point in the battle,

the British force was very much reduced by the steady fire
2
directed upon it.
Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond had fallen,
mortally wounded, and many of the other officers were dis
abled.

The guns and musketry from the intrenchments on

^Babcock, The Siege of Fort Erie, pp. ^3-24.
2_, . .
±bia.
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the right constantly swept the ditch rendering it imposs
ible for General Drummond to reinforce his nephew's illfated column.

At the last moment, Drummond sent forward

two companies of the Royal Scots from the reserve.

They

were raked by fire and few, if any, gained admission into
the bastion.

One officer and thirty-two privates were

killed and two sergeants and thirty-seven privates wounded
during the few minutes they were exposed to the deadly
fire.1
Having failed in two attempts to force their way into
the barracks, the storming party was preparing for another
assault.

On their side the Americans in the ravelin were

mustering their forces to drive the British out of the
bastion altogether when a gigantic explosion occurred in
the bastion beneath the feet of the British.

The gun-

platform, with its guns and men, masses of earth, and
fragments of stone were thrown into the air.

An extra

magazine beneath the platform had become ignited.
tales and theories purport to explain the mystery.

Many
A.

story became current in the British camp that it had been
exploded with a slow match by an American soldier who had
disguised himself in the red coat of a British deserter
and mingled with the troops until he was able to accomp-

*1

Cruiksnank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 27.
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lish his designs and escape.

1

Romantic American accounts

claim that a fatally wounded American officer crawled to
the center of the "bastion where he knew a cache of ammuni2
tion existed.
In all liklihood, these episodes are fic
titious, in any case no conclusive evidence is available.
The most probable explanation is that the magazine became
ignited from a train of powder accidently dropped incharging and firing the guns against the barracks.

Thus,

the great explosion and the resulting devastation of the
storming column were due to that indispensable and unpre
dictable battlefield commodity - chance.
The American troops were almost entirely protected
from the effects of the blast by the stone barracks but
the British suffered terribly.

Many died, some blown to

pieces, others were crushed beneath the falling masses of
stone and timber.

Those who were uninjured were hurled

into the ditch bewildered by the unexpected explosion.
Few officers survived and the rank-and-file could not be
convinced that the explosion was accidental.

They imagined

that the entire fort was mined and was about to explode
under their feet.

When the American fire resumed, the
3
panic-stricken men abandoned the works.

<♦

■“■Tomes, The Battles of America, 3 ! 178.
2

Lossing, Pictorial Fieldbook, p. 656.

^Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 28.
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Drummond's column had been practically annihilated.
The small body of Royal Artillery lost eight of their
original thirteen.

The detachment of seamen lost twenty-

three out of fifty who began the assault; the Royal Mar
ines, thirty of ninety.

Every officer of the flank com

panies of the 4lst Regiment fell and only thirty-nine men
out of one hundred and twenty escaped unhurt.

Of the

104th flank companies, twenty-four non-commissioned offi
cers were reported killed or missing and twenty-nine
officers and men noted as wounded.

Sergeant Smith, the

gallant leader of the forlorn hope, received no less than
five wounds but no commission.

Only twenty-six men of
1
these companies returned unwounded.
General Drummond dispatched the remaining companies
of the Royal Scots to cover the retreat of the ill-fated
attackers.

Day was breaking and the extent of the dis

aster became apparent:

the ditch of the fort was piled

high with dead and wounded, the plain and river-side was
strewn with bodies.

Those who survived were totally dis2
pirited and exhausted.
Drummond's effective force was
reduced to 1,000 men and a vigorous counter-attack by
Gaines could easily have thrown the besieging British out

"Harvey to Prevost, 15 August 1814, Government Print
ing Bureau, "Q" Series, multivolume.
(Ottawa: Public
Records Office, 1405-1409), 128-1: 182. This source
hereafter will be cited as Archives, "Q" Series.
“Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, pp. 28-29.
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of their works.

The less of the garrison was insignificant

amounting to only two officers and fifteen men killed, six
officers and forty-six men wounded, and one officer and
1
six men missing.
Comparatively uninjured hy the assault,
Gaines failed to take advantage of the opportunity, appar
ently being satisfied with the repulse of the British.
Drummond officially stated that he lost 4 officers
and 53 men killed; 24 officers, 12 seamen, and 273 soldiers
wounded; 9 officers, 7 seamen, and 523 missing.

The Bri

tish loses, totalling 905» were greater than those sus
tained at Lundy's Lane!

In Drummond's Fort Erie dispatch,

he pointed out:
Our loss has been severe in killed and wounded; and
I am sorry to add that almost all those returned
"missing" may be considered as wounded or killed by
the explosion and left in the hands of the enemy.2
In General Gaines' report to Armstrong, he markedly
underestimated the success of his repulse claiming that
the British "got possession of the salient bastion of the
old Fort Erie; which was regained at the point of the
bayonet, with a dreadful slaughter.

The enemy's loss in

killed and prisoners is about 600."

Curiously, Gaines

failed to mention the explosion and the role it played in
regaining the bastion but his deception aside, a later

■^C-aines to Armstrong, 17 August 1814, as cited by
Cruikshank, Documents, p. 177.
2Drummona to Prevost, 16 August 1814, Archives, C .
68 5, p. 101.
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report claimed 221 battlefield deaths sustained by the
attackers and 360 prisoners of which 174 were wounded,
1
many fatally.
In a private letter to Prevost of August 16, Drummond
blamed "this failure on the present disgraceful and unfor
tunate conduct of the troops."

The misconduct of the

Regiment de Watteville was seen, at least by Drummond, as
the single greatest factor in the failure of the attack.For the most part, however, these troops fought bravely.
Much of the blame for the failure must fall to General
Drummond.

Although his conduct at Lundy's Lane was meri

torious and praiseworthy, Drummond had very little command
experience, having never directed siege operations.

His

bombardment of the fieldworks was inadequate, nowhere
achieving an adequate breach; his reconnaissance was
faulty.

The success of the plan depended, in large part,

upon surprise yet the increased rate of artillery fire
and the added movement of troops warned Gaines that a
movement was afoot.

All three assaults were committed

piecemeal and none was mutually supportive.

Had either

Fischer's assault or Drummond’s lodgement been properly
supported, the attacks might well have ousted the Ameri
cans, who were forced to maintain a long defensive line.

1Gaines to Armstrong, 19 August 1814, as cited by
Cruikshank, Documents, pp. 179-181.
2Drummond to Prevost, 16 August 1814, Archives, C .
685, p. 102.
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When Fischer's attack faltered, Ripley was ahle to dispatch
reinforcements to Gaines.

At no time did the British bat

teries play a role in the assault, which might have neu
tralized much of the American resistance.

Instead, they

permitted Douglass' Battery to shell the British-held bas
tion as well as preventing any reinforcement from coming
up.
Prevost's reply, subsequently captured by the Ameri
cans, severely criticized and censured Drummond for having
staged a night assault and removing the flints from the
muskets of the troops engaged.
It is not in reproach of its failure that I observe
to you that night attacks made with heavy troops are
very objectionable, principally because chance and
not skill frequently decide the contest and that at
night difficulties and dangers are ever magnified,
particularly when they present themselves unexpec
tedly, and in the latter case the best disciplined
troops are placed only on a level with raw and un
disciplined troops.1
Fischer's column returned to camp next day in an ex
hausted state.
his position.

Drummond took immediate steps to strengthen
The 82nd Regiment was ordered up from Bur

lington and York while the 6th Regiment was instructed
to hasten its march from Kingston.

Only the terrible,

state of the roads, turned into quagmires by the rains,
deterred Drummond from bringing forth yet another regiment
from that vital post.

Furthermore, with the Americans in

"^Prevost to Drummond, as cited by Cruikshank, The
Siege of Fort Erie, p. 30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

169

command of Lake Ontario, the supply situation was made all
the more precarious.

Unless Yeo regained control of the

lake, Commissary-General William Robinson declared it im
possible to provide for the troops of the Right Division
i
beyond the middle of September..
The troops were, quite naturally, much dispirited by
their severe repulse.
wrote:

Drummond, sharing their dismay,

"The agony of mind I suffer from the present dis

graceful and unfortunate conduct of the troops committed
2
to my superintendence wounds me to the soul."
In his dispatch to Secretary Armstrong, Gaines declared
3
he was prepared "to follow up the blow.
Enlisting Por
ter’s aid, Gaines began a campaign to enlist ^,000 volun
teers from western New York.

Gaines wrote to Porter:

I shall not undertake to persuade my young countrymen
to come out to the tented field. They have heard the
eloquence of our cannon. This, I am sure, is fully
sufficient to excite their military ardor and call
them to the field, where American troops, if true to
themselves, will never fail to reap honorable victory
over foreign slaves and mercenaries.^
Toward this effort, Porter published appeals:
If the fate of the gallant little army, which for six

Robinson to Prevost as cited by Cruikshank, The
Siege of Fort Erie, p. 31 (no date given).
2
Drummond to Prevost, 16 August 181^, Archives, C .
685, p. 103-^Gaines to Armstrong, 17 August 181^, as cited by
Cruikshank, Documents, p. 178.
^Gaines to Porter, no date given, as cited by Babcock,
The Siege of Fort Erie, p. UrS.
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weeks past has been wading through fields of blood
for your security, can not move you to action, I
admonish you to recollect that your own security,
your fruited fields, your stately edifaces, and your
fair possessions depend upon the army. Your women
and children will feel the weight of the tomahawk
. . . . (the British commander) had 400 savages in
sight of our entrenchments. Should the enemy succeed,
there is nothing on this side of Utica that can resist
his force or escape his ravages.1
Governor Tompkins, presupposing the failure of Porter's
efforts, ordered General Hall to advance 3,000 men to the
frontier.

2

The Americans busily repaired the damage caused by
the explosion.

Limbs and shreads of flesh were found

strewn everywhere.

The body of Colonel Drummond was dis

covered, a "noble looking man, his countenance stern,
fixed and commanding in death.

The only offensive ac

tion undertaken by Gaines was a reconnaissance-in-force
sent out "to look at the British lines."
with the loss of fifty men.

It was repulsed

The British batteries had,

in the meantime, reopened a steady bombardment on the fort
and surrounding earthworks.
The condition of the besieged Americans was not as
good as one might suspect following their successes of
August 15.

Deserters continued to come into the British

lines at a rate of six or seven a day.

Only the fear of

“Ibid.
“Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 31*
3Ibid.
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the Indians p r e v e n t e d more from defecting.

These deserters

also r e p o r t e d that the g a r r i s o n n i ghtly f e a r e d a renewal
of the onslaught.
revive,

Meanwhile,

the B r i t i s h morale b e g a n to

p r o m p t i n g D r u m m o n d to write that they "bore the

privations

and ha r d s h i p s of the service w i t h great c h e e r 

fulness .

The British busied themselves in the construction of
a third siege battery.

On the morning of August 2k, Drum

mond was joined by the 82nd Regiment of Foot, about 500
strong.

In addition, the first battalions of the 6th

Regiment were just reported entering York.

Enlivened by

this news, Drummond pushed his outposts closer to the
American works and redoubled the bombardment.

But when

their outposts were moved forward, the British also began
to suffer from desertion.

Thus, the Regiment de Watteville

lost more in this way than during the night assault.~
On the afternoon of August 25, a British outpost was
overran by two companies of the 23rd Infantry, commanded
by Major Brooke.

The overzealous Americans continued their

advance and ran into a strong body of the newly arrived
82nd Regiment.

Although they repulsed the Americans,

these British regulars suffered great losses, primarily
because, used to linear tactics, they did not avail them

^Drummona to Prevost, 2k August 181^, Archives, C.
685, p. 117.
2Ibid.
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selves to cover.

Henceforth, whenever the 82nd or 6th

Regiments were engaged on outpost duty, they were rein
forced with units of the Glengarrys or Incorporated Mili
tia. “
During the night of the 25th, Brooke executed a
single act of heroism when he, armed with only a lantern
covered Toy a coat, crept unobserved through the British
picket-lines.

Using the sounds of the axes as a guide,

Brooke advanced to within a few paces of the British
fatigue parties employed in the construction of the bat
tery.

Climbing a tree, he fixed the lantern to the top

most branches before returning to camp unmolested.

Using

the light as a target, the American artillery alertly
opened a deadly fire which continued until the lantern

7

was discovered and extinguished."

The British bombardment began to take its toll.

Pri

soners reported that a daily loss ranged between ten and
fifteen.

On Sunday, August 28, a British cannonball pene

trated Gaines' commandpost seriously wounding him.

The

command fell to Brigadier General Miller who was immediate
ly replaced by Brown, now recovered from his wounds.

The

total loss, from August 16 to September 1, was reported
as 59 killed and 1^7 wounded.

During the same period,

^Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 32.
^Ibid., p. 33*
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seventy deserters came into the British lines.
can garrison also suffered from disease.

The Ameri

Despite the

arrival of a Battalion of the 11th Infantry, the total
garrison mustered only 119 officers and 2,127 men.1
The situation for the "besiegers began to improve.
The frantic shipbuilding race gave Yeo the upper hand on
Lake Ontario for the time being.

With the blockade lifted,

the British logistical situation markedly improved.

Drum

mond's army was also reinforced by 500 effectives of the
6th Regiment of Foot.

The British general promptly set

about to build a fourth battery. "He (Gaines) has been
unceasingly employed," Drummond wrote to Prevost, "in
strengthening his position by every means in his power.
He has thrown up such an accumulation of mounds of earth,
of batteries and breastworks as will certainly cost us
many men to dislodge him from, and which bid defiance to
our shot."“

The British commander, still wedded to the

notion of taking the fort by storm, ordered up the 90th
and 97th Regiments from York and Kingston.

Not wishing

to hazard another night attack, Drummond decided to stage
a daylight raid hoping to catch the garrison by surprise.

“Brown to Tompkins, no date given, as cited by Cruik
shank, Documents, p. 181.
p
“Drummond to Prevost, 30 August 1814, Archives, C .
685, PP. 118-120.
•^Drummond to Prevost, 2 September 1814, Archives, C .
685. p. 121.
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The fourth battery was completed on September k but Drum
mond delayed its employment until a sufficient supply of
of ammunition arrived.

The brig Charwell and schooners

Vincent and Netley lay at York in readiness to transfer
the 97th as soon as they arrived from Kingston.
The Americans were not idle.

A militia force, esti

mated between 4-,000 and 5,000 men, arrived at Buffalo,
the fruits of Porter and Tompkins' efforts.

The armed

brig Lawrence and the schooners Lady Prevost, Caledonia,
and Porcupine, all former 3ritish vessels captured by
Perry at the Battle of Lake Erie, arrived carrying 320
regulars and a company of Ohio volunteers.
A sharp outpost conflict took place on September 5
when detachments of the American 11th and 21st Regiments
assaulted the British picketlines.

This force was mauled

by the 89th Regiment, which obtained praise from Drummond
who wrote "nothing could exceed the gallantry and good
conduct of all the troops, their impetuousity was with
2
difficulty restrained."
Lieutenant-Colonel Willcocks,
commander of the renegade Canadian Volunteers, was among
the dead.
In retaliation, the 3ritish launched an attack upon
the American works on September 7-

Advancing under cover

■Drummond to Prevost, 9 September l8lh, Archives, C .
685, P. 137.
2Ibid.
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of darkness, the men of the 6th Regiment overran an out
post inflicting twenty casualties while suffering hut two
wounded.

A heavy rainfall put an end to these outpost

skirmishes, the deluge continuing with little interruption
for thirteen days.
On September 9> Drummond believed it necessary to
prepare the C-overnor-General for the "possibility of my
being compelled by sickness or suffering of the troops,
exposed as they will be to the effects of the wet and
unhealthy season which is fast approaching, to withdraw
them from their present position to one which may afford
them the means of cover.

Sickness has, I am sorry to

say, already made its appearance in several of the corps,
particularly the 8 2 n d . O n September 11 he wrote that
his batteries had been almost silent for several days
from the "reduced state of the ammunition. ’’ The "sudden
and most unlooked for return to the head of Lake Ontario
of the two (American) brigs by which the Niagara has been
so long blockaded," he wrote on September lA, "and my
communication with York cut off, has had the effect of
preventing the junction of the 97th Regiment, which
arrived at York on the 10th, and probably would have
been here the following day but for this unlucky circum-

1Ibid.
2Ibid., p. 138.
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stance."x
The hardships endured by the besieging troops was
graphically described by Doctor William Dunlop.It was rather a bivouac than
tering themselves under some
only collected the scattered
them down in a stream on the
and as it rained incessantly
clothes nor bedding could be

a camp, the troops shel
branches of trees that
drops of rain, and sent
heads of the inhabitants,
for two months, neither
kept dry.2

Nevertheless, the British doggedly persevered.

The fourth

battery, located on the edge of the woods about a mile
and a half inland from the shore battery, dominated a
fortified line, covered by abattis, of 600 yards.
Major General Brown feared that the British batteries
"would rake obliquely the whole American encampment."

He

desired "to storm the batteries, destroy the cannon, and
roughly handle the brigade upon duty, before those in reserve could be brought into action.

Clearly, Brown had

an excellent comprehension of the dispositions and strengths
of the British forces and batteries.

On the night of the

10th, large bodies of volunteers and militia were ferried
over from Buffalo; 3»000 disembarking.

General Brown

wanted to launch a sortie in the early hours of September
11th and toward his aim, he assembled a council-of-war on

-j

"Drummond to Prevost, 11 September 1814, Archives,
C. 68 5, p. 141.
“Dunlop, Recollections, pp. 64-67.
-^Brown to Armstrong, 9 September 1814, as cited by
Cruikshank, Documents, p. 186.
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the 9th.

General Ripley, as he did the day after Lundy’s

Lane, strongly opposed this operation and a majority of
the regular officers agreed.

Not to he denied, Brown de

clared his intention to utilise the militia if the regulars
i
refused to see their duties.
A messenger, riding from Kingston to York, was cap
tured by an American raiding party.

From these dispatches,

forwarded to Brown, the American commander ascertained
that Drummond only fielded 3>000 troops.

Brown decided

to attack Drummond before the 90th and 97th Regiments
could come up.

Clearly seeing the moment of decision,

Brown urged Major General George Izard at Sacket's Harbor
to land a force at the mouth of the Niagara thereby sever
ing Drummond's lines of communication and isolating the
British in the bottleneck of the peninsula.

Mustering

2,000 regulars and 3>000 militia, Brown prepared for his
sortie.

2

If anything, Brown underestimated the plight of the
British.

With the coming of the autumnal rains, the health

of the besiegers, which had been surprisingly good, deter
iorated alarmingly.

There was no depot of provisions

nearer than Fort George and the roads were impassable.
The rains were so heavy that two bastions at Fort Niagara
gave way and slid into Lake Ontario, throwing that vital

-]
‘Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 33*
“Ibid., pp. 33-3^*
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post intirely open on the water front.
area had long since been exhausted.

The forage in the

To make matters worse,

Chauncey's control of the lake prevented the transport of
the 9?th by water, forcing that corps to make the tedious
march around the lake and delaying its arrival for another
week .~
Drummond might well have abandoned the siege had he
possessed enough horses to remove the heavy artillery.
Not wishing to sacrifice these valuable weapons, he de
termined to hold his position until reinforcements, sup
plies,' and desperately needed ammunition arrived.

Rumors

that the Americans were planning a sortie periodically
reached him.

On September 14, he wrote Prevost:

I have strong grounds -for thinking the enemy will
risque an attack, an event, which from the necessity
of defending my batteries in the first instance with
the picquets alone, I shall have to meet under every
possible disadvantage, yet I am very much disposed
to hope the most fortunate circumstances that can
happen, as it will bring us into contact with the
enemy at a far cheaper rate than if we were to be
the assailants and may at the same time, I trust,
bring to a happy crisis a campaign which has been
marked by a series of unlucky circumstances as well
as, of late, severe hardships and privations.2
His opinion was seemingly confirmed when a strong
force of 400 men were repulsed by the advance British
pickets.

In order to protect the batteries from a sudden

assault, Drummond divided his force into three brigades:

^Ibid.
"Drummond to Prevost, 14 September 1814, .Archives,
C . 685, p. 169.
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one brigade garrisoned the picket lines while the remain
ing two stayed in camp.

This move did little to help the

sad plight of the besieging force, which continued to
suffer from the continual rains.
Informed by deserters of Drummond's deployment, Brown
revived his projected sortie.

Forseeing a compellingly

forceful assault, Brown hoped to fall upon the forward
brigade "roughly handling" it before the other two could
intervene effectively.

With this object in mind, Brown

ordered the commencement of a steady bombardment designed
to act as a diversion while fatigue parties cleared path
ways by which the infantry could avance to the attack.
These parties managed to penetrate into the bush within
2
150 yards of the forward British trenches.
The American general wished to assault the British
lines on the 17th, knowing the unsteady de Watteville
Regiment manned the lines.

The attack was set for early

afternoon intending to catch the besiegers unprepared.
The entire garrison, paraded and drilled, moving off at
at noon.

General Porter was given command of the left

division, aiming to turn the British right.

Its advance

guard, composed of the 1st and kx h United States Rifles

Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 3k.
“Babcock, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. ^8 .
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and a tody of Indians, spearheaded the movement.

The re

maining units of the division advanced along the rough
roads cut through the brush as an avenue of attack.

The

The right column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel S.D. Wood,
and the left column, under the superintendence of Brigadier
General Daniel Davis, New York Militia, consisted of the
1st and 23rd Regiments as well as assorted militia forma
tions.

Brigadier General Miller was instructed to move

the 9th, 11th, and 19th U.S. Infantry, in small detachments
by a circuitous route, from the center of the American
camp, into the ravine on the north side of the fort.

This

ravine would serve, as it had for the British, as the jump
ing off position.

The 21st, and a detachment of the 17th

Regiment was held in reserve in the bastions while the
25th Infantry, the bombardiers, and corps of artillery
were detached to garrison the fort during the sortie.
The sun was shining brightly when the movements began
but the sky rapidly gave way to clouds, then finally to
violent rain.

2

General Brown accompanied Porter's divi

sion, which succeeded in advancing within yards of the
right of the British works, where they quickly deployed
in the intervening forests.

At 2:31 P.m. Brown gave the

signal for the attack, then made his way to join Miller's

1Ibid., pp. ^9-51.
p
General de Watteville to Drummond, 19 September 181^,
Archives, Q. 128-2, p. 271.
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1

troops in the ravine.

Before he reached his destination

the steady roll of musketry announced the commencement of
the action.

Miller's regulars immediately assailed the

batteries on their front.
Passing around the abattis and trenches, Porter's
units wheeled to the right taking the pickets and support
troops in flank almost before the British soldiers could
stand to arms.

Offering only token resistance, the men

of the Regiment de Watteville were swept away.

The suc

cessful attackers overwhelmed the enemy in neighboring
works, leaving only a log blockhouse, gallantly defended
by a small detachment of the 8th, to be reduced.

Not

allowing his militia time to bask in their glory, Porter
hastily pushed on against the battery and breastworks de
fended by other detachments of the de Watteville Regiment
Emerging from the forests, the Americans seemed an irre
sistible force taking the sad British defenders in flank
and front.

With many of their officers down, the merce

nary regiment melted away leaving their colonel, Fischer,
and twelve other officers, wounded on the field.

One

hundred and sixty-five redcoats were captured including
two majors.

Hardpressed and surrounded, the blockhouse

was compelled to surrender.

In only half an hour, the

Americans succeeded in capturing two British batteries

■^Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 36.
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and all the intervening earthworks.

The expelled British

troops fell hack on the only remaining battery adjacent
to the river.

While the Americans were busily dismantling

the siege batteries, the British reserves were approaching
on roads all but impassable.

Drummond, accompanying these

columns, recognised the strength of the American positions.
The Glengarrys were thrown into the forests to impede the
enemy's thrusts against Battery No. 1.

The British general

detached the Royal Scots and 89th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, to move against the trenches while the
82nd and a wing of the 6th moved upon the enemy-held Battery
No. 2.

The reliable Glengarrys, happening upon the Ameri

can flank, exploited their fortune by launching a counter
attack.

Porter's militiamen, badly shaken by the crash

of musketry, fled.

The momentum of the assault grew,

taking these fine Canadian troops past the entrenchments
and right up to the glacis of the fort.

Just as this feat

was accomplished, Lieutenant-Colonei Pearson fell seriously
wounded.^"
Brown, fearful that his assaulting forces might be
cut off by the determined British countermeasures, ordered
his reserve forward.

This body became hotly engaged in

the open ground losing heavily, before falling back.

The

Americans in possession of the British batteries spiked

“De Watteville to Drummond, 19 September 181^, Archives,
Q. 128-2, p. 272.
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the guns and destroyed their carriages.

The magazines in

the n e w l y constructed b attery were b l o w n up by Lieutenant
D avid Riddle
explosion.

(15th Infantry) who was b a d l y b urned in the

1

C o n fused b y t h e i r success yet unable to advance,
A m e r i c a n m i l i t i a b e g a n to lose cohesion.

the

Their n e w l y w o n

positions were not p r o p e r l y g uarded b y outposts, w h i c h
allo w e d the British r elief columns to approach totally
unobserved.

With disaster looming,

the A m e r i c a n officers,

satisfied w i t h the r e d u c t i o n of the siege batteries,
dered a d i s e n g a g e m e n t .

Before this could be accomplished

the B r i t i s h were u p o n them.
under Major
Proctor,

or

Seven companies of the 82nd,

(later Lieutenant-General)

H e n r y Adolphus

scored a b r i l l i a n t success, r o u t i n g the enemy

from B a t t e r y No. 2.

Confused b y the woods,

sudden appearance of the British,
their lives.

rain,

and

Porter's m i l i t i a r a n for

The b r a v e s t amongst them attempted to cover

the r e t reat but the steady pr e c i p i t a t i o n h a d r e ndered m o s t
of their weapons unserviceable.

F iring a volley,

tish carried the a s sault home w i t h the bayonet,
the Americans out of their conquered positions.

the B r i 

casting
The r e 

m a i n i n g officers r a l l i e d their d i sorganized troops i n the
ravine where the r e s e r v e and fortress a r t illery c o vered

^Cruixshanlc,

The Siege of Fort E r i e , p.

37-

p
De Watteville to Drummond,

19 September, Archives

0,. 128-2, p. 273.
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t h e m .^
The action of September 17 was no outpost skirmish
b u t r a ther a m a j o r clash:

both sides suffered an a c c u m u 

l a t e d loss of more than one t h o u s a n d men.

The fact that

the Americans were able to inflict g r e a t e r damage u p o n
the defending B r i t i s h speaks well of the prepar a t i o n and
ex e cution of Brown's sortie.

2

While u l t i m a t e l y repulsed,

B r o w n was i ndeed correct wh e n he r e p o r t e d that the British
a r m y had b e e n

"roughly handled."

The Americans s u ffered h e a v i l y in the assault,
p e c i a l l y in officers of rank:
and L i e utenant-Colonel E.D.

es

B r i g a d i e r General Davis,

Wo o d were left dead on the

field; Major General Porter and B r i g a d i e r R ipley were among
the wounded;

twelve officers were t a k e n as prisoners.

General Brown's official report ac k n o w l e d g e d the loss of

79 killed, 216 wounded, and 216 m i s s i n g b u t as after
Lundy's Lane,

these figures seem suspect,

r e g a r d to m i l i t i a casualties.
into action wi t h
of w h o m

especially in

M c B u r n e y ' s Regiment went

176 n o n - c o m m i s s i o n e d officers and m e n

76 r e t u r n e d uninjured;

l i s t e d as ki l l e d or wounded,

4

of

12 officers, 8 were

as missing.-'

Aside from the c r i p pling of the siege batteries,

the

1

Babcock,
"Hitsman,

The Siege of Fort E r i e , p.
Incredible W a r ,

^Cruikshank,

The Siege of

pp.

53-

203-204.

Fort Erie,

pp.

38-39-
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American attack inflicted 579 casualties upon the besieg
ing force.

Brown claimed he had captured twelve officers,

twenty-three sergeants, one drummer, and 3^9 rank and
file.

Two-thirds of the loses fell upon the 2nd Brigade

which had occupied the trenches.

Lieutenant-Colonel John

Gordon (Royal Scots), commander of the First 3rigade, was
mortally wounded and Lieutenant-Colonels Fischer and
Pearson were disabled from future service m

1

the campaign.“

The following day, Drummond was joined by the 97th Regiment.
Despite this substantial reinforcement, he had little more
than 2,000 effectives - a force far too small to continue
siege operations.

The protracted wet increased the fatigue

of the troops, many of whom

fell ill. Reporting to Prevost,

Drummond wrote:
Within the last few days, the sickness of the troops
has increased to such an alarming degree, and their
situation has really become one of such extreme
wretchedness from the torrents of rain which contin
ued to fall for the last 13 days, and from the cir
cumstance of the Division being entirely destitute
of camp equipage, thatI feel itmy duty no longer
to persevere in a vain attempt to maintain the
blockade of so vastly superior and increasing a
force of the enemy.2
Curiously, he failed, to mention that Brown’s sortie might
have had a little to do with his decision.
The size of the American onslaught convinced Drummond

~De Watteville to Drummond, 19 September 181^, Archives,
Q. 128-2, p . 2?k.
p

Drummond to Prevost, 2k September 181^, Archives,
C. 685, p. 266.
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that 5,000 men were within the walls and earthworks of
Fort Erie.

The British commander feared that the Ameri

cans might land a force upon Lake Erie in the vacinity of
Point Abino, thus gaining his rear.

Far more unnerving

was the report from Kingston stating the arrival of Izard’
division at Sacket's Harbor.

Drummond, envisioning a

movement such as Brown had already suggested, immediately
saw that his position before Fort Erie was entirely under
mined.

Drummond had wished to retreat before Brown’s

sortie but now his weakened and exposed position left him
1

no option but to lift the siege."

Accordingly, he ordered

a retirement beyond Frenchman's Creek where he would be
free from any turning movement from Lake Erie.

By great

effort, the siege guns were removed on the 18th and 19th
2
without molestation.
On the night of the 21st, shortly after tattoo was
sounded, the British division retreated, predictably in
a driving rain, leaving their huts intact and watchfires
burning.

This movement was not detected by the Americans

.until daybreak when their pickets pushed forward to the
edge of the plain.

A small British rear-guard fired a

few volleys, forcing the Americans to fall back upon their
entrenchments.-^

This body was allowed to retreat without

1Ibid., p. 267.
Harvey to Prevost, 21 September 1814, ibid., p. 26l.
^Babcock, The Siege of Fort Erie, pp. 56-57*
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incident, burning the bridges as they did.

A cavalry

picket was left to watch the fords over Frenchman’s Creek
while another, supported by a detachment of the Glengarry
Light Infantry, guarded the Point Abino Road.
The action of September 17 prompted the British
historian, Sir William Napier, to write that Brown's
sortie was "the only instance in history where a besieg
ing army was entirely broken up and routed by a single
sortie."-

This indictment appears greatly exaggerated.

While the American assault did succeed in giving Drummond
a fright, the action alone certainly did not compel the
British to quit the siege.

The tough British regulars

responded quickly and effectively against the threat and
succeeded in gaining the initiative, and the battlefield,
from their assailants.

While injured, the military capa

city of Drummond's division was not destroyed and the
British retreat was not anything resembling a rout.

In

clement weather, not Brown’s sortie, was the principal
agent in the erosion of the British position.

Clearly,

the rude huts could not provide shelter for winter opera
tions.

Drummond was aware that Brown would soon be joined

with Izard's force, creating a field army far larger than
anything the British could manage to muster.

In Drummond'

^Harvey to Prevost, 21 September 181A-, Archives, C.
685, p. 2ol.
2Ernest Dupuy, The Compact History of the United
States Army (New York! Hawthorn, I956), p. 68.
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opinion, his division might better be provided for at
Niagara where the lines of communications were reduced
and greater security provided by the three forts.

Unde

niably, Brown’s sortie was a success militarily yet the
fact remains that Drummond would have soon broken off
the siege for a variety of reasons, military and other
wise .
Drummond sent the 8th and de Watteville Regiments to
the mouth of the Niagara where the situation was desperate.
The works at Fort Niagara continued to deteriorate in the
continued rains and the engineers reported their inability
to repair them readily.

The 6th, with the field artillery,

lay at Chippewa with the 1st Battalion/Royal Scots sta
tioned at Black Creek.

The 82nd camped upon the victorious

field at Lundy's Lane while the 89th and flank companies
of the lO^th camped in the redoubts atop Queenstown Heights.
Major General Abraham de Watteville, recently arrived from
Kingston, assumed command of the troops south of the Chip
pewa while Drummond made his headquarters at the Forsyth's
homestead above the falls.

Major General Richard Stovin,

also fresh from Kingston, took command of the troops at
Queenstown and in the forts.

These dispositions enabled

Drummond to speedily concentrate upon either flank or
retreat toward Burlington Heights if threatened by a pincer movement.

The troops were comfortably housed in pri

vate homes and barns while materials were gathered for
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the construction of barracks.
No hostile actions were undertaken by either side
until September 29 when a British cavalry patrol was
i
overwhelmed by an American force from Fort Erie.
Brown
did not possess a clear picture of the British deployments
and strengths.

The British enjoyed knowledge of the

American situation including news of the arrival of
General George Izard's division at Batavia.

Drummond

ordered the Incorporated Militia to aid in the harvests
2
of all grain south of the Chippewa.
In the meantime,
the Royal Scots and the 97th Regiment retired, leaving
only the light companies of the 6th, 82nd, 97th, and
Glengarry Regiments, as well as a squadron of the 19th
Dragoons, to guard the line of the Chippewa River.

The

Royal Navy manned a schooner at Chippewa to safeguard
the river approaches.-^
General Izard's division, nearly 4,000 strong, sailed
from Sacket’s Harbor on September 21.

Rather than assail

ing the exposed forts at the mouth of the Niagara, Izard
contented himself with a landing near present-day Roches
ter.

On September 24, Izard began his march to Buffalo.

Progress was slowed by rains

and the

stateof the roads.

Drummond to Prevost, 2
685, p. 1.

October

“Drummond to Prevost, 6

October

1314,ibid., p. 7*

-^Drummond to Prevost, 2

October

1814,ibid. , pp. 1-2.

1814,Archives, C .
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Arriving on the 26th, Izard decided tc exploit Brown's
success and advance up the American shore toward Fort
Niagara.

In the meantime, Brown began a series of move

ments designed to force the British to abandon their for
tifications at Chippewa.

Izard declared his intentions

of retaking the "shamelessly lest fortress of Niagara"
yet remained inactive until October 1, advancing only as
far as Lewistown by October 5-

G-enerals Brown and Porter

met Izard at Lewistown and asked that the siege of Port
Niagara be abandoned in favor of an advance along the
Canadian shore, for Brown's reconnoitering parties had
reported that the strengthening of the forts cost the
British much of their field army.

The cautious Izard

agreed with his subordinates reading of the situation.
To facilitate a union between the two American divisions,
Izard fell back to Fort Schlosser from which he could
1

cross the river above Chippewa.“
On October 8, Izard accomplished this retrograde
movement only to discover that an insufficient number of
boats had been collected for his passage into Canada.
Unable to cross with more than a quarter of his force at
one time, Izard halted the operation.

Transferring his

heavy baggage to the boats, the American division marched
once again toward Buffalo.

Not until October 11, fully

■^Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, pp. 41-^3.
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three weeks since a r r iving on the frontier,

aid Izard cros

into Canada w i t h his foot-sore battalions.

All this inarch

ing and counter-marching ended only in exhausting his
troops.

1

The success of Brown's sortie encouraged m i l i t i a e n 
listment.

In addition,

the 17th Infantry,

200 riflemen,

and 300 dragoons a r rived at Fort Erie from the west.

2

D r u m m o nd be l i e v e d Brown's force, w i t h these reinforcements
n u m b e r e d 6,000.

Izard's division r e p o r t e d l y bo a s t e d six

r e g u l a r regiments.

Spies and deserters kept the British

command aware of A m e r i c a n strength and deployment t h r o u g h 
out this crisis.
cans would,

The B r i t i s h commander assumed the A m e r i 

once t h e y f i x e d the B r i t i s h positions,

a fla n king movement,

launch

u t i l i z i n g their naval s uperiority on

Lake E rie.^
Kence,

on October 10 Drummond h a d the bridge over

B lack Creek destroyed and w i t h d r e w all but fifty m e n of
the Glengarry Regiment.

The 6th R e g i m e n t r e tired to the

b r i d g e h e a d at Ch i p p e w a while defensive positions were c o n 
s tr u c t ed at the junction of the C h i p p e w a River and Lyon's
Creek.

The fortif i c a t i o n s at Lyon's Creek prevented any

A m e r i c a n f l a nking m a n e u v e r as well p r o v i d i n g i n f i l a d i n g

^Drummond to Prevost,
6 8 6 , p. 10.

10 October 1814,

Archives,

C.

2 Ibid.
^Ibid.
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fire across the approaches to the vital Chippewa bridge.
The British right was patrolled by dragoons and mili
tia along the course of Lyon’s Creek and the Chippewa.
The Royal Scots, 82nd, and 97th Regiments were posted
along Portage Road, easily concentrated at Chippewa with
in two hours.

The Marquis of Tweeddale, recovered from

his wounds sustained at Chippewa, commanded a brigade at
Queenstown consisting of the 89th and 100th Regiments,
the flank companies of the 104th, a troop of dragoons,
and two field-pieces.

A large cache was established at

the mouth of Twelve Mile Creek where the heavy baggage
1

was maintained.

The local inhabitants were hostile to

the invaders and could be trusted to present every obstacle
possible.

When it became clear that Izard had crossed the

Niagara, Drummond called a leved en masse.

Arrangements

were made for the speedy concentration of all these de
tachments at Chippewa upon the firing of a single shot
2
at Lundy's Lane to be repeated at Queenstown.
On the morning of October 13, Major General Izard,
who assumed command by virtue of his seniority, began his
advance.

His force, the largest American army assembled

on the frontier, was organized into two divisions command
ed by Brown and Brigadier General Daniel Bissell.

The

advance-guard collided with the outposts of the Glengarrys

1Ibid.
Harvey to Drummond, 11 October 181^, ibid., p. 1^.
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at Black Creek.

After an exchange of fire, the British

retreated, leaving their stores in flames.
and hegan constructing a bridge.

Izard halted

Next day the advance

continued to Street's Creek, where progress was slowed
owing to the necessity of rebuilding the bridges over the
many streams along the road in order that the artillery
maintain the pace.

The C-lengarrys established a picket1
line south of the Chippewa.
Meticulous Izard wasted the afternoon constructing
a bridge over Street’s Creek, everywhere fordable.

This

accomplished, he deployed his entire force in an extended
line stretching a mile and a half from the Niagara River
to the woods near the mouth of Lyon's Creek.

The British

outposts hastily withdrew behind their fortifications.
Activity in the British rear led Izard to assume that
Drummond was preparing for a retreat.
ried six guns into action.

The Americans hur

As the British works were not

completed, the American artillery fire had a clear effect
several British pieces were disabled with only a token
2
fire being returned.
Next morning Lyon’s Creek was reconnoitred for a
crossing place while strong columns of infantry assembled
within view of the British.

The bombardment, so success-

Drummond to Prevost, 15 October 181^-, ibid. , p. 31.
2Ibid., pp. 31-32.
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ful the day before,

was curiously suspended.

Izard received some disconcerting nev/s.

T oward noon,

The British fleet,

with the launching of the St. L a w r e n c e , r e gained control
of Lake Ontario."

This i nformation so disturbed Izard

that he i mmediately ordered a retreat.

The shift i n the

n aval balance was of p o t e n tially great significance but
Yeo's 112-gun ship could do precious little to aid D r u m 
m o n d immediately.

Nevertheless,

I z a r d retired,

thereby

allowing a brilliant opportunity to crush Drummond's o u t 
num b e r e d army pass.
In an attempt to hide his weaknesses,
sued,

D r u mmond p u r 

finding huge stores of provisions abandoned or in

flames.

Shortly afterward,

two un s u s p e c t i n g p r o v ision

boats b lundered into the B r itish position, w i t h one of
them,

containing a d a y ’s supply of f o o d for a full brigade,

fall i n g into the red-coats'

hands.

Izard speedily r e t i r e d

b e hind Black Creek le a v i n g all his handiwork,
.

.

.

intact.

the bridges,

2

The Americans decided to l aunch one last half-h e a r t e d
attempt to out-flank the Br i t i s h p o s i t i o n at Chippewa.
On October 18, a force of 1,000, m a d e up of detachments
of the 5th, l^th,

15th,

and 16th Regiments,

Cook's Mills on L yon's Creek.

"Drummond to Prevost,

set out for

The force was un d e r the

18 October 181^,

ibid.,

pp.

3^-35*

2 Ibid.
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command, of Bissell.

The terrible condition of the roads

did not allow Bissell to haul his artillery along.

The

Americans surprised a militia unit at the mill and succeed
ed in forcing a crossing of the creek.

This action turned

the British right and suggested that Izard was planning
a renewed thrust toward Burlington.

A demi-brigade under

Tweeddale reinforced Lieutenant-Colonel Myers at Misener's
farm, seven miles from the redoubt at the confluence of
the Chippewa and Lyon's Creek.

Myers was instructed to

discover what the American intentions were and their
strengths.
Bissell's unsupported advance left him isolated.
Drummond hoped to meet and destroy Bissell's brigade be
fore it could be reinforced or retreat.

On October 15,

500 men of the 90th Regiment landed at Fort George.

This

force, with a detachment of Yeo's marines, was ordered
2
forward under Major General Richard Stovm.
During the night of October 18, the Glengarrys came
into contact with Bissell's outposts.
took place.
daybreak.

Some sporadic fire

Myers, with a force of 750 men, advanced at
The American outposts were soon encountered.

A large body of American troops were sighted in a ravine.

'l Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. kj.

Drummond,
in his dispatch of October 18 stated, "the enemy cannot
possibly bring guns." He was correct.
“Drummond to Prevost, 20 October l8ih, Archives, C .
686, pp. 77-78.
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Myers’ advance-guard, the omnipresent Glengarry Light
Infantry, succeeded in flanking the American position
while the remainder of the British force attacked them
in front.

A sharp skirmish flared up with the Americans

falling hack upon their main hody posted in a wood some
distance in the rear.
Colonel George Pinckney of the 5th United States
Infantry, posted across the creek, forded the stream with
the intention of assailing the British rear and taking
their guns.

Myers quickly perceived this movement and

retired hoping to draw the main American force into the
open and engage them despite his inferior numbers.

Rising

to the occasion, the Americans posted themselves along
the skirt of the -woods and opened a heavy musketry fire.
Myers replied with his field-pieces and rocket section.
The American formations, tightly compressed as they were,
suffered considerable losses.

The British commander was

not about to attack the Americans while his adversaries
showed no inclination of leaving their wooded shelter.
After a half hour fire-fight, Myers broke off the action,
having sustained one man killed and thirty-five wounded.
General Bissell reported twelve killed, fifty-four wounded,
and one missing. 1
■

•

3issell assumed that the British would not hazard an

“Myers to Drummond, 19 October 1814, ibid., pp. 70-73*
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action unless anticipating strong reinforcements.

Fear

ing disaster, the American general ordered a retreat des
pite himself receiving a substantial reinforcement of two
regiments of infantry.

1

To his credit, Bissell did not

destroy the mill, contenting himself v/ith the burning of
grain.

Drummond remarked that the American enemy had been

"studiously cautious in abstaining from his burning and
2
plundering system."
On the 21st, a body of American troops fronted Drum
mond's position before Chippewa.

This was a covering force

for Izard's retreat which began at noon that day.

Corre

sponding with Secretary Armstrong, Izard wrote:
1 confess I am greatly embarrassed. At the head of
the most efficient army the United States have pos
sessed during this war, much must be expected from
me; and yet, I can discern no object at this point
worthy of the risk which will attend its attempt.3
Meanwhile, the British general -launches a counterattack.

Ll

The advance was inaugurated by the dispatch of

a cavalry screen which, to Drummond's surprise, found the
Americans camped upon the heights opposite Black Rock.

-j
"Cruikshank, The Siege of Fort Erie, p. 45.
2

Drummond to Prevost, 20 October 1814, Archives, C .
686, p. 78.
■^Izard to Armstrong, 21 October 1814, as cited by
Cruikshank, Documents, p. 202. For his indecision along
the Niagara, Izard was disgraced. Faced by a storm of
public criticism, General Izard resigned his commission
in January 1815.
^Drummond to Prevost, 23 October 1814, Archives, C .
686. p. 85.
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Not wishing to reopen another sad siege of Fort Erie, es
pecially with the coming of the first fronts, Drummond
1
returned to his cantonments.
Izard wasted no time in recrossing the Niagara but
a strong gale forced him to delay this operation.

On

November 1st, the last brigade of the shortlived "Army
of the Niagara" recrossed the river.

Convinced that the

difficulties of maintaining Fort Erie outweighed its stra
tegic and political significance, Izard gave orders for
its reduction.

The artillery was removed and huge mines

laid beneath the bastions.

On the 5th, the final tiny

garrison disembarked leaving the barracks aflame and the
demolition of the bastions and the Snake Hill redoubt
complete.

In the words of the historian Henry Coles,
2
"the invasion ended with both a bang and a whimper."
Drummond was aware of the American plans for evacua

tion and dispatched Captain FitzGibbon of the Glengarry
_
2
regiment to have a look.
Arriving just after the final
explosions, he rode undisturbed throughout the deserted
and dismantled works around which so much gallant blood
had been shed in vain while the enemy silently rowed back
to the American shore never again to sally forth into
British Canada.

•1-Drummond to Prevost, 30 October 181^, Archives, C .
686, p.
2Coles, The War of 1812, p. 1633Drummona to Prevost, 6 November 181A-, Archives, C.
----------686. p. 121.
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V.

The Niagara Campaign Reconsidered

The War of 1812 ended amicably over a Christmas dinne
of roast beef and plum pudding.

The Treaty of Ghent re

presented a return to the status quo; that is, Canada
remained Eritish.

When one considers that Great Britain

was simultaneously waging war against Napoleonic France
and the United States, one is left to wonder how she man
aged to preserve her position in Canada.
only two explanations:

There can be

(1) the ineptitude of the Madison

administration and of the American military, and (2) the
superiority of the British army.
The United States blundered into the War of 1812
primarily because Congress was in the hands of a group of
bellicose young politicians.
was at its nadir.

The Revolutionary leadership

James Madison, himself a man of consi

derable talents and experience, was of this Revolutionary
generation.

As president, Madison endeavored to maintain

accord with the warring nations of Europe.

With his ac

tions buried in secrecy, opponents pictured Madison as a
timorous pacifist dragged into the war by congressional
War Hawks.

In fact, he worked for peace but British di

plomacy, predicated upon a condescending attitude toward
the United States, hampered Madison's moderating efforts.
The United States was ill-prepared for war.

The

national defense had long been allowed to atrophy.

200
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prospect of war against Great Britain crystalized politi
cal factionalism and threatened to reopen the rift of
sectionalism.

Madison, in times of peace, may well have

been a successful chief executive.

However as war approach

ed, he exercised less and less leadership.

Madison's

efforts to form a national administration failed, his
cabinet divided into factions.

At no time did the presi

dent command a controlling voice in Congress.

John Calhoun,

a leading War Hawk from South Carolina, wrote, "It is to
be hoped, that as

it is now seriously determined upon,

the Executive department will move with much more vigor.
Without it, it is impossible to proceed."
Madison's prosecution of the war was marked by any
thing but vigor.

He never seemed to direct policy, rather

drifting from policy to policy depending upon the prevail
ing opinion in his fractious cabinet.

In the summer of

1813, Attorney General Richard Rush wrote John Adams that
the nation "seems to fight for nothing but disaster and
2
defeat; and, I dare to add, disgrace."
Clearly, James Madison was not made of the stuff of
a great war leader.
indecisive.

His leadership was vacillating and

As commander-in-chief, Madison should have

^"George Taylor, ed. , The War of 1812, Past Justifi
cations and Present Interpretations, (Boston: Heath and
Company, 1963)» P* 9^2Ibid., p. 97.
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orchestrated the various invasion attempts and mediated
between conflicting generals and governmental departments.
As "Father of the Constitution," Madison was wedded to
republican doctrines which prevented him from grasping
the emergency powers the situation demanded.

As a result,

the American war effort was retarded by the absense of
sound fiscal and defense policies.

The historian must be

wary of speculation but one can not but wonder what turn
history would have taken had a man of Alexander Hamilton's
talents been at the helm.
It would be an injustice to lay the blame totally
upon Madison's doorstep.

At the onset of the war the

American army was commanded by a collection of superannua
ted generals whose service dated back to the Revolution.
Isolated from Europe, the .American military establishment
was allowed to languish into obsolescence.

For fear of

spawning an aristocratic officer caste, the United States
steadfastly refused to establish a military academy until
1802.

In 1812, there were no scientific soldiers among

the senior commanders and no regular drill manual to co
ordinate battlefield maneuver.

Educated young men gravi

tated to the medical and legal professions, commerce, or
agriculture and rejected the poor-paying military life
of dreary routine and garrison duty.

The American army,

inactive since 1783 except for a few Indian campaigns,
was not the effective tool of diplomacy that the War Hawks
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believed it to be.

Not until 1814 did the United States

begin to produce competent generals.

Therefore, the ina

bility to field proficient generals, along with a marked
slackening of national unity and dedication, explain the
lethargic conduct of the American war effort.
Despite the ineptitude of both politicians and generals,
the Americans, by virtue of the vulnerability of Canada
and their own numerical superiority, should have triumphed
in their task of conquering Canada.

Human material and

economic treasure were present in sufficient numbers to
insure the creation of a powerful military machine.

The

American population, especially the yeoman farmers,
possessed enormous military potential.

The fine legacy

of the Continental Army demonstrated America's ability to
rapidly develop a formidable army.

The feats of the Rev

olutionary and Napoleonic armies were achieved, not by
regular, professional troops, but by raw recruits who
developed their skills on the battlefields of Valmy,
Fleurus, Lodi, Marengo, Montenotte, Rivoli, and countless
others.

In the great armies of France, the levies, after

receiving only the rudaments of equipment and training,
were forged into a revolutionary military machine.

Cer

tainly, the human raw material of the American farmer,
mechanic, and frontiersman was at least the equal of
France's.

As history would indicate, the American soldier,

if intelligently led, is the equal to any on earth.

One
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must look beyond American failures alone to find the solu
tion of the question.
During the Napoleonic Wars the Sritish army earned
the admiration and respect of Europe.

The beginning of

the wars found Great Britain woefully unprepared.

A con

temporary wrote:
Our army was lax in ito discipline, entirely without
system, and very weak in numbers. Each colonel of
a regiment managed it according to his own notions,
or neglected it altogether; professional pride was
rare; professional knowledge even more so. Never
was a kingdom less prepared for a stern and arduous
conflict. -1
In a few short years, the British army displayed a remar
kable turn-about, prompting General Sir George Bell to
assert that "we had the bravest, the best, the finest
disciplined and well seasoned army in the w o r l d . F e w
would disagree.
Despite all the great changes, the British army main
tained its eighteenth century character.

Officers were

the sons of the upper classes, not skilled professionals.
The rank and file was composed of long-serive volunteers,
mostly uneducated.

Even in this, the age of the "nation

at arms," the British army remained small, its field for
mations rarely exceeding h0,000 men.

1
Gunther Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare m the Age
of Naroleon (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
Press, 1978), p. 1732
George Bell, Rough Notes of an old Soldier during
Fifty Years* Service, 2 vols. (London: Day & Son, 1867),
T: 165.
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The British armies were commanded and officered pri
marily by aristocrats.

Ail officers' commissions, from

ensigns' to lieutenant-colonels', were open to purchase.
There were other means of promotion - promotion by brevet,
rank for recruitment, and selection by merit - but the
purchase system accounted for three-quarters of all com
missions.

Money and approval of the regimental colonel

were all that was required.

As Bell observed, this meant

that veteran officers found themselves under the command
of "boys from the nursery who stayed at home and never
smelled powder."1
The Duke of York sought to remove the worst abuses.
In 1766, an official scale was set establishing prices;
a commission could only be sold after twenty years service
or incapacity.

Boys were no longer allowed to hold com

missions without proper preparatory educations (sixteen
was the minimum age).

Commissions could not be purchased

in the Royal Artillery or the Engineers.

These branches

became the preserves of the middle-class officers.

Three

years’ service was required in order to qualify for the
rank of captain; seven for that of major.
of colonel up, promotion went by seniority.

From the rank
2

Experience produced capable, often exceedingly fine,
officers but the British officer remained essentially an

"Bell, Rough Notes, 1:

115.

Rothenberg, Age of Napoleon, p. 1?6.
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amateur for whom military life was hut a continuation of
the rural life of the estate.
er and more dangerous.

War was a game, only rough

When he joined his regiment, the

average officer possessed little military knowledge.
Wellington wrote:
Nobody in the British Army ever reads a regulation
or an order if it were to be a guide for his conduct,
or in any other manner than as an amusing novel; and
the consequence is, when complicated arrangements are
to be carried into execution. . . . every gentleman
proceeds according to his fancy.1
The Duke of Wellington, himself a creature of the
purchase system, strongly defended the system.

The Bri

tish army was unrivaled in battle and Wellington declared
that the excellence of the army was derived from the fact
that it was officered by gentlemen.

As the magnatude of

operations expanded, it became clear that trained staff
officers, not zealour amateurs, were necessary.

In 1799

and 1802, the Duke of York instituted High Wycombe and
Great Marlow, staff colleges on the model of those of
France and Prussia.

Despite these attempts, the British

army suffered from the lack of staff cadre throughout'the
2
Napoleonic period.
The British officer was separated by an unbridgable
social gulf from those he commanded.

The enlisted men,

^Cited by Michael Howard, "Wellington and the 3ritish
Army," Studies in War and Peace (New York: Viking, 1970),
P. 53.
2Elie Halevy, England in 1815 (London:
p. 78.

Benn, 19^9)>
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who never represented a cross-section of the British pop
ulation, were recruited almost exclusively from the lower
classes.

Parliament refused to introduce conscription,

the necessary troops having to he obtained by voluntary
enlistment.

In England and Scotland, the war relieved

much of the unemployment which had previously induced men
to join the army.

In Ireland, conditions were so miserable

that the bounty of eighteen guineas and a fixed pay of
one shilling per day with regular rations proved an effec
tive inducement.
insufficient.

But even the Irish recruitment proved

Hence, the British hired foreign units and

recruited on the continent whenever possible.
these efforts, the army remained understrength.

Despite
By 1809,

the British army had 200,000 men under arms but this figure
is misleading.

Over half that total were stationed at

various posts throughout the empire and when Wellington
faced Bonaparte at Waterloo, only half of his 67,000 troops
were British.
Discipline in the army was harsh but necessary.

The

regiments, composed often of the worst elements of society,
were founded upon the notion that there was more to be
feared from the sergeant than the enemy.
of discipline might have proved fatal.

Any relaxation
Rifleman Harris,

a veteran of the Peninsula, wrote of the retreat to Cor
unna, "if he (General Sir Robert Crauford) flogged two,
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1

he saved hundreds from death."A

Discipline was often

difficult to maintain, particularly after a successful
battle or during a retreat.

After Vittoria, Wellington

'wrote that the British army was unrivaled in battle but
that indiscipline remained a serious problem.

2

The army never resorted to using "press gangs" as
did the navy.

This could not but help produce a most

beneficial effect upon the morale of the British army.
The army never faced a mutiny as did the Royal Navy.
The average soldier was proud to be a member of his regi
ment.

Whether a private or a non-commissioned officer,

the mere fact of serving in the British army gave the
soldier a sense of being an aristocrat among the soldiers
of Europe.

As the French historian Elie Halevy explained,

"the British Army was an army of snobs, but the universal
snobbery produced a maximum g o o d . P e r h a p s the greatest
tribute was paid by a French officer v/ho observed that
the British soldier "has no superior in the world; fortunately, there are but a few of him."
Between Valmy and Waterloo, a period of twenty-three
years, Europe was convulsed by a series of wars and coali

•J

‘Rifleman Harris, Recollections of Rifleman Harris,
as cited by Rothenberg, The Age of Napoleon, p. 1?92Ibid.
^Halevy, England in 1815, p. 83.
^A.s cited in Rothenberg, The Age of Napoleon, p. 180.
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tions.

Hostilities were by no means limited to the Euro

pean continent.

Like the Seven Years' War, the Revolu

tionary and Napoleonic Wars were global conflagrations.
While the United States was never formally allied with
France, the War of 1812 can not be divorced from the
European political and military situation.

From a purely

military standpoint, the tactical systems employed during
the Niagara campaign of 1814 mirrored those of Europe.
The American army under Brown was not unlike the
citizen armies of Revolutionary France as developed by
Lazare Carnot.

In 1793> Carnot became Minister of War

to the revolutionary Committee of Public Safety and pro
ceeded to implement, by iron-handed administration, the
concepts of war which evolved in France after the humilia
tions of the Seven Years' War.

The best known military

philosopher of this period was the Comte de Guibert.

In

his Essai general de tactique of 1772, Guibert formulated
the concept of a popular citizens’ army, imbued with the
aggressive fires of patriotism, overcoming one which re
tained the old ways.
Guibert was a codifier of Frederician tactics but
with an important difference.

The defeats suffered by

France during the Seven Years’ War unleashed a flood of
books and pamphlets calling for reforms in organization,
tactics, and weaponry.

The debate revolved whether the

French army should imitate the Frederickian linear forma-
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tion

(I 1ordre m i n c e ) or utilize tight- p a c k e d columns of

a t tack

(I ’ordre p r o f o n d ) .

In his writings,

cated a synthesis of c olumn and line,

C-uibert a d v o 

the ordre m i x t e .

One of the g r eatest theorist of the eighteenth-century,
G uibert c r i t icized the r e s t r i c t e d t a c tical practices of
the century, b e l i e v i n g that f l u idity and m o b i l i t y were
the f o r m u l a f o r success.

He r e c o g n i z e d that discipline

and t r a ining r e m a i n e d the greatest defects of the French
armies.

To compensate,

he devised m a n e u v e r s w h i c h r e d u c e d

the w h e e l i n g m o v e m e n t s of deployment down to the bare
essentials,
simplicity.

thus achieving the m a x i m u m in flexibility and
The ordre mixte p r o v i d e d for a r a p i d evolution

f r o m c o l u m n to line to column while

still allowing for

the m u c h p r i z e d co l u m n of attack.

Guibert recogn i z e d

the importance of being able to form a n order of battle
ahead of the line of march,

directly f r o m m a r c h i n g columns.

T h r o u g h a r a p i d series of movements,

F r e n c h troops were

e n a b l e d to deploy from column to line closer to the enemy,
t h e r e b y g a i n i n g the tactical advantage.

In battle,

he

e n v i s i oned a c o n flict b e t w e e n l inear formations decided
by i n f a n t r y fire-power.
stances,

However,

u n d e r certain c i r c u m 

like the storming of a v i l l a g e or forest,

Guibert

a

1French m i l i t a r y thinkers (de Saxe, Foland, MesnilD u r a n d ) b e l i e v e d that the n a t ional temper a m e n t was illsuited f o r , l i n e a r tactics.
The ordre p r o f o n d best allowed
for the c r u s h i n g offensive a outrance carried at bayonet
point.
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foresaw the advantages of a mass column of attack using
1

the "bayonet.*
Guihert advocated the employment of skirmishers.
These formations of elite light troops would seek to dis
organize the adversary's resistance and inflict casualties
"before the lines actually came into collision.

Artillery

firej in Guibert's opinion, should not indulge in duels
against their opposite numbers but rather attempt to break
up the enemy's infantry formations.

Frederick's tactical

successes, as at Leuthen and Rossbach, were achieved, not
by overwhelming artillery fire, but by the high degree of
mobility displayed by the Prussian gunners.

Behind these

diversions, the necessary deployments for the advance
could be completed with immunity.

Utilizing his superior

battlefield mobility, an able commander could advance
quickly and effectively against any exposed 'weaknesses
created by the skirmishers and artillery fire in the
enemy's lines.^
The principles and methods of Guibert played a major
role in forging the kind of army capable of achieving
great and glorious ends under the genius of Napoleon.

Robert Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957). PP. 17^-176.
^David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York:
MacMillan, 1966), p. 31-
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Guibert had caught the vision of a new system of
grand tactics. . . . The new mobile warfare which
he sketched was one of the major sources of Napoleon'
inspiration.
Guibert can claim an important part
in the new warfare which the Wars of the French
Revolution ushered in and which Napoleon perfected.1
The embodiment of Guibert's principles was the Ordinance
of 1791 issued by the French war ministry.

This manual

was the most important of the century serving as the
foundation for the victorious armies of the French Repub
lic and Empire.
The American army raised at Buffalo was founded upon
these very principles.

The mark of Guibert, transmitted

by Scott, is unmistakeable.
great offensive capabilities.

The American army possessed
The experiences of the

French levee en masse illustrated that armies could be
raised quickly and needed no more than two months' train
ing to acquire the rudiments of the Guibert system.

Win

field Scott, an able tactician and administrator, welded
his regiments into an excellent field army.

The army that

embarked upon the final invasion of Upper Canada was dis
tinguished from previous American forces by its competent
leadership based upon the foundations of sound tactical
doctrines, something unknown in the American service be
fore Scott’s Camp Buffalo.
An examination of the American tactics employed at
Chippewa and Lundy's Lane would immediately illustrate

^Quimby, Background, p. 106.
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h ow attentive Scott was to the Guibert system.
pewa,

Scott's columns m a r c h e d across Streets'

At C h i p 
Creek and

deployed in perfect order into linear formation.
a c c o m plished under B r itish fire.

All this

The American artillery

q u i c k l y occupied a f o rward position lending direct t a c 
tical support to the infantry.

The simplicity of the

Guibert system allowed Scott to extend his lines in a
successful effort to enfilade the approaching British
lines.

The artillery silenced the Br i t i s h guns which

likewise were brought forward to cover the advance of
their infantry.

W i t h the British pieces out of action,

the American guns o pened a devastating fire upon the a d 
v a n c i n g British w h i c h decimated the redcoats before the
v o l l e y exchanges began.
The British,

a l ready shaken b y the deadly American

gun-fire, were b r o k e n b y the mass v o l l e y s of the grey-clad
A m e r i c a n infantry.

At Chippewa,

the American system

allowed for a r a p i d deployment of a nu m e r i c a l l y larger
force supported by h i g h l y m o b i l e artillery.

Riall a d 

v a n c e d in linear f o r m ation and Scott's infantry,
extended lines,

p r o v e d its match.

that the A m erican army,

also in

Chippewa demonstrated

if r e s o l u t e l y led and provided

w i t h an elementary tactical capacity,

could meet and d e 

feat p r oven B r itish regulars.
The Battle of L u n d y ’s Lane was,
classical engagement of the period.

in many respects,
The Americans,

a

con-
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vinced of their invincibility after Chippewa, fought the
battle according to the precepts of the Ordinance de 1791.
The British, occupying a selected defensive position, de
ployed into their famed "thin red lines" as in the tradi
tion of the Peninsula and Waterloo.

Lundy's Lane would

be a confrontation between the ordre mixte and the British
linear tactics.
Let us now turn our attention to the British system.
The solid bedrock of the British army was its regimental
organization.

Locally recruited and officered, the Bri

tish regiments enjoyed an unparalleled degree of homogen
eity, the cornerstone being their high level of discipline
and esprit de corps.

This system spawned an excellent

cadre of long-service non-commissioned officers.

British

junior officers often refused to perform the tasks of
clerk and jailor and left the administrative duties to
the non-commissioned ranks.

In large part, it fell to

the sergeants to perform these duties as well as to main
tain the rigorous discipline that characterized the British
army.

Whatever the individual motivations of the soldiers

might have been, the British system inculcated a tremen
dous loyalty to the regiment.

For this reason, perhaps

more than any other, British units illustrated, time and
again, extraordinary capacities for cohesion and recuper
ation in battle.
On paper, the regiment consisted of two battalions.
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In practice, only one battalion was active at any one time.
A second battalion, often little more than a recruiting
party, provided the framework for home defense.

Late in

the wars, several regiments fielded two battalions although
not necessarily in the same location.

A battalion consisted

of ten companies, of which one was the light and another
the grenadier company.

The strength of the battalion

varied, usually something less than 600 men.

The exper

iences of the War of Independence in America taught the
British of the necessity of light troops.

These specially

selected men were trained as all-purpose infantry.

Armed

with the Baker rifle, they could fight as individual skir
mishers, in groups, or in line.

Light infantry formations

generally fought in open order in advance or on the flanks
of the line.

A.s at Lundy’s Lane, the light infantry often

fired the opening and last shots of the bavtle.

The gren

adiers, also an elite formation, were usually held in
*1

reserve for the purpose of carrying home the assault."
Nothing reflected the anachronism of the British army
more than its organization, especially in regard to the
artillery and engineering branches.

The Master-General

of Ordnance and the Board of Ordnance superseded the com
mander-in-chief, a nearly defunct office until revived in
1793, in control of the weapons, ammunition, and personnel

"Rothenberg, The Age of Naooleon, pp. 181-182.
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of the artillery.

In effect, the engineers and artillery

composed an army within an army.
was the artillery troop.
usually fielded nine guns.

The hasic organization

Commanded by a captain, it
The Royal Artillery's high

level of competency belied its antiquated organization.
In fact, the British artillery branch demonstrated a marked
inventiveness pioneering the use of shrapnel and rockets,
both of which made their appearances felt in the war in
America.
Fundamentally, British tactics remained based upon
the linear formation and infantry firepower.

The threat

of the column of attack did not induce the British to
abandon the linear tactics, merely to improve them.

The

three-deep line was forsaken in favor of two ranks.

This

allowed for a considerable broadening of the frontage
while more muskets were brought into play.

The nature

of the musket, especially its restricted range, limited
the number of files that could effectively engage the
enemy.
Time and again the British linear tactics proved their
superiority over the French column of attack.

The volume

of firepower generated by a line, invariably supplemented
by artillery, was greater than that generated by the col
umn.

A British line, composed of three battalions on a

frontage of 175 yards, presented 1,800 muskets.

Two French

battalions in column formation, 1,920 men in all, brought
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only l60 muskets to the fore.

The deep column also

proved particularly vulnerable to canister fired by well
served artillery.

1

Wellington refined these tactics in the Peninsula
War.

The Iron Duke's soldiers, who saved themselves from

decimation by artillery by occupying sheltered positions
on a rearward slope, devastated numerically larger French
armies.

Once the French preparatory artillery fire abated,

the British light infantry and artillery provided covering
fire behind which Wellington advanced to meet the French
onslaught.

By concealing his dispositions, Wellington

enjoyed tactical superiority.

Often, French columns prob

ing for the British flank found themselves confronting
the center of the red line.

At Waterloo, behind formid

able barriers and fortified positions, the British invited
the suicidal column assaults.

As Wellington remarked,

"They came on in the same old way and they went back in
the same old way."

The line, when manned by British
2
regulars, was superior to the column.
Drummond's conduct of the Battle of Lundy's Lane was
in the Wellington tradition.

The British consolidated

their lines on the rear-slope of the hill, behind a screen

^Rothenberg, The Age of Napoleon, pp. 183-184-.

p

John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York:
1976), pp. 161-192.

Viking,
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of light infantry.

Drummond brought forward his artillery,

posting it in a commanding position atop the knoll.

While

inferior in number of guns, Drummond's possession of naval
2^-pounders provided the British with a tremendous volume
of fire.

His center manned by regulars and his flanks

guarded by able militia, Drummond beckoned the Americans
to attack.
Scott, the American combination of Ney and Davout,
accepted the challenge.

The American attacks, in ordre

mixte, were thrown back by the British lines.

Lundy's

Lane, like Waterloo, witnessed brilliant feats of valor
by both the attacking columns and defending lines.

Here

too, superior British discipline and tactics were the
authors of the attackers' ruin.

Only Miller’s good for

tune of discovering an unguarded salient robbed Drummond
of winning his miniature Waterloo.

Nevertheless, superior

discipline and the ability to maintain cohesion on the
battlefield won the day for the British but not before
the Americans gained their measure of honor and glory.
The fighting traditions of the United States Army
were upheld by the "Army of the Niagara."

The actions

at Chippewa and Lundy's Lane, in addition to the defense
of Fort Erie, restored the honor of American arms, tar
nished in the two previous years of war.

The campaign

along the Niagara, although dwarfed by the successes of
the British in Spain and at Waterloo, did much to enhance

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the honor of the regiments involved.

It might he said

that the British regiments were in their element in the
engagements of the War of 1812.

The battles in North

America were essentially small-scale, small unit confron
tations in which British military weaknesses were mini
mized and their strengths maximised.

The adoption of

light infantry formations admirably suited the British
regiments for warfare in America.

Semi-autonomous regi

ments, banned together into demi-brigades, were formid
able formations, especially on the defensive.

American

units of roughly equal size, although in themselves fine
formations, could not match the British.
The military history of the War of 1812 has been
downgraded, seen as little more than a side-show of the
conflict in Europe.

This is a curious attitude since

the destiny of much of the North American continent was
held in the balance.

Furthermore, the war is pictured

as a British rearguard action fought against a comically
ineffective American army.

This certainly was not the

case in the Niagara campaign of 1814.

Here, the battles

and sieges were fought with considerable sophistication.
The tendency is to discount the significance of small
scale actions in war.

Book upon book has been written

about the exploits of the Peninsula Army but only on thre
occasions, at Talavera, Albuera, and Toulouse, did losses
exceed ten per-cent.

Wellington's loses were greater
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during the Waterloo campaign but it must be remembered
that barely half his army was British.

At Chippewa,

Riall lost thirty-eight per-cent while three weeks later..
Drummond suffered twenty-seven per-cent losses at Lundy's
Lane.

Despite these hard-fought engagements, the rein

forced British army still managed to lay siege to a nu
merically larger force inside Fort Erie.
Fort Erie is remarkable in itself.

The siege of

In Drummond's night

assault, the attacking British lost an incredible fortytwo per-cent.

No siege in Europe conducted in this period

approached this.

The bloodiest siege of the Peninsula

campaign was Badajoz where Wellington lost only seventeen
per-cent.

The battles along the Niagara, while dwarfed

in comparison to the huge struggles taking place in Europe,
suffered from no lack of ferocity.

The bloody night battle

of Lundy's Lane has few parallels.
Mightier armies have met in conflict, on fields of
greater renown, but a fiercer struggle in proportion
to the numbers engaged, a severer trial of discipline,
a greater test of patriotic bravery - a battle more
closely associated with the beauty of nature - the
world has never known.1
This was the verdict, 100 years after, of Peter A. Porter,
grandson of an American general who took part in this
extraordinary battle fought within sight and sound of the
mighty Niagara.

1

“As cited by Grey, Lund?/'s Lane, p. 23-
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Ep i l o g u e

The Wa r of 1812 c o n t r i b u t e d little to the d e v e l o p 
m e n t of m i l i t a r y science.
Chippewa,

L u ndy's Lane,

The traditions established at

a n d N e w Orleans provided a l e g a c y

from w hich A m e r i c a n s d r a w inspiration.

However,

subse

quent wars pale the War of 1812 into insignificance.
Today,

Canadians an d A m e r i c a n s enjoy the longest u n d e f e n d e d

b o r d e r in the world.

E x c e p t for some sporadic explosions

of n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c h a u v i n i s m and the Fenian incursions,
the peace e s t a b l i s h e d at C-hent has survived.
b e t w e e n two n a t i o n s could h a r d l y be better.

R e l ations
Most people

are on ly too p l e a s e d to f o r g e t and forgive old injust i c e s
a nd injuries.

In m o s t minds,

the W a r of 1812 has b e e n

forgotten.
Each J u l y 25,

u p o n the b a t t l e f i e l d of Lundy's Lane,

the U n i o n Jack once a g a i n faces Old Glory.
held, not b y b l o o d i e d soldiers,
the B r itish Empire

The flags are

b u t b y aged Daughters of

on one h a n d and fat, m i d d l e - a g e d men,

cu r i o u sly g a r b e d i n Civil W a r battledress,
This m e l a n c h o l i c ceremony,

on the other.

amidst the tombstones,

is

v i e w e d by a m o t l e y crowd w h o s e n u mbers annually decrease.
O n the m o d e r n six lane t h o r o u g h f a r e below,

hundreds of

tourists pass ob l i v i o u s of the s ignificance of the day.
Some miles north,

at Q u e e n s t o w n Heights,

the once f o r m i d 

able r edoubts n o w house f l o w e r g a rdens and w ading pools.

221
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To whom, then, are these long forgotten events important only to the anachronistic octogenarians; to the play sol
diers; and to the historian.
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